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2The Project on Middle East Political Science
The Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS) is a collaborative network that aims to increase the impact of political scientists 
specializing in the study of the Middle East in the public sphere and in the academic community . POMEPS, directed by Marc Lynch, is 
based at the Institute for Middle East Studies at the George Washington University and is supported by Carnegie Corporation of New 
York and the Henry Luce Foundation . For more information, see http://www .pomeps .org .
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3The Arab world never seemed more unified than during the incandescent days of the 2011 Arab uprisings . Tunisia’s revolution clearly and powerfully inspired Arabs everywhere to take to the streets . Egypt’s January 25 uprising that led to 
the removal of Hosni Mubarak taught Arab citizens and leaders alike that victory by protestors could succeed . The subsequent 
wave of protests involved remarkable synergies that could not plausibly be explained without reference to transnational 
diffusion . Bahrainis, Yemenis and Jordanians alike attempted to replicate the seizure and long-term encampments in Egypt’s 
Tahrir Square and protestors across the Arab world chanted the same slogans and waved the same signs . 
But what happened in the months and years after those heady days? Did similar processes of diffusion and cross-national 
learning shape the post-uprisings era? Did autocratic regimes learn from one another in the same way that protestors did? In 
June, more than a dozen scholars came together in Hamburg, Germany for a workshop jointly organized by the Project on 
Middle East Political Science and the German Institute for Global Affairs . The workshop closely examined learning, diffusion 
and demonstration across autocratic regimes during the Arab counter-revolution . The papers for that workshop, available here 
as an open access PDF download, closely examine the ways in which Arab autocrats did – and did not – learn from one another . 
Diffusion and demonstration effects continued at the societal level, of course, but often took different forms than in the 
peak days of revolutionary enthusiasm . Tunisia’s Ennahda handed over power in August 2013 soon after Egypt’s Muslim 
Brotherhood had been toppled in a military coup . Syria’s descent into a horrifying civil war offered a cautionary tale to 
would-be challengers across the region, discouraging once hopeful protestors elsewhere . The images and news from Syria 
inspired a remarkable number of individuals to open their pocketbooks or leave their homes to join the struggle, but as time 
went on, the relentless parade of horrific images also served to deter would-be challengers from taking the risk of protest . 
But what about at the level of regimes? Maria Josua observes that authoritarian regimes adopted a number of remarkably 
similar policy responses to mass protest, including the denial of access to public space, dehumanizing discourses and 
mobilization of a xenophobic nationalism . Protestors across countries found themselves labeled – in remarkably similar 
language –foreign-backed provocateurs, alien agitators or drug-addled criminals . 
But such similarities do not, in and of themselves, prove that diffusion or learning have actually taken place . As German 
scholars Thomas Richter and André Bank emphasize, not everything that looks like diffusion is necessarily so . Many policy 
responses may simply be obvious tactics available to any reasonably competent political actor, not innovations that had 
to be learned . Authoritarian regimes hardly needed to be taught to torture or jail their own people, strip citizenship from 
dissidents, monitor social media, clear the streets of protestors or censor the media . 
Even more plausible cases of learning may not have been quite as they appeared . The Turkish military did not need the 
Egyptian example to conceive of the possibility of an effective coup . On the contrary, Turkey has been profoundly shaped 
by a number of successful military coups over several decades – likely more potent influences than an Egyptian coup that 
had been loudly and violently denounced across the Turkish political spectrum for three years . However, while coups may 
not spark imitation rebellions elsewhere, according to Jonathan Powell and Curtis Bell, they do often prompt pre-emptive 
repression by potentially threatened leaders .
In Tunisia, Ennadha’s decision to cede power in the summer of 2013 looked to many observers like an obvious reaction 
to Egypt’s coup, but Monica Marks has carefully documented it had more to do with local Tunisian and internal party 
dynamics . In short, many seemingly similar outcomes are in fact common responses to a similar cause, filtered through 
local particularities, creating dangerous opportunities to over-predict diffusion . 
Introduction
4Introduction
The contributors to POMEPS Studies 21 Transnational Diffusion and Cooperation in the Middle East go considerably 
further than past studies have done to show how significant learning and diffusion did take place among Arab regimes in 
the years following the uprisings . Demonstrating diffusion and learning requires careful attention to timing and sequence . 
It also requires scrutiny of the mechanisms by which ideas are transmitted, whether passively as actors observe events 
in the media, or actively as agents make direct efforts to spread those ideas . While direct evidence of the thinking and 
interactions between secretive autocrats may be hard to gather, these scholars carefully trace the timing and sequencing of 
these processes to show where learning and diffusion mattered . Such careful scrutiny of local conditions and the precise 
mechanisms of diffusion introduces healthy skepticism into the research agenda, but it does not lead to the conclusion 
that no diffusion occurred .  Today’s Arab world is profoundly shaped by forces promoting transnational interactions, from 
pervasive social media and satellite television to weakening states, refugee flows, cross-border military interventions . 
Authoritarian learning may be indirect and partial, as desperate regimes experiment with various strategies which have 
worked for them in the past or which more recently have seemed to be working for their friends . Steven Heydemann, who 
for years has been at the vanguard of studying the processes of authoritarian upgrading and cooperation, describes a distinct 
political ecology within which regimes have learned survival strategies . Reinoud Leenders goes further in his compelling 
account of “counter-revolutionary bricolage,” in which threatened regimes are “pursuing their international linkages to 
cobble together counter-revolutionary policies, strategies and tactics from a variety of repertoires or tested methods of 
governance… regime incumbents reassemble these elements in adjusted forms for local use as they seek effective measures 
to counter challenges to their rule .”  Surveillance of dissidents might be standard practice for these regimes, for instance, but 
they still needed to learn specific methods for infiltrating and exploiting social media .  Leaders scrutinizing the divergent 
early international responses to the repression of protests in Egypt, Bahrain and Libya might learn lessons about how much 
and what kind of violence they could safely deploy .  Such learning is indirect, filtered through local experience, and tailored 
to particular conditions – but clearly manifests transnational influences . 
Sean Yom, by contrast, observes a more active process by which Arab monarchs came together in novel ways to pursue 
collective self-defense . In Yom’s account, the diffusion of policy instruments, along with material support and technical 
assistance, is much more direct and intentional . Kevin Koehler and Ruth Santini trace similarly intentional diffusion through 
a close observation of security cooperation and the sharing of military and policing practices across autocratic regimes . 
Those influences include international alliances, as Leenders and Schlumberger note . The willingness of the United States to 
sell arms and to remain supportive of even the most brutally repressive among its allies, from Bahrain to Egypt, challenges 
popular theories of moderating influence of democratic allies and offers an alternative channel by which such autocratic 
practices might spread among allies . 
The consolidation of a “monarchies club,” the adoption of common practices of surveillance and repression, the spread of 
distinctive new forms of sectarianism, and more have all unfolded at the regional level . Most states in the region have grown 
weaker over the last five years, resorting to ever-fiercer domestic repression out of a profound sense of threat and ever more 
brazen military and political interventions abroad . Transnational forces will only grow stronger, from growing transnational 
sectarian identities and networks to the relentless expansion of borderless social media . Cross-national diffusion and learning 
are likely to be an increasingly prominent feature of Middle Eastern politics . The contributions to POMEPS Studies 21 have 
decisively advanced our understanding of these processes of diffusion and learning in regional politics . Download it today . 
Marc Lynch 
POMEPS Director
5Transnational Diffusion and Cooperation in the Middle East 
and North Africa: A Conceptual Note
Thomas Richter & André Bank, GIGA Hamburg
The Arab uprisings of 2011 and their aftermath were 
significantly shaped by transnational processes . Three 
prominent examples of these processes are the rapid 
diffusion of opposition demonstrations, protest repertories 
and slogans from Tunisia to Egypt and on to other 
countries; the sequential use of similar regime reactions 
in policing, repression, and counter-insurgency; and the 
spread of almost identical sectarian discourses across 
the Middle East, including to countries without Shi‘a 
populations . In addition to these often indirect but 
supposedly interdependent mechanisms, there have also 
been significant direct and coordinated interventions as 
well as concrete moments of cooperation by states, groups 
of states, and transnational movements to either support 
or suppress protests . Even though such a transnational 
perspective encompassing diffusion processes and 
cooperation patterns is not completely new to the study 
of Middle Eastern politics more broadly, it has only rarely 
been employed to understand crucial current political 
dynamics such as those that followed the Arab uprisings .
The papers in this series grew out of an international 
workshop co-sponsored by the International Diffusion and 
Cooperation of Authoritarian Regimes (IDCAR) project 
based at the German Institute of Global and Area studies 
(GIGA) and POMEPS and held in Hamburg, Germany on 
June 8-9, 2016 . Inspired by the current state of research 
in the field of diffusion studies, in this introductory note 
we outline a broad conceptual framework that could help 
to better locate and connect many of the past, ongoing, 
and future transnational processes prevalent across the 
Middle East and beyond . We strongly believe that the 
exploration and analysis of the transnational dimensions 
of the post-Arab uprisings dynamics will contribute to a 
better understanding of similar future events in at least 
three important ways: First, diffusion and cooperation 
might generally enable us to better capture the strong 
interconnectedness of some of the most relevant political 
dynamics that have emerged throughout the Middle East 
since late 2010 than do the traditional understandings 
that entail looking at the national and local causes of daily 
politics . Second, a perspective that looks at processes 
of diffusion and cooperation helps to isolate previously 
overlooked ways of influencing politics beyond and below 
the state from traditional mechanisms for influencing 
regional politics – such as, for instance, coercion and state 
intervention . Third, systematically studying the transnational 
dynamics of such a regionally and globally relevant series 
of events as the Arab uprisings should also yield important, 
fresh insights for more general political science debates 
about transnational dynamics, including diffusion and 
cooperation, their underlying logics, and the forces that have 
led to policy change and the stability and change of (Middle 
Eastern) authoritarian regimes in particular .
Research in comparative politics, especially on 
democratization, has often considered diffusion to be 
a neutral, uncoordinated development that spreads 
throughout the world (Brinks and Coppedge, 2006; 
Starr and Lindborg, 2003), in accordance with Rogers’s 
definition of diffusion as a “process by which an 
innovation is communicated through certain channels 
over time among the members of a social system” (Rogers, 
1995: 10) .  Thus, diffusion often refers to the more or 
less spontaneous spread of ideas through media and 
communication channels . Many diffusion studies based 
on this understanding provide statistical correlations or 
find patterns that leave out the actors involved (sender and 
receiver) . Further, they often do not specify the concrete 
manner or channels, let alone the mechanisms, through 
which the relevant innovations travel, emerge, and abate .
A more recent strand of diffusion research suggests 
distinguishing various kinds of mechanisms by looking at 
the interdependence between two units or actors, whereby 
(policy) choices in one unit reflect (policy) choices in some 
6of the other units (e .g . Elkins and Simmons, 2005; Gilardi, 
2011) . According to this understanding, diffusion can be 
conceptually distinguished from two other trends . First, 
political change or institutional reform could be the result 
of a similar response to similar conditions without looking 
at the behavior of other actors in other states . Second, 
reform or change might be related to cooperation as the 
coordinated effort of one state, a group of states, or an 
international institution (Elkins and Simmons, 2005: 35) .
While state intervention and coercion fall outside the scope 
of this concept due to the massive pressure exercised by 
more powerful actors, which often entails violence, the 
diffusion literature emphasizes that learning, emulation, 
and competition are the three core mechanisms of diffusion 
(Maggetti and Gilardi, 2016) . From a transnational 
perspective, learning relates to the idea that  the adoption 
of one unit’s policies or institutional changes by another is 
based on the recognition of a problem and the willingness 
to solve it by looking at the experiences of others .1 Inspired 
by sociological institutionalism, transnational emulation 
is a kind of adaptation, which goes back to the idea that 
actors or units will implement (policy) change in order to 
conform to their normative environments . Competition at 
a transnational level, finally, can be seen as an adaptation 
made by units in order to attract or retain resources at the 
global or regional level .
Research on the diffusion of social action, protest, and 
anti-regime discourse has been clearly at the forefront of 
studies on the Middle East since 2011 . This research has 
identified important regional specifics compared to earlier 
waves of protest in other parts of the world (Weyland 
2012; Patel et al ., 2014) and has demonstrated the degree 
of interconnectedness based on protest experiences versus 
geographic proximity (Lynch et al ., 2014) .
It is interesting to note that in the recent diffusion 
literature on the Middle East a perspective on 
1   From an analytical perspective that does not primarily focus on 
transnational dynamics, the sources of learning can certainly be 
domestic and, for instance, date back in time (domestic learning, 
historical learning, cf . Bank/Edel 2015) .
transnational learning prevails . The popular uprisings that 
spread across many Arab countries over the course of a 
few days and weeks in early 2011 underline the fact that 
oppositional activists learned from each other, with similar 
protest repertoires, such as the occupation of central 
squares (e .g . in Cairo, Sana‘a, Manama), or the same anti-
regime slogans appearing in different places around the 
same time (Patel et al ., 2014) . In one of the first systematic 
contributions to this emergent research field with a view 
to the Arab uprisings, Steven Heydemann and Reinoud 
Leenders highlight the “adaptive capacity” (Heydemann 
and Leenders, 2014: 76) of incumbent Arab regimes and 
present illuminating evidence on how the Syrian regime 
under President Bashar al-Assad in particular closely 
studied the Libyan case, trying to learn from the perceived 
failures of Colonel Gaddafi’s counter-insurgency strategy 
(Heydemann and Leenders, 2014: 78ff) . Building on these 
insights, André Bank and Mirjam Edel (2015) differentiate 
between spatial (from home vs . abroad) and temporal 
(from present vs . [recent] past) sources of regime learning . 
They also examine whether incumbent elite learning in 
the context of regime crises is primarily about emulating 
successful cases or avoiding the failures of others 
considered similar . While most of the regime learning is 
arguably negative – i .e . avoiding duplicating the mistakes 
of others, such as the Syrian regime learning from “failed” 
Libya – there are also single examples of regime learning 
from successful examples . Jordan’s almost unprecedented 
constitutional reform in 2011 very much followed the 
successful Moroccan script, in terms of both its design 
and the “reform steps” taken (Bank/Edel 2015, 12f .) . An 
opposite perspective that looks instead at regime (re)
actions has so far found no systematic evidence of similar 
wave-like diffusion effects among ousted or surviving 
Middle Eastern authoritarian regimes (Josua, 2016) . 
While the learning processes of both oppositional activists 
and authoritarian regime elites have contributed to a better 
understanding of some of the transnational dynamics 
of post-Arab uprisings politics in the Middle East and 
North Africa, more research is needed to better capture 
the specific conditions under which learning has led to 
success, or not, in achieving a certain policy goal .
7In both International Relations and Comparative Politics 
literature, the concept of cooperation is often ill-defined, 
abstract, and normatively loaded . Frequently, cooperation 
is understood as the opposite of conflict, confrontation, 
and competition, or it is viewed as an early stage of regional 
integration . As a textbook definition claims, “cooperation 
is action for the common benefit . […] [It] is at the core of 
the issues of conviviality, democracy, peaceful coexistence 
between different communities, and the preservation of 
human life” (Colomer, 2011: 447) . Recent events in the 
Middle East have shown, however, that cooperation can 
also take place for less noble purposes . Especially among the 
monarchies, the early events of the Arab uprisings triggered 
a decisive increase in inter-monarchical cooperation (Yom 
2014; Bank, Richter, Sunik 2015), as the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) intervention in Bahrain and the ensuing 
scheme of security cooperation across the Gulf and with 
Jordan and Morocco illustrates .
A more balanced and less normatively loaded definition 
of cooperation is provided by Robert Keohane . According 
to him, cooperation occurs when actors adjust their 
behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others 
through a process of policy coordination (Keohane, 
2005: 51–52) . Based on a classic realist assumption in IR 
theory, cooperation requires an asymmetrical relationship 
– for instance, a hegemon (such as the United States 
at the global level) bears the coordination costs for a 
cooperation-based international regime in a first step  of 
hegemonic cooperation . Once international regimes have 
been established, they develop their own self-interest as 
international institutions in whose maintenance other 
actors have an interest too, even in the event that the initial 
hegemonic power declines . As a result, non-hegemonic 
or post-hegemonic cooperation may emerge . A regional 
perspective on the patterns of cooperation in the aftermath 
of the uprisings highlights not only the ongoing weakness 
of existing regional organizations such as the Arab League 
and the Gulf Cooperation Council but also the continuing 
dynamics of fractionalization . While both the Arab League 
and the Gulf Cooperation Council continue to exist, they 
are either in stasis or have been strategically hijacked 
by the relevant hegemons . The emerging sub-regional 
coalitions appear to be structured along the lines of 
common enemies rather than according to mutual regional 
interests and common benefits . A stage of non-hegemonic 
cooperation has yet to be reached in the Middle East and 
North Africa, as the recurrence of violent external state 
interventionism in Libya, Yemen, and especially Syria since 
2011 has clearly demonstrated . Although much anecdotal 
evidence points to the empirical relevance of new forms of 
cooperation among surviving authoritarian regimes – for 
instance, in the realm of state security and terrorism – the 
literature still lacks a systematic analysis of the drivers and 
pitfalls of these newest developments (for a study on Iran’s 
Syria policy cf . Terrill 2015) .
A central challenge in developing a new perspective on 
transnational diffusion and cooperation in the Middle 
East and North Africa remains whether a change in 
behavior, policy, or institutional setup can be traced to 
concrete empirical evidence – either direct observations 
or interpretations of them . Tracing this causality would 
allow us to consider transnational similarities as more than 
just “similar responses to similar conditions .” The papers 
in this series represent an outstandingly rich collection 
of attempts in this regard, looking at the Middle East 
from the perspective of transnational processes . These 
contributions not only point out relevant and important 
events of positive diffusion and cooperation, but some also 
highlight important negative findings that enable us to 
better understand the limitations of our concepts .
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The Political Ecology of Authoritarian Learning
Steven Heydemann, Janet W. Ketcham Chair, Middle East Studies, Smith College
Since mass protests first broke out in the Middle East in 
late 2010, authoritarian regimes in the Arab world have 
demonstrated significant resilience . Not all have survived . 
Some are engulfed in violent conflict . Yet in a majority of 
cases, the uprisings of 2011 failed to bring about either 
the breakdown of authoritarian regimes or transitions 
to some form of post-authoritarian governance . Among 
scholars of Arab politics – even those who view it as too 
soon to declare that the uprisings have failed – there is a 
widely shared consensus that among their many effects the 
“resurgence of the security state” and the reconsolidation 
of authoritarian governance rank among the most 
important and consequential for the future of the region 
(Lynch 2016; POMEPS 2015) . 
Despite this consensus, the resurgence of authoritarian 
governance in the Arab world has done little to resolve 
debates about the causes of authoritarian resilience . 
What enabled most authoritarian regimes in the region 
to survive sustained, large-scale anti-regime uprisings? 
Explanations for the capacity of regimes to contain, 
suppress, or prevent mass protests have varied widely . 
They have focused on the effects of regime type, the 
redistributive capacity of regimes, civil-military relations, 
the presence of cross-cutting coalitions, levels of sectarian 
diversity, and the extent of institutionalization among 
security sectors . 
In addition, and of particular interest in assessing regime 
resilience, scholars have shown growing interest in 
the effects of authoritarian learning and transnational 
dissemination of authoritarian practices on the survival 
of Arab regimes (Bank and Edel 2015; Patel, Bunce, and 
Wolchik 2014; Heydemann and Leenders 2014) . Extending 
the insights of literatures on the adaptive or recombinant 
qualities of authoritarian regimes (Heydemann and 
Leenders 2013), and building on comparative lessons 
drawn from authoritarian responses to the “color 
revolutions” and regime efforts to counter Western-backed 
democracy promotion, research programs on authoritarian 
learning and dissemination have begun to explore 
the forms, content, and mechanisms through which 
authoritarian regimes in the Arab Middle East upgrade 
their governance practices in the face of new challenges . 
Such processes have been highly visible among Arab 
regimes, where we see longstanding evidence of 
convergence in the tactics and strategies they have adopted 
to sustain themselves (Heydemann 2007) . They have 
been widely characterized as central to the governance 
repertoires that regimes developed to mitigate the effects 
of the 2011 uprisings . Yet even as this literature has grown, 
and even as the causal effects of learning and dissemination 
are becoming increasingly apparent, the processes through 
which they take place, and the causal relationships 
between dissemination, learning, and resilience, remain 
understudied and under-theorized .1 
In particular, important efforts to identify and trace the 
causal pathways through which international factors 
reshape regime practices have outpaced attempts to 
untangle how imported ideas become integrated into 
the standard operating procedures of authoritarian 
institutions . Researchers have worked to identify the 
mechanisms that facilitate dissemination – including 
emulation, appropriation, socialization, and inter-elite 
cooperation among authoritarian epistemic networks 
(Heydemann 2009; Xiaoyu 2012; Levitsky 2005) – and 
to pinpoint distinctive domains in which learning leads 
to policy change (Bank and Edel 2015) . But how these 
mechanisms generate learning—that is, lead to durable 
and meaningful changes in the behavior of actors 
and institutions responsible for the maintenance of 
1   In this working memo, I distinguish between learning and 
dissemination, on one hand, and authoritarian cooperation, on the 
other hand (Erdmann, Bank, and Hoffmann 2013) . Not all cooperation 
involves learning and not all learning requires cooperation . Cooperation 
may facilitate learning and dissemination, but is not necessary for them 
to occur . See also footnote 3 . 
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authoritarian regimes—remains murky .2 
We have established a number of plausible mechanisms 
of dissemination . We see evidence of their impact on 
governance practices . But how they actually work is 
less clear (Erdmann et al 2013, 7) .3 The links between 
dissemination and the institutionalization of learning are 
too often underdeveloped .4 
This gap is evident in how dissemination and learning have 
been approached in research on authoritarianism in the 
Arab Middle East . Claims about the role of these processes 
in the maintenance of authoritarian regimes has relied 
heavily on observed shifts in regime behavior during periods 
of stress (Bank and Edelman 2015) . Relevant shifts seem to 
include those that meet one or more of three criteria: 
(1) they appear to express conscious and intentional 
imitation in governance practices (Bunce and Wolchik 
2006); 
(2) they reflect behavioral changes among key regime 
actors that are triggered by personal experiences 
(Bermeo 1992; Levy 1994 in Bank and Edel 2015); 
2   Literatures on democratic learning exhibit a similar gap . In 
Bermeo’s (1992) work, for example, learning is presented as a process 
that operates at the level of individual actors . Experience affects the 
attitudes and beliefs of influential actors, changing their views about the 
desirability of democracy . In response, actors behave differently and, 
through their actions, affect outcomes . For durable systemic change 
to occur, however, individual preferences have to be institutionalized, 
routinized, and integrated into both bureaucratic processes and the 
attitudes and beliefs of publics at large . 
3   This concern does not apply to all instances of dissemination and 
learning . In some cases, the causal mechanisms linking dissemination 
to outcomes are explicit and visible . These include the dissemination of 
authoritarian practices through direct cooperation among governments, 
where we can identify the agents who transfer knowledge across 
borders in defined contexts for defined purposes . Iran’s involvement in 
upgrading the skills and competence of Syrian loyalist militias and other 
arms of the Assad regime’s security apparatus, and in restructuring 
security forces to undertake roles for which they were not previously 
equipped – notably urban warfare – is a prominent example of visible 
and traceable modes of authoritarian dissemination and learning though 
formal, inter-regime cooperation . 
4   One of the effects of this gap is that we have fewer tools with which 
to explain why dissemination and learning do not occur in some 
instances when authoritarian regimes face challenges for which tested 
and effective responses exist in global repertoires of authoritarian 
governance, or why learning sometimes fails (Bank and Edel 2015) . 
(3) they increase convergence in governance practices 
among authoritarian regimes . 
These criteria are useful . They take into account that 
dissemination is likely to increase the extent to which 
authoritarian regimes adopt similar governance repertoires 
to address similar threats and challenges . They also 
acknowledge that learning can lead to innovations, hybrid 
practices, or contextually-specific adaptations . However, 
these criteria do not address how newly-learned practices 
become institutionalized within authoritarian systems of 
rule to become standard operating procedures . 
This working memo, using the related concepts of 
recombinant authoritarianism and the political ecology 
of authoritarian learning, is a preliminary and partial 
effort to address this missing link . It relies heavily but not 
exclusively on experiences of the Syrian regime of Bashar 
al-Assad in the period since the start of the Syrian uprising 
in March 2011 . It uses these concepts to highlight the 
importance of principal-agent dynamics in authoritarian 
learning . It goes on to  suggest that further research 
on principal-agent relations – a surprisingly neglected 
aspect of the learning literature – is needed to understand 
patterns and variation in authoritarian dissemination and 
learning .  Through a focus on principle-agent relations, it 
sheds tentative light on why the top-down consolidation 
or institutionalization of new governance practices seems 
to occur more easily in some organizational domains than 
others, and varies across cases as well . 
Dissemination and the Institutionalization of Learned 
Practices
For some scholars of authoritarianism (not only in 
the Arab Middle East), the processes through which 
governance practices become institutionalized are 
obvious and uninteresting . In authoritarian regimes 
decision authority is tightly held by a small number of 
individuals who rule by fiat, ruthlessly ensure compliance, 
and cultivate risk averse organizational cultures . Under 
authoritarianism, in other words, principal-agent problems 
are minimized . The introduction of new and expanded 
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coercive practices in Syria’s security sector since 2011 
serves to illustrate this view of authoritarian learning . 
Coercive strategies of compliance as a means to overcome 
resistance to the adoption of controversial modes of 
repression and violence are evident in two recent accounts 
of the practices adopted by the Assad regime to respond 
to an emergent uprising in the city of Deir al-Zour located 
near Syria’s eastern border with Iraq (Borger 2015; Taub 
2016) . Regime documents acquired by the Commission 
for International Justice and Accountability (CIJA) provide 
unprecedented insight into processes of decision making 
and the downward dissemination of orders concerning 
the methods to be used in repressing protests . According 
to these documents, local agents of the regime’s security 
apparatus fed information concerning protest activities 
upward to a high-level security committee, the Central 
Crisis Management Cell (CCMC), constituted of the very 
top tier of trusted regime officials . The CCMC, in turn, 
oversaw the work of the National Security Bureau (NSB), an 
agency responsible for coordinating four internal security 
organizations as well as the Ba`th Party security apparatus, 
including their regional and local security committees . 
As protests escalated in Deir al-Zour during the spring 
of 2011, the CCMC instructed local security forces 
to increase their use of torture, expand the range and 
intensity of torture techniques used against detainees, 
and increase the numbers of detainees by lowering the 
threshold of behavior warranting detention . In at least one 
documented case, a local security official criticized these 
procedural changes, expressing concern about the brutality 
with which new measures were being implemented . 
Such criticism was quickly suppressed, however, and 
local security forces shortly integrated and routinized 
new coercive procedures . Emphasizing the effects of an 
authoritarian bureaucratic culture on learning, the founder 
of the CIJA describes the Syrian security apparatus as an 
organizational context favoring the rapid dissemination 
and integration of new practices: 
“It [the internal security apparatus] is highly bureaucratized 
 .  .  . It generates an awful lot of paper, because it is a culture 
in which decision-making by subordinates is implicitly 
discouraged, so people are forever reporting upwards, trying 
to get others to take responsibility for decision making, and 
covering their ass .  .  .” (Borger 2015) .
A similar account of coercive compliance in the regime’s 
security sector has been reported within the Syrian air 
force (SyAAF) . According to a military analyst, the Assad 
regime issued orders to helicopter pilots to target civilians:
“Through 2012, reports began to circulate that the 
regime in Damascus had ordered all SyAAF squadron 
commanders to bomb civilians in insurgent-controlled 
areas . Damascus instructed all commanding officers at 
first, and then all officers in each operational unit, to 
acknowledge the order with their signatures .
Although a majority of SyAAF pilots at that time were 
Alawite –  there were by then very few Christians, Druze 
and Sunnis left with the service – the order met with 
strong dissent . Pilots who refused to obey the order 
disappeared . A few reappeared after a week or two in 
prison, where torture was not uncommon . Others were 
never seen again .”5
In both instances, the regime’s leadership used 
repression to overcome non-compliance with new rules 
within its security sector . Resistance to the adoption 
of new techniques was simply crushed . These cases 
highlight the absence of barriers to dissemination and 
the institutionalization of new practices in specific 
organizational contexts and under exceptional 
circumstances . When the institutionalization of new 
practices requires internal adaptations of the state 
bureaucracy, when it occurs within the most hierarchic 
of organizations – the security sector – when it concerns 
governance practices that are seen as necessary to ensure 
the survival of a regime, and when the costs of non-
5   Tom Cooper, “The Hind Gunship Is One of Syria’s Worst Terror 
Weapons: 
Aging Helicopters Attack Indiscriminately .” https://warisboring .
com/the-hind-gunship-is-one-of-syrias-worst-terror-weapons-
a590dff95a4e# .tu6vq8jap
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compliance by agents are seen by rulers as unacceptably 
high, the effectiveness of dissemination is likely and 
predictable . Adherence to new procedures may not be 
complete . Some agents will continue to find ways to dissent 
– passive resistance exists within even the most hierarchic 
and coercive institutions – but overall, coercive learning 
can, in some cases, eliminate principal-agent problems . 
In other instances, however, when the consolidation of 
new rules or procedures is not only internal to a state 
institution but also requires the compliance of external 
actors, resolving principal-agent problems is more difficult 
and less predictable . Regime efforts to adapt the rules of 
economic governance and mitigate the impact of war on 
the Syrian economy have had decidedly mixed results . 
Regulations restricting the export of capital have not 
prevented capital flight . In 2011, the imposition of new 
rules restricting imports was resisted by business actors 
and quickly rescinded . More recently, subsidy cuts have led 
to protests in areas under regime control . 
These examples illustrate the variation in the consolidation 
of learning among different organization or sectoral 
domains . Where the institutionalization of new practices 
requires the compliance of a large and diverse set of 
agents, where incentives for non-compliance are high 
and the costs less severe, and where coercive means for 
securing compliance themselves involve high costs, even 
an authoritarian regime in the midst of economic collapse 
may find it challenging to resolve principal-agent problems 
and secure the institutionalization of new governance 
practices .
Institutionalized Resistance to Learning
A second, contrasting view of authoritarian regimes in 
the Arab Middle East leads to very different conclusions 
about the ability of political leaders to disseminate and 
institutionalize new governance practices . From this 
perspective, possibilities for authoritarian learning are 
highly constrained . Regimes in the Arab Middle East are 
viewed as sclerotic, resistant to change, and locked into 
established practices by corrupt, clientalist organizational 
cultures that impede innovation and undermine 
the capacity of rulers to ensure the compliance of 
subordinates . This view posits that authoritarianism, with 
its lack of transparency and accountability, exacerbates 
principal-agent problems and works against processes of 
dissemination and learning . 
The downward causal links needed to institutionalize 
and routinize new practices are present, but weak and 
fragmented . This perspective is perhaps most widely 
expressed in analyses of elite tensions that marked 
Egypt’s uprising from 2011-2013 . When accounting for 
the struggles and turmoil that led to the overthrow of 
President Morsi in July 2013, assessments have highlighted 
the institutional incoherence of the Egyptian state, the 
diffusion of authority and control, and the ominous role of 
“the deep state” to explain the difficulties elected officials 
encountered in their efforts to implement Islamist-oriented 
projects of political reform, respond to popular demands 
for political change, and restore economic stability . As a 
prominent Jordanian economist observed:
“[Salafist] FJP party leaders contend that deep state 
networks are an obstacle to their sovereignty, while other 
political camps argue that the Brotherhood’s influence is 
becoming more pronounced in state institutions . Some 
groups also claim that there is no impetus to improve the 
performance of public institutions, to render them more 
responsive to the demands of the citizenry, and to address 
the problems the system faces  .  .  . 
Once again, the key sources of weakness in the Egyptian 
economy must be pinpointed . Does weakness stem 
from institutions so fragile that they are incapable of 
improvement, irrespective of who is in power? In a political 
framework that gives control of critical institutions to 
the ruling party or the covert resistance to this control? 
Egypt lacks institutions that may facilitate dialogue on 
this question, while the rival groups continue to hold each 
other responsible for the current situation” (Saif 2013) . 
What Saif describes as a rigid state with fragile, ineffective 
institutions – meaning, institutions in which agents can 
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prevent principals from disseminating and consolidating 
new governance practices – is consistent with the view 
of authoritarianism in the Arab Middle East as sclerotic 
and resistant to change, with leaders who can rule but 
not govern . Following his coup against Morsi, however, 
General and then President Sisi succeeded in expanding 
and institutionalizing a broad repertoire of repressive 
measures that build on and significantly enhance prior 
practices . In responding to the threat mass politics 
posed to the regime, Sisi was able to achieve what Morsi 
could not: to mobilize the repressive, regulatory, and 
legislative institutions of the state in a large-scale process 
of authoritarian adaptation . This was accomplished, 
in part, through the use of coercive means to ensure 
compliance among agents within the state apparatus . It 
also mattered that Sisi was able to frame the consolidation 
of new practices as necessary for the survival of both state 
and society, and as an expression of the state’s role as 
guarantor of security and stability . More broadly, however, 
the contrast between Sisi and Morsi underscores the 
difficulty of generalizing about processes of learning and 
dissemination within authoritarian regimes in the Arab 
Middle East .  
Both approaches – perspectives that view authoritarianism 
as either a source of principal-agent problems or as their 
solution – offer important insights into learning dynamics 
within authoritarian regimes . Both capture significant 
aspects of the organizational cultures that prevail in 
authoritarian regimes in the Arab Middle East . Yet neither 
is  wholly complete or entirely satisfactory . Authoritarian 
regimes in the Middle East vary along any number of 
dimensions – regime type, resource base, demographic 
diversity, and state capacity . Despite these differences, 
however, Arab regimes cannot easily be classified as 
either highly centralized with tightly-coupled institutional 
structures that facilitate dissemination and learning or 
highly decentralized with loosely-coupled structures that 
impede diffusion and learning . 
Both sets of attributes are present in every Arab regime . 
In fact, the “learning profiles” of Arab regimes may exhibit 
higher levels of “within regime” variation than of “cross 
regime” variation . Thus, even as documents surface 
revealing how norms of deference and compliance in 
Syria’s security sector supported the rapid dissemination of 
shifts in coercive practices, we find numerous accounts of 
the erosion of regime authority and the rise of autonomous 
economic and military actors in regime-held areas of 
the country . Even as Egypt’s deep state frustrates the 
ambitions of the Muslim Brotherhood, we find the rapid 
dissemination and adoption of governance practices that 
have intensified internal repression of the media, civil 
society, and Islamist opposition movements since 2013 
– tactics evident to differing degrees in virtually every 
authoritarian regime that survived the 2011 uprisings . 
Authoritarian Ecologies and the Challenge of Learning
If authoritarian regimes are inconsistent and uneven in 
their capacity to institutionalize new ideas and practices, 
how can we account for the impact of dissemination and 
learning on governance or on authoritarian resilience? 
Two related concepts might prove useful in attempts to 
theorize processes of authoritarian dissemination and 
learning under such conditions . One is the notion of 
recombinant authoritarianism, which defines authoritarian 
regimes as “systems of rule that possess the capacity to 
reorder and reconfigure existing instruments and strategies 
of governance, to reshape and recombine existing 
institutional, discursive, and regulatory arrangements to 
create recognizable but nonetheless distinctive solutions 
to shifting configurations of challenges” (Heydemann and 
Leenders 2013, 7) . The second, intended to provide the 
empirical foundations needed to test claims concerning 
the recombinant capacity of authoritarian regimes, is 
based on mapping the political ecologies of regimes to 
identify (1) when, within what domains, and under what 
conditions they exhibit the attributes of either tightly-
coupled systems in which principal-agent problems are 
minor, or loosely-coupled systems in which principal-
agent problems obstruct dissemination and learning; (2) 
whether and under what conditions rulers are able to 
change the balance of attributes within distinct domains 
of governance, moving along a spectrum from tightly-
coupled to loosely-coupled; and (3) the conditions under 
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which dissemination and learning encounter resistance, 
are ineffective, or fail to become institutionalized and 
routinized within regimes . 
The notion of a political ecology is important in this 
respect in its implication that regimes are not fixed at one 
point on this spectrum (and, indeed, may occupy more 
than one point at any given time) . Yet it should also be used 
with caution to avoid the inference that dissemination and 
learning can somehow be seen as comparable to natural 
evolution . With this caution in mind, these two concepts 
offer a framework for both theorizing dissemination 
and learning and testing empirically claims concerning 
their effects on authoritarian resilience . As this memo 
has suggested, the path forward in the development of 
such a framework lies in mapping the political ecologies 
of authoritarian governance in the Arab Middle East: 
disaggregating processes of learning and dissemination 
to unpack how and under what conditions governance 
practices in distinct domains are imported, disseminated 
internally, and institutionalized . Such a framework, 
moreover, requires a conception of authoritarianism as 
a recombinant system of rule, in which the potential for 
adaptation is universally present but unequally distributed, 
and where the capacity of regimes to manage principal-
agent relations stands out as a key indicator of how 
effectively they institutionalize new governance practices 
in specific organizational contexts . Further research 
along these lines will, I believe, help bridge the empirical 
and theoretical gaps that now limit our understanding of 
how dissemination influences processes of authoritarian 
learning in the Arab Middle East .  
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Arab Regimes’ International Linkages and Authoritarian Learning: 
Toward an Ethnography of Counter-Revolutionary Bricolage
Reinoud Leenders, King’s College London
The resilience of authoritarian rule throughout the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) region has alerted scholars 
to what intuitively may appear to be self-evident: Arab 
autocrats do not operate in an international vacuum but 
variously draw on their external environments to mobilize 
resources and expertise, learn from successes and failures, 
adjust to changes, and respond to the challenges of mass 
mobilization and –increasingly – insurgencies . Some of the 
emerging literature on the MENA’s authoritarian diffusion 
has focused on “authoritarian learning .” Within this 
niche researchers centered their attention on “emulation .” 
They did so primarily in an attempt to read regime 
incumbents’ calculations and calibrations as they watched 
early counter-revolutionary responses in Tunisia, Egypt 
and Libya, absorbed lessons, and developed their own 
strategies . More generally, the literature on international 
dimensions of authoritarian governance rewardingly 
adopted some of the concepts and starting points of 
democratic diffusion approaches to explore the regional 
and international dimensions of authoritarian diffusion . 
Arguably, it is time that we stand Levitsky and Way’s 
main hypothesis about “international linkages and 
democratization”1 on its head and ask whether and how 
the scope and density of their international linkages 
helped Arab authoritarian incumbents in their counter-
revolutionary strategies . First, such international linkages 
are understood to comprise Arab regime incumbents’ ties 
to other authoritarian regimes both within the region and 
beyond . Accordingly, the proposed perspective promises 
to shed some light on the rather muddled and contested 
concept of “autocracy promotion .” By no longer guessing 
at the intentions of “black knights” (authoritarian regimes 
purposely promoting autocratic governance elsewhere) we 
shift our research to observable ties among authoritarians 
1   Steven Levitsky and Lucan A . Way, Competitive authoritarianism: 
Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War, Cambridge University Press (2010) .
and their relevance to regime maintenance . At the same 
time, a focus on Arab regimes’ international linkages 
informed by an ethnographic research agenda compels 
us to transcend assumptions about the overriding effects 
of geographical and/or political proximity, which appear 
to make more sense when it comes to intra-authoritarian 
emulation . By taking authoritarian regimes’ global 
linkages seriously, we challenge the morally gratifying but 
inaccurate narrative of dictators patting each other on their 
backs while, in contrast, links to Western democracies are 
primarily viewed as raising the costs of authoritarianism .
International linkages, authoritarian learning and 
bricolage
To start framing the study of international ties that 
arguably help inform authoritarian governance, I suggest 
borrowing Levitsky and Way’s concept of “international 
linkages” but broadening it to include authoritarian 
regimes’ ties to both Western democratic and (regional) 
authoritarian countries . This strips the concept from its 
expected democratizing significance, leaving us to define 
international linkages as “the density of ties (economic, 
political, diplomatic, social, and organizational) and 
cross-border flows (of capital, goods and services, people, 
and information) among particular countries […] .”2 
Furthermore, we are ultimately interested in the extent 
to which such international linkages – encompassing 
“the myriad networks of interdependence that connect 
individual polities”3 – provide a site or transmission belt 
for authoritarian learning . The latter is preliminarily 
understood here to refer to international and transnational 
interactions enabling the exchange or transfer of 
knowledge, ideas, insights, models, expertise, skills and/
or technology that can be used at the service of a regime’s 
2   Ibid ., 43 .
3   Ibid .
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efforts to adjust, enhance or optimize authoritarian 
governance . More specifically, at times of potential 
protest diffusion, like during the Arab uprisings and their 
aftermath, such learning may be assumed to help regimes 
build “autocratic firewalls .” 
Finally – and to both acknowledge and capture the 
eclectic qualities of authoritarian learning in a world 
where few present themselves as being in the business of 
‘autocracy promotion” – I propose adding the notion of 
counter-revolutionary bricolage . This term inverts Selbin’s 
“revolutionary bricolage,” which denotes mass movements’ 
selective borrowing from and appropriating a variety 
of repertoires and registers of contention worldwide .4 
Not so different from their revolutionary contenders, 
authoritarian regimes are, from this perspective, perusing 
their international linkages to cobble together counter-
revolutionary policies, strategies and tactics from a 
variety of repertoires or tested methods of governance . 
I hypothesize that regime incumbents reassemble these 
elements in adjusted forms for local use as they seek 
effective measures to counter challenges to their rule . 
Proximate linkages
Arab regimes’ proximate linkages denote geographically 
close ties with neighboring countries and, in terms 
of regime type, relations with authoritarian regimes 
within and beyond the region . Given the region’s high 
concentration of authoritarian regimes, geographically and 
politically proximate linkages largely overlap . Following the 
Arab uprisings, there have been some marked changes in 
how regime incumbents are tied to each other in ways that 
may have enabled or encouraged authoritarian learning . 
Firstly, regional security cooperation especially between 
the Gulf states and Arab monarchies received a 
considerable boost . This involved increased linkages – 
comprising authoritarian incumbents, army and security 
personnel, and defense specialists –  among Saudi Arabia, 
4   Eric Selbin, Revolution, Rebellion, Resistance: The Power of History, 
Zed Books (2010), 40-41 .
the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, expanding to 
the Jordanian and Moroccan monarchies after the latter 
were invited to join the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
in September 2011 . An exchange of security personnel 
and increased regional outlook of the UAE’s and Jordan’s 
defense colleges and military training facilities are of 
particular relevance in this context . While cast in terms 
of anti-terrorism and “national security” more broadly, 
it seems reasonable to assume that such linkages are 
spawned and reinforced to allow newly acquired skills and 
knowledge in these fields to feed into regime maintenance 
efforts . 
Secondly, authoritarian regimes strengthened their 
bilateral linkages, foremost Syria and Iran, to directly 
counter insurgencies to the extent that their political and 
security apparatus virtually merged . Ensuing political and 
material linkages between the two regimes incorporated a 
vital transfer of knowledge, technologies and skills, further 
enabling the Syrian regime to fight off steep challenges at 
many fronts . Countering mass protests, cyber policing, 
military training and advice on counter-insurgency tactics 
are among the numerous fields in which Iranian-Syrian 
linkages flourished . 
Thirdly, Arab regimes have built linkages to non-state 
actors with expertise and skills in irregular warfare, 
anti-terrorism operations and security techniques 
more generally . In the Gulf countries and Jordan this 
is particularly apparent in the proliferation of private 
military and security companies (PMSCs) offering a 
host of services, including expertise and advice on anti-
terrorism operations, surveillance, cyber technology, and 
the protection of critical infrastructure . Dubai has become 
a hub for such companies setting up their headquarters 
there with the clear intention to serve clients throughout 
the region . Jordan, too, counts several PMSCs that appear 
to advise governments on a host of security techniques 
and technologies that could directly feed into authoritarian 
learning . In Syria it has been primarily Hezbollah that – in 
addition to providing skilled and well-trained manpower 
for the regime’s military campaigns – has been offering 
tactical advice to the regime and training to both the 
18
regular armed forces and pro-regime militias . 
Linkages to authoritarian regimes beyond the region have 
also expanded considerably, primarily through the growing 
interventionism of Russia and its considerable support 
to the Syrian regime . Yet beyond Russia’s material and 
diplomatic support there is little evidence of Russian advice 
and expertise informing or helping the Syrian regime’s 
impressive array of counter-revolutionary tactics and 
strategies at home . Indeed, some of the advice reportedly 
given by the Russian military in Syria – such as dissolving 
the NDF and instead relying on regular forces – have not 
been heeded, perhaps because of the greater leverage of 
the Iranians who heavily invested in the NDF .5 Framed in 
Levitsky and Way’s terminology, the intense cooperation 
between Syria and Russia appears to be a rare case of “high 
linkage-low leverage,” made all the more extraordinary 
given the Russians’ vital military support to the regime . 
Beyond Syria, Russia’s post-2011 linkages to authoritarian 
Arab states and authoritarian BRICS states’ ties to the 
region, seem more limited . Another exception may develop 
in relation to Russia’s posturing toward Egypt’s General 
Abdel Fattah al-Sissi, as the two countries signed a $2 
billion arms deal in February 2014 and held joint naval 
exercises in the Mediterranean Sea a year later . However, 
here too the Russian move does not seem to be part of 
an elaborate effort of “autocracy promotion” immersed 
in tightening networks of authoritarian learning; rather it 
appears to be motivated by the Egyptian regime signaling 
to the United States that it can circumvent human rights 
conditions placed on the delivery of military hardware 
and the Russians seizing an opportunity to contest U .S . 
hegemony and find customers in the Middle East for its 
arms industry .
Ties to the West 
Accompanying a massive transfer of Western military 
hardware and technology to the MENA are intense 
5   Ibrahim Hamidi, “Russian intervention urges to dismantle ‘defence 
forces’,” Al-Hayat, 11 October 2015 (in Arabic) . http://www .alhayat .com/
Articles/11536041 
linkages with the West involving military and security 
instructors, trainers, maintenance engineers, and advisors . 
Much of such programs and exchanges are framed in terms 
of supporting allies’ legitimate “national security” concerns 
and “anti-terrorism” efforts . Often curricula taught to Arab 
students explicitly incorporates democracy, human rights 
promotion, peace-keeping, and “security sector reform .” 
Yet one may reasonably suspect that the dual use of such 
deep linkages, in addition to their lacking transparency, 
make this transfer of military technology, knowledge and 
experience a rich source for authoritarian learning .
Contrary to initial expectations, linkages connecting 
Western and Arab intelligence seem to be as robust as 
ever five years after the Arab uprisings, and both U .S . 
and European policymakers are striving to make them 
ever stronger . Little is known about what these intimate 
Western dealings with Arab intelligence agencies do to 
the latter, especially whether it exposed them to a transfer 
of Western skills, techniques and expertise in tracing 
suspects, surveillance and interrogation and whether such 
acquired capabilities fed into enhanced techniques of 
authoritarian governance more generally . The assumption 
that it had such effects seems plausible enough to 
investigate further . 
Following their intense use by U .S . forces in Iraq, a large 
number of Western PMSCs established their regional 
headquarters in Dubai in a bid to reach new clients . The 
region’s instability and armed conflicts after 2011 provided 
new impetus . For instance, Erik Prince, the founder of 
Blackwater (now renamed Academi), has provided advice 
and personnel with the explicit aim of securing regime 
incumbents in the UAE, Jordan and Libya .6 Western 
PMSCs in Dubai have offered their clients the services 
of “embedded staff” in security agencies, highly skilled, 
experienced and often retired military, security and police 
6   Mark Mazzetti and Emily B . Hager, “Secret Desert Force Set up by 
Blackwater’s Founder,” The New York Times, 14 May 2011; Matthew 
Cole and Jeremy Scahill, “Erik Prince in the Hot Seat,” The Intercept, 24 
March 2016 . https://theintercept .com/2016/03/24/blackwater-founder-
erik-prince-under-federal-investigation/; Jeremy Scahill, Blackwater: 
The Rise of the World’s Most Powerful Mercenary Army, Profile Books 
(2011) . 
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officers . Western security and police experts have also 
been hired in their personal capacities in Bahrain and 
Abu Dhabi . The region’s sprouting defense and security 
colleges, including Abu Dhabi’s National Defense College, 
are almost entirely staffed by ex-U .S . military .
Western firms offer their MENA clients products, services 
and support in surveillance and policing techniques 
– ranging from CCTV and phone hacking devices, 
to biometric authentication technology – in addition 
to prison and riot police tools and gear that are often 
subjected to EU export bans .7 West-European and North 
American companies specializing in “lawful interception” 
software supplied, advised and supported most Arab 
regimes’ efforts to survey, control and manipulate the 
internet, and to spy on its local users . 
If the Arab uprisings were at least partly informed by 
grievances over widespread regime corruption and 
cronyism, Arab authoritarian incumbents’ response 
appears to have been to hide, launder and secure their 
ill-gotten wealth in even more elaborate ways . Western 
financial institutions sold products to and advised Arab 
authoritarian incumbents in setting up a myriad of shell 
and front companies and built a chain of subsidiaries in 
(offshore) jurisdictions worldwide to counter identification 
of their ultimate owner . The Panama Papers – leaked 
documents of Panama-based Mossack Fonseca legal firm 
– already showed how several Arab regime incumbents 
are tied to Western financial institutions . Their full 
disclosure is likely to offer a wealth of information on 
the international financial linkages of Arab authoritarian 
regimes and how these ties assist them to hide their wealth .
Before 2011, Western support for “reform” in the region 
rarely had the desired result of generating significant 
democratic change and, from a democratization 
perspective, it could even be considered as counter-
productive . More often than not, reform assistance 
provided regimes with new cooptation techniques to 
7   Omega Research Foundation and Amnesty International, “Why the 
EU Should Ban the Commercial Marketing and Promotion of Inhumane 
Policing and Prison Equipment,” 9 May 2016 .
replace those left obsolete by retrenching states . In the 
midst of the Arab uprisings, the U .S . and the European 
Union promised to reconsider their reform-based aid 
to authoritarian regimes . Yet with security concerns 
over terrorism and refugee flows crowding out stated 
sympathies with protestors’ demands, the reform narrative 
soon became acceptable again . Western reform assistance 
resumed to Arab countries where regime incumbents 
have no intention to embark on meaningful reforms . Once 
again, “dancing with wolves”8 inexorably causes Western 
donors in the post-revolutionary MENA to provide 
authoritarian “reformers” with the linkages and resources 
that help them to entrench their power .  
An ethnography of counter-revolutionary bricolage
Arab authoritarian regimes appear to have built and 
nurtured a web of international linkages allowing for an 
exchange or transfer of knowledge, ideas, insights, models, 
expertise, skills and/or technology directly relevant to 
authoritarian governance . These linkages could be viewed 
as informing authoritarian learning and, in turn, they 
may feed into regime strategies to adjust to and overcome 
steep challenges to their rule . Strikingly, Arab regimes 
have established dense linkages with agents in the region 
and beyond . They also do not appear to be particularly 
choosy when drawing on these linkages whether to other 
authoritarian regimes or to democratic countries . Indeed, 
authoritarian incumbents appear to engage in bricolage at 
a truly global scale, utilizing various often-contradictory 
repertoires or tested methods of repression and 
cooptation . Put differently, Arab regimes’ “recombinant 
authoritarianism”9 has a strong international dimension . 
It also appears that the study of linkages between 
authoritarian regimes, although imperative, should not 
8   Oliver Schlumberger, “Dancing with Wolves: Dilemmas of 
Democracy Promotion in Authoritarian Contexts,” in: Dietrich Jung 
(ed), Democratization and Development: New Political Strategies for the 
Middle East, Palgrave Macmillan (2006), 33-60 .  
9   Steven Heydemann and Reinoud Leenders, “Authoritarian 
Governance in Syria and Iran: Challenged, Reconfiguring, and Resilient,” 
in: Steven Heydemann and Reinoud Leenders (eds), Middle East 
Authoritarianisms: Governance, Contestation, and Regime Resilience in 
Syria and Iran, Stanford University Press (2013), 7 .
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be privileged, or perhaps not even be separately pursued, 
In fact, a strong case could be made for the study of Arab 
regimes’ linkages to the democratic West as being of equal 
or, in some cases, even greater importance to authoritarian 
learning . Furthermore, regimes’ linkages to democratic and 
authoritarian countries are at times mutually reinforcing . 
Also noteworthy is that Arab regimes’ international 
linkages appear to increasingly comprise numerous non-
state actors, ranging from Hezbollah, to Western PMSCs, 
to international banks . Arab regimes eagerly turn to them 
whenever needs and opportunities arise to strengthen 
authoritarian rule at home . 
The international linkages that feed into regime strategies 
and authoritarian governance can be viewed as sites for 
ethnographic research on authoritarian bricolage . As 
Levitsky and Way observe, “[m]any international effects that 
are commonly described as ‘global’ are, in fact, rooted in 
concrete ties – networks; organizations, and flows of people, 
information, and resources – among states .”10 In this context, 
it may be fruitful to consult anthropologists who in response 
to globalization developed methodologies of “multi-sited 
fieldwork” catered to the “study of phenomena dispersed 
across borders and articulated in flexible networks .”11 For our 
purposes, the finely-grained nature of such an ethnographic 
inquiry would help to establish the exact learning effects 
enabled by regimes’ international linkages, distinguish them 
from other forms of authoritarian diffusion, and 
10   Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, 44 .
11   Finn Stepputat and Jessica Larsen, “Global Political Ethnography: 
A Methodological Approach to Studying Global Policy Regimes,” DIIS 
Working Paper, 2015, 6 . https://www .econstor .eu/dspace/bitstream/104
19/122296/1/81845234X .pdf 
explore how these effects were translated in concrete 
policy adaptation . It may also be a fruitful starting point to 
explore the conception, transfer and exchange of values and 
norms that may also be suspected to inform authoritarian 
learning . By viewing Arab regimes’ international linkages as 
constituting an “authoritarian epistemic community,”12 an 
ethnography of authoritarian learning could develop its own 
approach to “socialization,” borrowing from Europeanization 
studies and, perhaps more pertinently, criminology .
Some may object that an ethnography of authoritarian 
linkages and learning will be seriously hampered by lack 
of access to the shady and secretive sites where knowledge 
and values relevant to authoritarian governance are likely 
to be produced and shared . In some cases this indeed will 
impose serious challenges . Yet agents maneuvering in 
many of the proposed sites for ethnographic research have 
their own imperatives to present themselves to the outside 
world, giving the researcher a way to approach informants . 
Such self-presentations often reside in the “dual use” or 
Janus-faced nature of many of the linkages discussed, 
ranging from “anti-terrorism” cooperation, the imperative 
of “intelligence sharing,” and “lawful interception” software, 
to “reform” more generally . Even the most contentious 
linkages among authoritarian incumbents are no longer 
clouded in total secrecy, as they too feel compelled to 
tell the world that they have a cause worth fighting – and 
linking up – for .13
12   Thanks to Steven Heydemann for suggesting the term .
13   See e .g .: Bozorgmehr Sharafedin, “General Qasem Soleimani: Iran’s 
Rising Star,” BBC News, 6 March 2015 . http://www .bbc .com/news/
world-middle-east-27883162 .
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Regional and international diffusion and firewalls (excerpt)
Etel Solingen, University of California, Irvine
Studies on international and transnational diffusion 
found that regional neighborhood effects have dominated 
democratic transitions in Latin America, Eastern Europe, 
and the Middle East far more so than global ones . One 
mechanism explaining why democratic transitions tend 
to cluster within regions focuses on the role of pivotal 
states . In the post-communist world, such states shared 
an unusual combination of relatively large and organized 
opposition movements; enduring authoritarians which 
could not defeat popular mobilizations; geopolitical 
importance; similar political economies across neighboring 
states; and powerful international support for incumbents 
and opposition, revealing tolerance for regime change 
(Patel and Bunce 2012) . Those conditions in pivotal states 
signaled to neighbors the potential for further diffusion 
of democracy . Another mechanism for diffusion of color 
revolutions was emulation of elite-defection and elite-
learning models (Mekouar 2014) .
The 2011 Middle East contagion brings to relief the 
complexity entailed in the study of diffusion, with wide-
ranging debates over who the main agents were, what 
causal mechanisms dominated (bread prices, learning, 
emulation, and identity, inter alia), the varying mix of 
firewalls and conductivity in the relevant medium,1 and 
spatial and temporal patterns (direction of contagion, 
duration of gestation) . While the role of social media is 
often cited as a core transmission belt, the most affected 
states were less endowed in such media than those that 
were less affected by regional diffusion . Indeed recent 
work found new media not to have played a significant role 
in either coalescing collective action within countries or 
underpinning diffusion regionally . However, that type of 
media would have been more likely to spread information 
beyond the region than within it . Arab uprisings hailed 
1   On the utility of focusing on firewalls that increase or decrease a 
medium’s conductivity along the diffusion path; on the political agents 
that seek to reinforce or dismantle firewalls and the causal mechanisms 
through which they operate, see Solingen (2012) .
from Tunisia to Egypt, Yemen, Libya, and Syria . Higher 
firewalls in Iran, Algeria, and the GCC among others 
blocked further diffusion . Even assuming primarily 
regional – rather than global – sources of diffusion for 
those upheavals, their effects leapt into both adjacent 
non-Arab states (including Israel’s 2011 protest movement) 
and into more remote regions, from sub-Saharan Africa 
to Myanmar, Malaysia, Chile, Wall Street, Frankfurt, and 
Russia, although with varying intensity .
The occurrence and diffusionary potential of the 2011 
Arab uprisings may also have deep roots in the models of 
political survival adopted by different regimes in power 
over the preceding decades . I outlined earlier (Solingen 
2007b) why a significant number of East Asian political-
economy models (Taiwan, South Korea, Philippines, 
Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and others) were able to 
re-invent themselves in democratic form, often through 
the model’s unintended effects rather than by design . 
I also outlined the domestic sources explaining how 
internationalizing political-economy models came to 
take root in that part of the world to begin with . But a 
more complete account of this process requires a better 
understanding of regional diffusionary mechanisms . 
Progressive diffusion of successful export-oriented models 
arguably predisposed successive East Asian regimes to 
adapt analogous models to local circumstances in Taiwan, 
South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, 
China, Indonesia, and Vietnam . This diffusion was 
famously captured initially by the “flying geese” metaphor, 
pointing to Japanese capital and technology as an agent of 
diffusion through foreign direct investment (FDI) and bank 
loans . The economic success of models adopted by Asian 
“tigers” and “dragons,” in turn, led to a pattern of outward 
but uneven region-to-region diffusion . Ruling coalitions 
from Turkey to Chile adapted components of East Asian 
models . Today’s Pacific Alliance in Latin America (Chile, 
Peru, Colombia, and Mexico) may well be another instance 
of such diffusion .
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By contrast, domestic firewalls – notably dominant 
coalitions in rigid, exhausted, and predatory states – 
explain the very limited diffusion of East Asian models 
into the Middle East . Deeply rooted in the inward-looking 
political economy described above, these regimes were 
slower to recognize the end of the brief, “easy,” period of 
economic expansion under import-substitution . They 
continued to spend heavily, particularly in the military 
and its sprawling entrepreneurial activities, leading to 
inflation, balance-of-payments crises, and further decline 
(Egypt wrote the manual; Iraq, Syria, Iran, and Pakistan the 
7 .0, 8 .0 and 9 .0 versions) . Often protected by oil revenues 
or second-order transfers from oil-rich to oil-poor and 
other remittances, they responded to economic crises by 
“deepening” inward-looking models rather than replacing 
them . “Dutch disease” reinforced reluctance to change . 
Yet, counter to deterministic oil-curse (or religion-based) 
expectations, Malaysia and Indonesia were receptive to the 
regional diffusion of internationalizing models throughout 
East Asia .
Entrenched inward-looking models in the Middle East 
explain not only the resolute firewalls against extra-
regional East Asian models . They also explain intra-
regional firewalls in dominant Middle East states that 
worked to prevent internationalizing steps primarily 
through mechanisms of coercion and emulation as 
well as socialization . Nasserite and Ba’athist models – 
crucial agents of diffusion of inward-looking models 
– exerted forceful intervention in neighboring states . 
They threatened and subverted internationalizing efforts 
by small, resource-poor Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, 
and Tunisia . The latter, as well as Turkey and the Gulf, 
were able to partially stem those intrusions to different 
degrees .2 Today it is quite clear what model is diffusing 
endemically over the carcasses of failed inward-looking 
states, including Syria and Iraq: extreme variants (Daesh et 
al .) of autarky-seeking movements .
*This excerpt was originally prepared for the International 
Relations and a new Middle East symposium. Read the full 
2   See memo by Legrenzi (2015) .
memo, “Transcending disciplinary divide/s: A comparative 
framework on the international relations of the Middle 
East” here:  
http://pomeps .org/2015/08/31/transcending-disciplinary-
divides-a-comparative-framework-on-the-international-
relations-of-the-middle-east/
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What really made the Arab uprisings contagious?
Merouan Mekouar, York University
After the January 2011 Tunisian revolution, virtually every 
Arab capital city witnessed popular protest inspired by the 
Tunisian case . Throughout North Africa and the Middle 
East, pro-democracy activists coalesced in central city 
squares and called for political change and economic reform . 
Yet, despite the presence of similar political and economic 
grievances, the countries of the region experienced different 
degrees of revolutionary emulation . While localized acts 
of protest in Egypt, Libya and Bahrain quickly evolved into 
regime-shaking demonstrations, other cases of protest 
in Morocco and Algeria failed to grow into national 
movements and quickly fizzled within a few months .
In a paper published in the June 2014 issue of the 
International Studies Review, I argue that for localized acts 
of protest to take a national dimension, respected political 
personalities or groups need to be on board during the early 
acts of protest against the government . In order to make my 
argument, I use the large theoretical body of informational 
cascades and focus on four North African countries .
For informational cascade theorists such as Suzanne 
Lohmann, Timur Kuran, Bueno de Mesquita or Kricheli, 
Livne, and Magaloni, citizens living in authoritarian states 
face a major informational problem . Because the state 
controls access to local information and because people 
are afraid to voice their opinions of the regime, disgruntled 
citizens are largely cut-off from each other and are unable 
to evaluate the level of popular dissatisfaction with the 
authorities . An aggrieved citizen may be aware that close 
friends and family are unhappy with the regime, for instance, 
but he or she is unable to assess whether people in other 
parts of the country are also dissatisfied . Thus, before taking 
to the streets, disgruntled citizens need to receive a signal 
that large parts of the population are also unhappy with the 
regime and willing to mobilize against it . For Bikhchandani, 
Hirshleifer and Welsh, informational cascades occur when 
individuals receive new information that helps them update 
their beliefs and bandwagon around the actions of others .
In the early days of the Arab Spring in North Africa, 
respected political agents helped trigger informational 
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cascades (and subsequent mass mobilization) by solving 
the informational challenge citizens faced in some 
authoritarian countries . In Egypt and Libya, the visible and 
largely unexpected involvement of groups or personalities 
traditionally close to the regime (or usually tolerated by 
it) transformed relatively small, isolated acts of protests 
into national events and helped signal to the rest of 
the population the presence of major opportunity for 
contestation . In contrast, protests led by marginal groups in 
Morocco and Algeria were unable to convince the rest of the 
population that there was an opening for demonstration .
Following the Tunisian revolution, mobilization in Egypt 
in early 2011 was nourished by an unexpected coalition 
between old and new activists . While a number of groups 
and personalities had been mobilizing for years against 
Mubarak’s regime, the unexpected involvement of new 
actors in the early protests alerted the rest of the population 
to the presence of a truly exceptional opportunity for 
contestation . In addition to traditionally vocal groups, such 
as al-Mahalla workers or dissident liberal parties, the protests 
that followed the Tunisian revolution were characterized 
by the unexpected involvement of youth, celebrities, or 
internationally respected figures . Many activists were from 
well-off families close to the regime, and their involvement 
brought exceptional visibility to the protests organized by the 
traditional political activists . The involvement of these new 
actors created a powerful informational cascade by giving the 
demonstrations the visibility and the respectability necessary 
to reach the rest of the population .
A very similar process occurred in neighboring Libya 
following the February 2011 Benghazi protests . While 
the city experienced popular protests in 2006 that were 
swiftly extinguished by the authorities, the 2011 protests 
were marked by the quick defections of a series of senior 
government officials and military leaders, some of whom 
were friends of Moammar Gaddafi . Their actions created 
a sense of exceptionality and helped the rest of the 
population realize that Libya was experiencing historic 
momentum . Within a few days, the defections broke the 
silence in the country and helped nourish a powerful 
informational cascade .
In Algeria, in contrast, demonstrations organized 
by the Coordination Nationale pour le Changement 
Démocratique (CNCD) in Oran and Algiers were unable 
to attract more than a few thousand sympathizers . The 
low turnout of the CNCD demonstrations was particularly 
puzzling in a country which experiences dozens, if not 
hundreds, of acts of protests every year . In the Algerian 
case, virtually all of the country’s political and economic 
actors firmly stood in defense of the regime . With the 
exception of the Algerian League for the Defense of 
Human Rights and a number of small independent unions, 
all of the country’s relevant political agents refused to 
join the early demonstrations so that the local acts of 
protest did not gain the visibility necessary to spark an 
informational cascade .
The situation was similar in Morocco where locally 
relevant political agents also refused to join the protests 
organized by the youth of the February 20 movement . 
While a coalition of youth, human rights activists and 
Islamists demanded economic and political reform, 
virtually all of the country’s major personalities and 
institutional groups, including respected journalists and 
popular artists, refused to bandwagon on the protests . Not 
only did these actors refuse to join the demonstrations, 
they also worked to stop the process of revolutionary 
diffusion in the country . Religious leaders, former 
dissidents and respected writers called on their followers 
to support the monarchy . Even hip-hop artists helped 
stop popular mobilization . Don Bigg, one of Morocco’s 
most recognizable singers, dismissed the country’s 
pro-democracy activists by referring to them as a bunch 
of “brats” and “Ramadan eaters” .
The comparison of North African countries during 
the Arab Spring shows that a wide sense of popular 
disgruntlement with the authorities is not enough to 
trigger mass social mobilization . Local political agents 
have the ability to kill or inflate local acts of protests . 
The calculations made by these agents are critical for the 
development of informational cascades and it is therefore 
necessary to study their motivations more in detail .
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Convergence through Learning?  
Patterns of Exclusion During the Arab Uprisings
By Maria Josua, German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg
During the Arab uprisings, the mass demonstrations 
that took place in many countries triggered different 
reactions by incumbent elites towards protesters . Regime 
reactions ranged from concessions and reform promises 
to defamation, negative framing and repression . The initial 
benevolence towards demands deemed legitimate, such 
as socioeconomic grievances or government reshuffles, 
subsided over time and was replaced by “exclusive-
repressive policies” (Heydemann 2015) in the countries 
that slipped into protracted violence . However, in resilient, 
so-called “moderate,” autocracies such as Morocco, 
Jordan and Algeria, a negative attitude towards protest 
movements and the transnational ties between them 
also gained traction . Was this convergence towards the 
increasing delegitimation of transnationalism generally 
and of protesters more specifically due to learning by 
state actors in these countries? Learning is one crucial 
mechanism leading to convergence (Gilardi 2014), 
which can originate either in historical experience or the 
observation of external actors .
I look at various facets of exclusion, understood as “the 
neglect or rejection of the demands of certain groups and/
or disregard for or discrimination against their identity” 
(Josua 2016a: 7) . In the context of the Arab uprisings, the 
specific focus lies on the delegitimation and exclusion 
of protesters and different societal groups . From the 
multitude of mechanisms, I focus on three examples: 
negative and/or ethnical framing of protesters; banning 
dual nationals from public office; and physical exclusion . 
What these strategies have in common is that they seek 
to confine transnational ties and stop diffusion effects of 
activism from states undergoing profound change . As the 
exact mechanisms leading to convergence are difficult 
to trace, I outline some common strategies that deserve 
further study, building on evidence from recent literature 
on authoritarian learning (Heydemann and Leenders 2014, 
Bank and Edel 2015) . The cases considered here include 
countries with a high degree of volatility, though most are 
resilient autocracies . This uncovers broader patterns that 
currently shape Arab politics and that might continue to 
do so over the next years .
Framing Protesters vs. The Good Citizen
Participants in mass protests of the Arab uprisings were 
targeted by a variety of exclusionary discourses seeking to 
discredit them . In most Arab countries, the dominance 
of state media and some degree of self-censorship helped 
enhance the frequency of such frames . Their aim was to 
deter risk-averse citizens who were unsure whether to join 
the protests .
Already in early 2011, beginning with Ben Ali in Tunisia, 
officials framed protesters as foreign infiltrators, trouble-
makers, vandals or criminals in their discourse . An even 
blunter frame depicted all protesters as Islamists or even 
jihadists . Even in cases where protest mobilization was 
low, such as Jordan and Algeria, elites apparently felt the 
need to resort to these kinds of frames to delegitimize 
the protesters’ demands and to justify the security forces’ 
repressive actions . 
Dehumanizing framing of protestors was employed 
infamously in Libya where it backfired and to a lesser 
degree in Syria (Heydemann and Leenders 2014: 82) . Assad 
only once referred to conspiracies as germs then refrained 
from using this genocidal terminology (ibid .) . Branding 
protesters as terrorists became the default strategy in Syria 
“to legitimate its use of force, demonize its opponents, 
and communicate to the West that it and the Assad 
regime shared a common foe” (ibid .) . The anti-terrorism 
discourse neatly tied in with similar approaches in Western 
countries, where it symbolizes the ultimate justification for 
all measures sold as necessary, no matter who the group 
labeled “terrorist” actually is .
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Related to the discourse about foreign influence, conspiracy 
theories loomed large, e .g . Yemen and Syria, where they 
were first brought up very prominently in Assad’s March 
2011 speech . Allegations centered around Western 
democracy promotion schemes that were pictured as 
attacks on Arab states . Beyond the West, other enemies 
were suspected of meddling with domestic politics . Algeria 
probably even tried to create its own foreign conspiracy . An 
anonymous call for an uprising on 17 September 2011 was 
set up on Facebook, which appeared to have been faked . 
Also because it had no relation to domestic movements and 
political protests had long subsided, nobody followed it . 
The Minister of Interior was eager to blame “foreign parties 
related to the Zionist entity” in the newspaper Ennahar as 
the ultimate delegitimation . 
A subtler, but more disturbing method of deterring the 
general population from taking to the streets was to frame 
protesters as belonging to ethnic or religious minorities . 
The most notorious case is Bahrain (Shiites), but it also 
happened in countries with moderate protests, such as 
Jordan (Palestinians), Morocco (converted Christians, 
sympathizers of the Polisario movement) and Algeria 
(Kabylians, Christians) (Desrues 2013: 417-418, Josua 
2016a) . Some of these ascriptions were ad hoc statements 
by individual officials in order to cater to resentments 
and prejudices by the “mainstream” population . In some 
cases, they have become entrenched, leading to societal 
divisions and suspicion of others . This strategy of othering 
not only brought up the delicate question of identity, but 
also exposed the minorities themselves to open challenges 
by their compatriots . The side effect of such labeling was to 
unsettle group members . 
In a similar vein, government officials gradually employed 
and promoted a more nationalist discourse to deny the 
protesters’ loyalty to the nation . This was a counter-
reaction to the protesters’ use of national symbols such 
as flags and their insistence that the demonstrations were 
directed against the regime, not against the state . Strategies 
like sectarian framing of protests as discord with strong 
religious undertones (in Arabic, fitna) were employed 
in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Syria (Heydemann and 
Leenders 2014: 87f .), but this wording was also used in 
Algeria and Jordan .
Codified Nationalism
Xenophobic sentiment also translated into legal policies . 
Legislators in several states enacted laws that prevent dual 
citizens from assuming high public offices . This insulation 
was supposed to demonstrate that transnational ties 
and “foreign” influence were undesired . Egypt had had 
such a stipulation for a longer time, but Jordan followed 
suit after the protests in fall 2011 . The new regulation 
came into force retroactively, which meant that sitting 
members of parliament and ministers were forced to 
either revoke their citizenship of another state (such as 
the United States, Canada or Syria) or resign from their 
post (The Jordan Times, 13 October 2011) . On the one 
hand, this measure reflected a general growing suspicion 
of foreigners and “foreign agents .” As shown above, this 
suspicion was partly evoked by state discourses . On the 
other hand, the new law posed “significant challenges for 
political inclusion for some of the most educated and well-
trained Jordanians” (Tobin 2012: 97), not least those with a 
Palestinian background, who tend to hold dual citizenship 
more often than East Bank Jordanians do . Syria adopted a 
similar regulation in its 2012 constitution, Iraq attempted 
to codify a constitutional provision barring dual citizenship 
in 2009 and 2013, and most recently Algeria amended its 
constitution in 2016 with the same clause .
However, Jordan reversed its law in May 2016, as Egypt 
planned to do in 2015 . Official newspapers have not 
given any particular reason for this change . One possible 
interpretation is that the signaling function of keeping 
non-exclusive nationals away from spoils was more 
important than implementing the actual policy . However, 
later the negative effect of excluding potential office 
holders who were competent or important for co-optation 
might have prevailed in the decision for revoking the 
regulation . In this case, the adoption of the law could result 
from transnational learning, while its abolishment would 
be due to historical (domestic) learning . 
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Denial of Public Space
Another widespread strategy was the physical exclusion 
of protesters by denying them public space . Authoritarian 
regimes in general have an ambivalent attitude towards 
public gatherings unless they are in the rulers’ support . 
In the Arab uprisings, the appropriation of public space 
by protesters was the crucial point of empowerment . The 
ouster of Mubarak on February 11, 2011 was certainly 
a strong motivation for implementing harsh policing 
measures in the Algiers demonstrations that took place on 
the following day . On both days, all traffic to Algiers was 
halted, security forces checked cars and busses, preventing 
demonstrators from reaching the central meeting point at 
the Place du 1er Mai . Public servants and students were 
advised not to pursue their work in the capital in order 
to keep the streets empty . At the protest site, people were 
split into small groups to avoid larger mobilization of the 
population, so that just more than 1,000 protesters were 
met by 30,000 security forces . Analysts of Algerian politics 
cited previous domestic experiences with riot control as 
crucial for containing the protests . Although the massive 
presence of police has been a characteristic of Algeria’s 
recent past, it would be plausible to attribute the high level 
of precaution at least partly to learning from the negative 
example of Egypt, probably combined with historical 
learning . Without the dangerous Egyptian precedent, 
the Algerian leadership might have been content with 
deploying less forces to counter the demonstration . 
Following a similar logic of not allowing successful 
examples from abroad to gain hold domestically, 
in Bahrain the Pearl Roundabout’s importance was 
recognized as a symbolic and infrastructural center for the 
protest movement . Also in this case, a recognition of the 
crucial role that Tahrir Square in Cairo played probably 
led to authorities “learning from the losers .” Security forces 
therefore violently cleared Pearl Roundabout on the third 
day of its occupation in mid-February and for a second 
time in mid-March . Then they even destroyed the pearl 
monument in order to eliminate the protest movement’s 
main symbol (Bank & Edel 2015: 15), going far beyond 
challenging the protesters’ appropriation of public space . 
Convergence Through Learning? 
While the outcome of convergence towards exclusionary 
politics can be safely stated, tracing processes of learning 
is methodologically challenging . Learning in political 
science is understood as “a change of beliefs (or the degree 
of confidence in one’s beliefs) or the development of new 
beliefs, skills, or procedures as a result of the observation 
and interpretation of experience” (Levy 1994: 283) . In 
order to show that learning actually took place, first the 
“change in individual beliefs” and second policy change as 
a direct result of the changed beliefs should be observed 
(Levy 1994: 291) . However, learning does not always lead 
to policy change, but is likely to be successful when it 
reifies existing beliefs, thus impeding policy change (id .: 
290) . It is important to bear in mind that learning does 
not have to mean innovation . Learning might also be the 
confirmation of working strategies from an established 
repertoire under new circumstances . 
The chronological sequence of events is vital for identifying 
actual learners . Another desideratum is identifying the 
sources of learning . One central finding in Bank and Edel’s 
study is that the models of learning are contingent upon 
“proximity – either in terms of geographical closeness or 
in terms of political similarity” (2015: 21) . However, the 
threshold for establishing that learning has taken place 
is high because the cognitive processes among elites are 
a black box to outsiders who can only observe the policy 
outcomes . From a distance the evolution of individual 
decision-makers’ calculations is difficult to conjecture . As 
in-depth interviews with decision-makers are not available 
for these examples, in the following I sketch how learning 
as the mechanism at work could be studied, avoiding the 
trap of false positives judging only from the common 
outcome of converging strategies .
In the cases of physical exclusion, a thorough study would 
aim to empirically show whether learning from Egypt’s 
failure was a central part of the rationale behind massive 
protest proofing in Algeria and the destruction of the Pearl 
monument in Bahrain . Also counterfactual reasoning 
would help to strengthen an argument about the regional 
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influence that played into the calculus of decision-makers .
Regarding the legal provisions that exclude dual 
nationality holders from access to office, interviews with 
parliamentarians might provide insight into where the 
initiatives came from and whether the laws in other 
countries set the example . Even without direct evidence of 
authoritarian learning, the convergence on the legal level is 
striking . It is safe to say that the legal modifications were a 
response to a diffusing perception, namely the frame that 
foreigners are disloyal and the nation should be shielded 
against all kinds of external influence, even by dual 
nationals . A contrasting study of the cases where these 
laws have been subsequently abolished would be insightful 
for showing the locus of historical learning .
The common pattern of othering dissenters is also 
noteworthy, though direct learning is most difficult to trace 
here . The important result from the framing examples 
is that local conditions shaped the specific forms that 
these transnational patterns assumed to adapt them to 
the domestic audiences, as can be seen in the specific 
minority framing used in different countries . Nonetheless, 
the tendency of these discourses again converged around 
exclusion .
Outlook 
What is striking about the exclusionary mechanisms 
described above is that they were present in countries 
belonging to different post-uprising trajectories, 
irrespective of the exact course of events . The patterns thus 
seem to reflect a general thrust towards more exclusion . 
This development also transcends the monarchy-republic 
gap . The variety and breadth of exclusionary strategies 
points at their relevance for autocracies in general . 
However, using them can backfire as they ultimately have 
far-reaching repercussions and develop self-fulfilling 
dynamics reinforcing prejudices . The normative dimension 
of such a shift of repertoires has worrying consequences, 
almost inevitably leading to an erosion of societal cohesion .
Finally, how distinctive are the phenomena described 
above? Such patterns of exclusion are not unique to the 
Arab world, as Lisel Hintz (2016) showed in her study of 
Turkey . But even going beyond the Middle East, there is 
nothing specifically regional about the strategies . Nationalist 
discourses and the repression of dissent below the threshold 
of violent force are trademarks of authoritarian regimes 
worldwide . Nonetheless, exclusionary policies have been 
specifically justified by weathering the crisis of the Arab 
uprisings . In this sense, a historical moment offered the 
chance for implementing the described policies . After 
providing a glimpse into selected mechanisms of exclusion, 
the ways in which such repressive actions are justified to 
domestic and international audiences deserves to be studied 
in more detail .
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Collaboration and Community amongst the Arab Monarchies
Sean Yom, Temple University
The Arab uprisings resulted in regime change in several 
Middle East republics but none of the monarchies 
(Morocco, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, 
Oman, and the United Arab Emirates) . Since 2011-12, 
scholars have expressed renewed interest in the so-called 
durability of the Arab kingships, attempting to explain 
their cultural heritage, institutional endowments, and 
rentier wealth .1 Yet we should study not only what these 
royal autocracies are in terms of structure, but also what 
they do, in terms of agency . We must understand how they 
made certain choices and implemented new policies in an 
effort to survive .
In doing so, we can observe authoritarian diffusion 
1   See, for instance, Victor Menaldo, “The Middle East and North 
Africa’s Resilient Monarchs,” Journal of Politics 74, 3 (2012): 707-
722; Sean Yom and F . Gregory Gause, “Resilient Royals: How 
Arab Monarchies Hang On,” Journal of Democracy 23, 3 (2012): 
74-88; and André Bank, Thomas Richter, and Anna Sunik, “Long-
Term Monarchical Survival in the Middle East: A Configurational 
Comparison, 1945-2012,” Democratization 22, 1 (2015): 179-200 .
since 2011, in particular how the spread of common 
norms and ideas has helped catalyze unprecedented 
policy convergence among these eight regimes sharing 
a revitalized pan-royal identity . Many of the Arab 
monarchies have implemented shared policies in areas 
such as societal policing, sectarian inflammation, media 
suppression, and Gulf Cooperation Council expansion . 
This brief essay suggests that we cannot explain such 
convergence, the kind of inter-regime cooperation 
that Thomas Richter and André Bank invoke in their 
introductory essay, without first locating its ideational 
origins . Put another way, diffusion matters in this context 
as a causal variable, as the mechanism engendering a 
new pan-royal identity that, in turn, has facilitated policy 
collaboration and convergence among eight authoritarian 
monarchies .
There is some precedent for theorizing this . For one, 
comparative scholars know that much like liberal 
democracies share “best practices” and norms, 
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authoritarian regimes can diffuse “worst practices” 
regarding their repression, financing, and governance . 
Essays in this volume by Steve Heydemann, Maria Josua, 
and May Darwich show how Arab regimes have picked 
up specific practices of coercion and financing from one 
another during both war and peace . The other theoretical 
foundation comes from international relations . IR theorists 
know well how not just material interests but ideas 
enable disparate political groups to behave in concerted 
ways across borders . Work on epistemic communities as 
well as security communities uses that contested term, 
“community,” to show how shared truths (i .e ., consensual 
ways of viewing the world and processing information), 
allow actors to perceive one another as equal parts of a 
bigger collectivity that share a common identity and thus 
fate .2 The metaphor of community provides a striking way 
to interpret how Arab monarchies (i .e ., not just kings but 
also senior princes, cabinet ministers, and advisers tied to 
the palace) are coming to see and treat one another – as 
not simply strategic allies in a materialist sense, but also 
members of an embattled community of royalism whose 
way of political life is under attack .
What makes the Mideast monarchies distinctive, however, 
is that these regimes have tended to emulate and learn 
from one another far more than their republican allies 
since the Arab uprisings . Simply being a non-democracy 
is not enough: one must be a member of that endangered 
species called absolute monarchism to reap the fruits of 
this brand of diffusion . The closest historical equivalent 
to such selectivity within a broader landscape of regional 
authoritarianism is perhaps Operation Condor, the 
decade-long effort by the military intelligence services 
of Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay to 
eliminate leftist dissent . From 1975 through the mid-1980s, 
these leaderships exterminated numerous dissidents whose 
very existence threatened their shared model of right-
wing bureaucratic-authoritarianism . The collaboration 
2   Emanuel Adler and Peter Haas, “Epistemic Communities, World 
Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program,” International 
Organization, 46,1 (1992): 367-390; Amitav Acharya, Constructing a 
Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of 
Regional Order (London: Routledge, 2001);
among Arab monarchies since 2011 may well inaugurate 
a more modernized, stealthier version of such selective 
international cooperation . Little reported in the Western 
media, the interior ministers of the Arab League have 
met annually under the auspices of the Arab Interior 
Ministers Council, based in Tunis since the early 1980s . 
Like Operation Condor, these summits have allowed 
regime watchdogs to innovate and share new technologies 
of repression .3 Further, outside the region, autocratic “great 
powers” Russia and China counter liberal democratic 
norms by diffusing their own models of security and 
stability, in particular utilizing mechanisms like coercion 
and competition to promote authoritarianism in their 
respective spheres of influence .4
A Royal “We”
The Arab uprisings threatened all autocracies in the 
Mideast, but they made royal voices especially doubtful 
about their viability in the modern world . By viability, I 
mean the prospects for survival not simply as dictatorships 
(as there are plenty everywhere), but rather as biological 
enterprises built upon the twin pillars of familial succession 
and near-absolute control over the state apparatus . During 
2011, calls for malakiyyah destouriyyah (constitutional 
monarchy) from newly mobilized voices in these societies 
– not just suppressed minorities, but also students, 
workers, clerics, professionals, and others – resonated . For 
palace hardliners, the notion of constitutional monarchism 
was a “virus” contagiously spreading across their societies .5 
It cut as deeply as protest buzzwords like isqaat (downfall) 
due to its normative implications: it reminded absolutists 
that they were among the last royals left in the world 
clinging onto the coercive reigns of state ownership . One 
Gulf prince admitted that even the oil-rich kingdoms were 
3   “Qam‘ ‘arabi ‘abir lil-qaarat,” Al-Quds Al-Arabi, 18 March 2010 .
4   See, for instance, Thomas Ambrosio, “The Rise of the ‘China 
Model’ and ‘Beijing Consensus’: Evidence of Authoritarian Diffusion?” 
Contemporary Politics 18, 4 (2012): 381-399; Alexander Cooley, 
“Countering Democratic Norms,” Journal of Democracy 26, 2 (2015): 49-
63; and Christian von Soest, “Democracy Prevention: The International 
Collaboration of Authoritarian Regimes,” European Journal of Political 
Science 54 (2015): 623-638 .
5   “Malakiyyah destouriyyah maghribiyyah… masdar qaliq khaliji,” Al-
Quds Al-Arabi, 2 July 2011 .
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not “100 percent immune” to the uprisings, for at stake 
were principles of political representation rather than 
questions of economic well-being .”6 Indeed, some royals 
felt that this crisis posed a greater threat than the heyday 
of Arab Nationalism, which swept away royalism in Egypt, 
Iraq, Yemen, and Libya, for two reasons . First, unlike the 
turbulence of the 1950s and 1960s, absolutist royalism 
by 2011 had become virtually extinct everywhere else; 
outside the Middle East, only Swaziland and Brunei still 
abided by its tenets . Second, whereas Arab Nationalism 
was conveyed as a regional threat emanating from 
republican capitals like Cairo and Damascus, demands 
for constitutionalism came from the monarchies’ own 
societies .
Such existential fear compelled many leaders to fall 
back on the common norms that bound their familial 
regimes together . Between private dialogues and public 
media articulations, these consensual truths were many . 
One prominent example was the internalized principle 
of dynastic superiority, or “blood over ballots .” Blood 
over ballots establishes not only the distinction between 
monarchism and republicanism but also enshrines eternal 
political inequality: all else being equal, the worst member 
of a royal family still has more legitimacy to rule than 
the best commoner from society . Whereas father-son 
succession in dynastic republics like Syria or Azerbaijan 
was justified ex post facto on pragmatic grounds of national 
cohesion or effective leadership, monarchical power-
holding rests upon a genetic argument implying that blood 
alone renders the ruling family’s claim to power immune to 
popular contestation .
These and other consensual truths rendered visible a new 
pan-royal identity that coalesced by spring 2011 . This 
identity manifested through increased communication 
among the monarchies, which included not only direct 
lines between kings but also the lower-level exchanges 
between cabinet ministers, senior princes, and private 
emissaries . While much of this interaction was hidden 
6   “Duwwal al-khalij laysat muhsana dhidd al-thawrat [Qatari PM: Gulf 
Countries Not Impervious to the Revolutions],” Al-Akhbar Al-Yawm, 10 
November 2011 .
from the Arab media (and even when uttered, was 
glossed over with opaque euphemisms), one indicator of 
this shift was the increased level of talks involving only 
the monarchies . Frequent summits of foreign ministers 
representing just these eight countries exemplified 
this .7 These meetings brought together not just official 
emissaries but also various senior princes who could build 
upon previous interfamilial links crafted by decades of 
intermarriage, cross-investments, and social networks . 
Other cases of direct cross-royal exchanges were more 
obvious, such as the Jordanian regime emulating its 
Moroccan counterpart in promulgating constitutional 
“reforms” by summer 2011 in order to appease peaceful yet 
stubborn protests .8
The diffusion and coalescence of this pan-royal identity 
– an Arab royal “we” – should not imply that the Arab 
monarchies intended to form some grand confederation . 
Neither does it herald the sublimation of underlying 
identities (e .g ., tribal, national, geographic, familial), or even 
the elimination of past rivalries . Social scientists know well 
that identities are not only malleable but also compete with 
one another; the existence of one does not preclude the 
subsistence of another . The brief ideological spat between 
the Qatari and Saudi monarchies over which political 
faction to back in transiting states like Egypt and Tunisia, 
for instance, occurred at the same time that they both 
participated in more frequent monarchical meetings and 
communications . Pluralism is part of any communal social 
order, and only by considering the full range of patterned 
behaviors and ideas can we gain a textured appreciation of 
how complex this realm of ideas and beliefs is . 
Monarchical Cooperation
Starting in 2011, then, pan-royalism was a new source 
of collaborative policymaking among these monarchies . 
It was notably stronger than the old fear felt by the Gulf 
7   “Ijtimaa‘ wuzaraa’ khaarijiyyah duwwal majlis al-ta‘aawun al-khaliji 
wal-magrib wal-urdun al-ahad,” Al-Quds Al-Arabi, 9 September 2011 .
8   André Bank and Mirjam Edel, “Authoritarian Regime Learning: 
Comparative Insights from the Arab Uprisings,” GIGA Working Paper 
No . 274 (2015), Hamburg, Germany .
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kingdoms in the aftermath of the 1979 Iranian Revolution . 
There, the threat generated by the new Islamic Republic 
was conveyed in sectarian terms, and localized to the 
Arabian Peninsula – dictated more by place and religion 
rather than reactionary critiques of monarchism itself, and 
not exactly the catalyst for any new Gulf-oriented (khaliji) 
identity amongst Saudi Arabia and its five neighboring 
kingdoms .9
Still, how can we ascertain whether pan-royalism palpably 
spurred new forms of monarchical collaboration? One 
way is to examine specific cases of policy convergence and 
consider rival materialist explanations . Take, for instance, 
the effort to expand the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
by bringing in Morocco and Jordan alongside the six Gulf 
kingdoms . Completely bypassing the Arab League, this 
idea was first advocated in February 2011 and, despite 
some stumbles, is still discussed in foreign ministerial 
meetings . Some observers saw the initiative as an effort 
to convert the GCC, an otherwise ineffectual security 
alliance, into a broader “monarchies’ club” that could 
create a symbolic firewall protecting the royal autocracies 
from everyone else .10 
Establishing close ties to the oil-rich Gulf made strategic 
sense to resource-poor Jordan and Morocco, since they 
would receive far greater economic and invest aid . Yet 
what realistic benefit would it bring to the Gulf kingdoms? 
Neither the fly arc of Moroccan fighter jets nor the 
defensive prowess of Jordanian infantry would be much 
use in potential war against Iran . Likewise, the GCC 
intervention in Bahrain in March 2011 demonstrated that 
Saudi Arabia alone could help its smaller allies squash 
domestic threats . Geography likewise cannot explain this 
impetus from the Gulf to better protect its monarchical 
brethren . The Saleh regime in neighboring Yemen had 
long lobbied to gain entrance into this alliance, but to little 
avail; even at the height of its unrest, no official suggested 
9   Michael Barnett and F . Gregory Gause, “Caravans in Opposite 
Directions: State, Society, and the Development of Community in the 
Gulf Cooperation Council,” in Security Communities, 186-189 . 
10   “Tabaayin bi-sha’n tawsi‘ majlis al-ta‘aawun,” Al-Jazeera.net, 17 May 
2011 .
inserting Yemen into the GCC in order to preserve this 
allied dictatorship . 
Rather, the GCC expansionist policy reflected novel 
framework of pan-royalism kindled in the fires of the Arab 
uprisings . The heightened perception among monarchical 
voices that they were more alike than different ironically 
also explains why some of the smaller Gulf kingdoms 
slowed down the expansion process by 2012, preferring 
instead a longer timeline of negotiated admission . 
Reportedly, some in smaller Gulf kingdoms like Kuwait, 
Qatar, and Oman feared the contagious spread of popular 
protests from Morocco and Jordan to the Gulf, given the 
similarities these countries apparently shared .11
Another example of greater monarchical collaboration 
occurs in the realm of domestic policy, with the practice 
of “cross-policing,” in which royal governments smother 
domestic critics of other Arab monarchies, even if those 
critics never opposed their own dynasty . Since 2012, 
there have been dozens of cases of cross-policing across 
the monarchies . Only a few have broached the Western 
media, such as the incarceration of Jordanian Muslim 
Brotherhood official Zaki Bani Irsheid for criticizing the 
United Arab Emirates, or the startling detention of Kuwaiti 
parliamentarians due to their censure of Saudi policies and 
Bahraini treatment of Shi‘a . These cases are but the tip of 
the iceberg .
Cross-policing is hardly a new practice and has occurred 
between republics and monarchies in the past as well 
as the present – for instance, the Sissi regime in Egypt 
cracking down on anti-Saudi dissent . Yet two aspects of 
specifically royal cross-policing suggest that something 
deeper and ideational is operating: timing and domain . 
In terms of timing, virtually all cross-policing cases 
among the monarchies began after the November 2012 
Joint Security Agreement issued by the Gulf kingdoms 
and to which Morocco and Jordan assented . The JSA, 
first proposed in late 2011, called for signatories to 
11   “Jalsa sirri: sultanat oman taqud al-mu‘aaradha li-dhim al-urdun 
wal-maghrib lil-khaliji…” Al-Quds Al-Arabi, 14 December 2011 .
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“suppress interference in the domestic affairs” of other 
kingdoms, among other new requirements that blurred the 
boundaries between these kingdoms .12 
Second, the act of cross-policing has required syncretic 
legal framing and transnational coordination between 
the monarchies to a far greater degree than necessary 
given past practices of ad hoc crackdowns . Since 2012, the 
majority of the Arab kingdoms have promulgated revised 
“anti-terror” statutes that have not only extended the 
criminalization of speech to include all the monarchies but 
also expanded the purview of state monitoring itself to new 
areas, such as online social networks . Further, there have 
been almost no cases of cross-policing occurring from 
monarchy to republic; for instance, Jordanian censors are 
keen on preserving the image of the Gulf kingdoms, but 
seldom make trouble for critics of Egypt . In short, many 
of the Arab monarchies have systematized their legal 
strategies of suppressing reformist sentiments .
12   For one rare example of English reportage, see Madawi Al-Rasheed, 
“Kuwaiti Activists Targeted Under GCC Security Pact,” Al-Monitor, 20 
March 2015 .
Other examples of greater monarchical collaboration 
since the Arab uprisings that demand further research 
include the deliberate amplification of Sunni chauvinism 
during 2011-12 that went hand-in-hand with retrenching 
monarchist power, as well as democratic diffusion-
proofing, or common strategies of sanitizing media 
discourse and manipulate the public sphere in order 
to better insulate the domestic citizenry from external 
democratic norms . 
At the same time, this exploratory probe comes with 
a disclaimer . As constructivists have long understood, 
empirically proving that an idea, truth, or identity 
fundamentally caused a certain policy shift is difficult . 
Perceptions are notoriously intersubjective, and even the 
best evidence may reflect hindsight bias . Still, there is 
abundant reason to consider how the diffusion of pan-
royalism and the creation of a new communal order can 
help explain the origins and trajectory of monarchical 
collaboration since 2011, either as a substitute or else a 
complement to more traditional rationalist explanations . 
At the most, this proposition begs for further study; at the 
least, it dispels any lingering assumption that monarchism 
does not matter in the modern Middle East .
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Authoritarian strategies after the uprisings
Contagious Crumbling? Stability, Breakdown, and the 
Diffusion of Arab State Failure
Oliver Schlumberger, University of Tübingen
The three major outcomes of the Arab uprisings
This memo first maintains that there are three essential 
outcomes of the Arab uprisings of 2011, then focuses 
on one of them that I claim is the least studied . While 
the question of the title is answered to with a clear “no,” 
a larger new field of research appears on the horizon to 
which, by way of conclusion, I briefly suggest a few lessons 
to be taken into account as well as some possible starting 
points for further research .
It is often cited that four dictators were ousted as a 
consequence of the Arab uprisings and that Tunisia 
provides a (however fragile) case of democratic transition, 
disproving essentialist arguments about the absence 
of democracy in the Middle East . This, however, is but 
one out of three major political outcomes of the recent 
protest wave . A second is the survival of at least a dozen 
authoritarian regimes in the MENA region, lending 
credibility to the broad literature on authoritarian 
resilience, authoritarian learning, and strategies of regime 
survival . A less investigated third outcome is that not only 
regimes, but also states as such1 seem to have increasingly 
come under stress as a consequence of the mass uprisings, 
to the point where state fragility or, grave yet, of state 
collapse is imminent or manifest . This contribution focuses 
on the third and least studied outcome, which doubtlessly 
constitutes one of the “crucial current political dynamics” 
that Bank and Richter (2016) refer to in their conceptual 
note for the recent workshop .
The new relevance of statehood in the Middle East and 
North Africa
While a handful of state structures2 such as Iraq, Lebanon, 
Yemen and Palestine had, for various reasons, been 
infamous for the precarious state of their statehood prior 
to the Arab uprisings, the 2010s have brought to the 
fore a new dimension of state fragility in the region . Not 
only have the remnants of statehood in Iraq and Yemen 
worsened, but with Libya and Syria, two new cases have 
joined the “Arab league of failing states .” Yet other cases, 
including some with a comparatively longer history of 
independent statehood such as Egypt, Bahrain or even 
Morocco, cannot easily dismiss observers’ worries about 
the longer-term sustainability of their statehood .
In this politically diverse new Middle East and North 
Africa, Tunisia and Egypt under Sisi arguably occupy two 
poles on a continuum of political regimes . However, the 
group of states that either dramatically fail to fulfil the core 
functions associated with statehood3 (usually termed state 
failure) or that simply seem to dissolve physically (usually 
labelled state collapse) has been growing since 2011 .
This becomes particularly evident when looking at 
the three republics (apart from Egypt and Tunisia) 
that underwent massive political change as a direct 
consequence of the 2011 upheavals: Syria, Yemen, and 
Libya . Two saw an – at least formal – removal of the 
respective dictators (Yemen and Libya), whereas the third, 
Syria, continues to be headed by Bashar al-Assad whose 
regime has not been able to regain control over the entire 
territory ever since the conflict turned violent . Arguably, 
in summer 2015, it was mainly Russia’s massive air force 
support and ground troops that helped keeping Assad’s 
regime in place .
The former Yemeni president Ali Saleh, for his part, 
continues to be actively involved in Yemeni politics, 
inter alia by allegedly spin-doctoring – in an unlikely 
alliance with Shiite Houthi rebels – the January 2015 fall 
of his successor government led by Abedrabbo Mansour 
Hadi while eyeing to his return to the presidency . In the 
meantime, a UN-brokered “National Dialogue Conference” 
(NDC) chaired by interim president Hadi seemed 
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promising until early 2014, when it ended after two Houthi 
representatives were assassinated within a few weeks only 
and the group withdrew from the NDC (cf . NDC 2015; 
Gaston 2014) . While many of its eleven standing working 
groups had made considerable progress towards national 
reconciliation between most relevant social forces (except 
for al-Qaeda), it was the Southern issue that remained 
unsolved with no roadmap on how to achieve further 
progress . This was likely also due to the fact that while the 
Hirak movement was part of the NDC, other Southern 
groups remained excluded . Thus, while Yemen has figured 
high in the Fund for Peace’s Fragile States Index’ (FSI’s) 
ranking for many years, the regime collapse after the 
breakdown of the NDC is qualitatively different from the 
regime’s long-term failure to deliver essential public goods . 
In Yemen as well as in Syria, today the state itself is up for 
grabs by competing powers who all try, by violent means, 
to capture and re-build central state institutions . 
Both in Syria and in Yemen this struggle over the state has 
been accompanied by the renewed rise of militant Jihadist 
actors who not only oppose the formerly well-established 
regimes, but also propose alternative visions of a state . 
Notably in the case of the “Islamic State in Iraq and Syria” 
(ISIS or, in its Arabic acronym, da‘esh), a transnationalized 
understanding of statehood is debased from its notion 
of territoriality which almost all definitions of statehood 
include as a key marker . In that sense, ISIS’s vision of its 
Islamic State can be seen as a either a “plurinational” state, 
to borrow Bolivian president Evo Morales’ term, or even as 
a non-nation state .
Syria, Libya, and Yemen all fell into prolonged and at least 
regionalized (and in the Syrian case globalized) violent 
strife for power over the state to an extent that statehood 
as such is less of a given than it was before 2011 . Some 
see good reasons to classify the Libyan case, too, into the 
same box of violent conflict after the breakdown of a prior 
authoritarian regime: It resembles both other cases insofar 
as non-state armed groups (ISIS as well as others) could 
make considerable inroads there both in terms of followers 
and territorial gains . It resembles the Yemeni case insofar 
as the country has fallen into prolonged political crisis with 
two opposing governments in Tobruq and Tripoli, each 
of which claimed to act as the legitimate representative of 
the Libyan people . The December-2015 agreement that 
enabled the establishment of a “Government of National 
Accord” still has uncertain prospects of pacifying the 
country in the light of greatly factionalized militias and 
splits in both the Tobruq and the new unity government .
Apart from the three cases discussed here, however, 
we must not forget the range of other countries of the 
MENA that remain fragile . Lebanon has long experienced 
a volatile situation, which is even truer yet of Iraq . Less 
thought of in that context, Egypt and Iran also figure 
among the FSI’s 50 most fragile countries (out of 178) . 
Taken together, the group of fragile, failed or collapsed 
states makes for no less than seven countries of the core of 
the MENA region, and Palestine is not even listed in the 
FSI . Furthermore, if the geographical margins of the region 
were to be taken into account, Arab League members such 
as Mauretania, Djibouti, Somalia and Sudan would have to 
be added . In fact, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates are 
the only Arab states which the FSI rates as “stable” (Fund 
for Peace 2016) .
This all means that roughly half of the Arab political 
entities today are either directly threatened by or have 
already fallen victim to state failure . While the task of 
studying authoritarian resilience has thus certainly not 
vanished for scholars, researchers as well as policy-makers 
will have to give much greater consideration to questions 
of statehood in this post uprisings region .
Is there a diffusion of state failure?
Some factors may seem to support the assumption 
that there is an element of contagion or diffusion in the 
processes sketched out above . When looking for potential 
causes for the observed accumulation of state decay in the 
MENA region, two overarching factors might be relevant: 
Temporality and territoriality . By temporality I mean, 
in this context, the proximity in time of cases of regime 
breakdown and subsequent state failure and/or collapse as 
it happened in Yemen, Libya and Syria and beyond . This 
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proximity in time is undoubtedly given . 
Territoriality, however, seems more questionable: Among 
the prominent three cases I have focused on above, one 
is in the Levant, one in North Africa, and one on the 
outermost edges of the Gulf peninsula . While students 
of “democratic diffusion” differ as to what factors they 
see as causal for the spatial clustering of democratization 
processes, they unanimously do tell us that the likelihood 
of diffusion processes increases with geographic proximity 
(cf ., i .a ., Starr 1991; O’Loughlin et al . 1998; Gleditsch & 
Ward 2006; Elkink 2011; Brinks & Coppedge 2006) . If 
we assume that diffusion of regime traits has anything in 
common with the diffusion of the erosion of statehood 
and that it is thus permissible to adopt the theorem of 
geographic proximity influencing such diffusion processes, 
then the territorial dimension seems less given in the 
clustering of state failure/collapse in the MENA than the 
temporal one .
Therefore, it seems wise to search for factors other than 
purely geographical ones in order to carve out reasons 
for the sudden downfall not only of political regimes but 
also of states . Diffusion in the simplistic sense of spill-over 
processes that permeate world regions due to geographic 
proximity seems counterintuitive as the causal chain would 
need to be very long for such spill-overs of state failure . In 
that sense, then, it seems fairly safe to answer the question 
of whether there is a (direct or simple) diffusion of state 
failure/state collapse in the negative . However strong 
authoritarian learning or cooperation may be, it obviously 
failed in preventing a number of regimes from falling apart 
to the point that the state as such eroded and collapsed .
Three Lessons
As signals of state failure within the region are quite 
obviously cumulating, there must be reasons for this . 
Searching for explanations to the recent clustering of state 
failures in the MENA, the option that is probably closest 
at hand would be to look into the monarchy-republic 
divide – and quite a number of authors have recently done 
so (e .g ., Lucas 2014; Derichs & Demmelhuber 2014; Bank, 
Richter & Sunik 2014; idem . 2015) . Some have argued 
that this is related to the specific position of monarchs as 
residing “above” their polities and not even theoretically 
up for contestation (e .g ., Williamson 2012; Hinnebusch 
2015: 30), while others have discussed the specific sources 
of legitimacy available to monarchs but not to presidents 
(Schlumberger 2010) .
Yet this new literature on monarchical survival likely 
contains a bias in that it overemphasizes monarchical 
survival in the sense that monarchies did come under 
pressure as a consequence of the recent mass protests, 
whereas it may underestimate republican survival (e .g ., 
if cases such as Egypt are considered as breakdowns 
of political order as such)4 . Remember that the first 
international military intervention was not the Western 
alliance in Libya, but rather the Saudi led GCC forces in 
Bahrain, whose state may not have survived without it5 . 
And while Jordan, with a cosmetic reaction, remained 
relatively quiet, the long-term stability of Morocco is 
certainly not a given even though the regime managed to 
disperse the 20 February movement quickly by pro-actively 
embarking on constitutional reform, thus presenting the 
king as a spearheading positive change . On the other hand, 
republics such as Egypt count as regime breakdowns in 
most analyses, which remains highly doubtful in the light 
of the fact that at no point in time did Egypt’s military elite 
cede political power (which it arguably has occupied ever 
since 1952) . Thus, there are at least several non-marginal 
question marks that render the monarchy-republic 
distinction a less airtight explanation of statehood failure 
in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings .
Apart from the empirical question marks, however, 
another such question is what we actually mean when we 
say that four of the republics “did not survive” whereas 
all of the monarchies did . In Egypt, I would argue, the 
regime certainly did survive, but statehood increasingly 
came under stress . More concretely, we need to distinguish 
more carefully between “regime” on the one hand and 
“state” on the other when talking about “survival” or 
“stability .” Tunisia, for instance, represents a case of regime 
breakdown while statehood remained intact . Syria, by 
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contrast, lends itself as an example of a regime being more 
resilient even than the state it ran, and thus represents, 
in a sense, the opposite of Tunisia (i .e . regime survival 
despite state failure) . Before the breakdown of the National 
Dialogue, Yemen could also be placed in that category, but 
after the Hadi government stepped down, both regime 
and state have not only failed but de facto collapsed . Thus, 
there is an urgent need to better and more carefully map 
the phenomena we are talking about, as the Arab uprisings 
did not just happen “between democratization and 
authoritarian persistence” on the regime level, but also on 
the level of the state .
Three lessons follow from the above: First, and on an 
analytical level, we need to distinguish more carefully than 
before between the concepts of “state” on the one hand 
and “regime” on the other . A second conclusion sounds 
trivial but has largely been ignored by a good deal of the 
respective literature: we also need to distinguish more 
carefully between state failure (referring to the functional 
dimension) on the one hand and state collapse (referring 
to the institutional dimension) on the other . Third, as 
has become obvious from the above, neither diffusion 
in a simple sense of spillover effects due to geographic 
proximity nor the monarchy-republic divide seem to offer 
convincing explanations for the more prominent role 
precarious statehood as such plays in the post-2011 Middle 
East (and accordingly for future research) .
Some Starting Points for Further Analysis
A first core factor that needs attention in a more 
microscopic examination of the clustering of state failure 
in the Middle East is its international dimension and more 
precisely direct military intervention . In all three cases 
highlighted above, foreign military forces have massively 
intervened in search of an outcome to conflictual situations 
that caters to their own interests . This story starts with 
the Saudi-led GCC intervention into Bahrain with the 
goal of saving its monarchy from the challenge posed by 
street protests; apparently, neighboring regimes did not 
trust in the success of the Bahraini monarchy’s narrative 
about the uprisings as being merely Iran-inspired sectarian 
strife . The intervention gave Bahraini security forces the 
necessary leeway to clamp down on protesters in Pearl 
Roundabout and crush the protests . However, after a sham 
national dialogue that faded away without tangible results, 
the Bahraini state is still precarious, while protesters to a 
large extent did not buy hastily made-up “evidence” that 
was supposed to “prove” the uprising was instigated by 
Iran and was only Shiite in nature .
Likewise, the downfall of colonel Ghaddafi’s regime came 
about through the establishment of a no-fly zone and 
military intervention by NATO and allied Arab forces . 
Even today, under the national unity government, external 
forces continue to actively support autonomous militias 
that operate outside (and at times against) the command 
of the new central government the establishment of which 
was brokered by the UN between the opponent competing 
predecessors, the GNC in Tripoli and the House of 
Representatives at Tobruq . One example among others 
is the “Libyan National Army,” a militia run by General 
Haftar who refuses to support the UN-backed unity 
government and which is being supported by Egypt and 
the UAE (Ezzat 2016), among others, as well as reportedly 
even by Western countries (Al-Jazeera 2016) . And in Syria, 
not only Russian air-force assisted the Assad regime, but 
also ground troops of similar origin, while reports about 
special forces from the US, the UK, France and Germany 
operating within Syria (albeit mostly combatting ISIS), 
abound . In Yemen, finally, it is once more Saudi Arabia 
that has intervened directly militarily, allegedly committing 
war crimes against the Yemeni population (Mohamed 
& Shaif 2016) . Saudi Arabia is leading a coalition that 
consisted of forces from nine Arab states6 plus a range of 
apparently UAE-trained mercenaries of various countries 
of origin (Hager & Manzetti 2015) . In 2015-16 alone, 
Moroccan, Saudi, Emirati, Australian, Bahraini, Sudanese 
and Colombian soldiers and officers as well as privately 
contracted soldiers have reportedly been killed inside 
Yemen (The Australian 2015; Almasmari 2015), while an 
attack on a coalition base in the Maarib province lead to 
the UAE’s largest military casualties in the history of its 
armed forces (Ghobari 2015) .
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Second, it is not only direct military intervention but, 
equally important in the international dimension, the 
indirect involvement of external actors that has sparked or 
reinforced processes of state failure and collapse . It must 
be equally stressed that arms, persons and ideas travel 
easily across borders in today’s Middle East . There is little 
doubt today among observers that financing of arms and 
equipment by various Gulf countries of Syrian rebel groups 
greatly influenced both the relative strength of individual 
groups and the direction of the course of events within 
the Syrian conflict . Likewise, the U .S . and British support 
to the Saudi-led coalition in the Yemeni conflict plays a 
major role in the destruction of the country . Not only have 
cluster bombs of American origin reportedly caused great 
humanitarian damage, but the arms sales in general, by the 
U .S . and the UK, have contributed to the coalition’s ability 
to execute large-scale military operations in that country . 
More than 2 .5 million internally displaced civilians 
and 83 per cent of Yemen’s population depending on 
humanitarian assistance are just one result of this conflict 
(cf . Mohamed & Shaif 2016) .
Thus, even though “state intervention and coercion fall 
outside the scope of this concept [cooperation; OS] due 
to the massive pressure exercised by more powerful 
actors” (Bank & Richter 2016: 3), the strategies and 
policies of external actors, in both their direct and indirect 
dimensions, remain a forceful explanatory element for 
the spatial clustering of state failure and state collapse 
in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings . Much more 
systematic and in-depth research is necessary to unearth 
the mechanisms and consequences by which actors within 
and outside the region have actively contributed to the 
phenomenon under scrutiny here, which is beyond the 
scope of this memo .
Third, however, such direct and indirect international 
involvement does not explain everything . When cases 
of an erosion of statehood accumulate to the extent seen 
today in the Arab world, this might well be a sign of a 
more general underlying process that transcends the 
mere fact that borders are permeable and boundaries are 
porous . They have been porous before . The discussed 
accumulation of state failure and fragility in today’s Middle 
East comes with a quite successful project, not of state 
decay, but of state-building, namely the one undertaken 
by ISIS . Through a very simple ideology, large-enough 
amounts of people and resources have successfully been 
mobilized for their leaders to engage in a project that can 
arguably be described as the building of a state-like entity 
that, at least within the territory it controls, manages to 
fulfil several of the functions of traditional states (such 
as extraction, monopoly to the use of force, effective 
administration, etc .) . This Janus-faced process of state 
erosion on the one hand and state-building on the other 
might well hint to a deeper underlying crisis of legitimacy 
of the political orders established decades ago .
Violence, as the absence of security (probably the core state 
function), usually does not start at the international level . 
At least in the cases discussed here, there has been a highly 
conflictual constellation of actors on the domestic scene 
before military intervention that usually involved equally 
high levels of violence exercised mostly by state agents, 
but which cannot fully be captured by the state’s Weberian 
claim to the “monopoly of violence .” Rather, it is the equally 
Weberian legitimacy of that claim that, in the perception 
of large parts of the societies concerned, has been absent 
before violence by non-state actors spread against ruling 
regimes . 
Traditionally, one of the strongest generators of a sense of 
legitimate rule has been reference to a common national 
belonging shared by the ruled . Related to this, another 
observation could provide a potential starting point for 
a preliminary mapping of state failure in the Middle 
East: The cases of state failure and/or collapse that have 
occurred in the MENA arguably differ in kind . For some 
cases, the question of national unity (or the lack thereof), 
which had been highlighted by Rustow (1970) decades ago, 
plays an obvious role (e .g ., Libya, Yemen, but potentially 
also for Bahrain) . This point does not only refer to the 
variable ethnic heterogeneity, but represents a question 
that touches directly on the concept of the nation-state 
in a broader sense . 7 Egypt, Tunisia, and Syria can all 
be said to have a significant awareness of a common 
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nationhood, despite marked differences in the degree 
of ethnic and religious heterogeneity .8 Thus, not only a 
sharper differentiation between state and regime, but 
also a mapping along the dimensions of state vs . nation 
could potentially also yield insights into the observed 
phenomenon of an accumulation of state failure in the 
Middle East . 
But more needs to be said on the issue of intra-societally 
conflictual constellations of actors . While the majority 
of Arab countries today are involved in various sorts of 
military action outside their own borders, the majority 
of those conflicts stem from struggles over who owns 
the right to rule within national borders . Thus, at the 
heart of most of today’s cases of state failure and collapse 
lie domestic disputes over political rule, and over how 
political rule can legitimately be exercised .
In this respect, then, the question of whether it was a 
president or a monarch who has been toppled, and even 
the question of whether such a toppling has actually 
occurred or not, are maybe not the ones of utmost 
importance . Rather, we need more fine-grained analyses 
about the nature and degree of conflict and consent that 
exist between incumbents and those they govern . States in 
which the relationship between rulers and ruled is highly 
conflictual are, in this view, more likely candidates for the 
outbreak of violent conflict which, in turn, may lead to 
state erosion and collapse . In the words of one of the most 
prominent liberal thinkers: “To the extent that one tries to 
suppress social conflicts, these gain in potential virulence, 
thus demand for yet more violent suppression, until finally 
no power on earth is able to repress the energies of conflict 
that have been bereft their expression” (Dahrendorf 1961: 
226) . In that sense, then, we are cast back to the question of 
the nature of political regimes when analyzing state failure . 
In other words, the coincidence of the Middle East having 
been the world’s most unfree region for decades and 
the fact that now, after protests erupted, a most striking 
cluster of state failure and collapse emerges, might not 
be entirely accidental . This observation may come with 
potentially massive implications for the policy community: 
Western strategies to support some of the world’s most 
repressive leaders for the sake of gaining “stability” have, 
grosso modo, not changed after the Arab uprisings . But 
in the light of the above, this could actually not only fail 
to produce political stability in one of the world’s most 
conflict-ridden regions, but also directly contribute to the 
exacerbation of intra-societal conflict .
The suggestions presented here obviously cannot, in 
themselves, deliver a comprehensive explanation for the 
phenomenon of state failure and state collapse in the 
Middle East . However, they can provide possible new 
lenses for looking at the phenomenon that might enable us 
to see things we might otherwise miss . That said, the range 
of other potentially relevant factors still remains broad . 
At least some of those that have not been discussed here 
will sound familiar . This is not least because they are likely 
symptomatic of the intimate link between statehood and 
political regimes that exists – despite the above call for a 
more careful differentiation between the two .
In sum, the look at the Middle Eastern political landscape 
presented here may serve to identify elements of a future 
agenda for research . While the puzzles of such an agenda 
will likely be too vast for any individual project to resolve, 
I hope that the ideas sketched out here might help in 
identifying possible avenues for further research .
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(Endnotes)
1   There is no room here to engage in a deeper discussion 
about contending definitions of the “state .” Suffice it here 
to say that for the present uses an understanding of the 
state that is informed essentially by Max Weber’s (1947 
[1922]: Ch . 1, § 17) classical (and in many contemporary 
definitions still crucial) elements of a state as the set of 
public institutions which lay (successful) claim to the 
monopoly of the legitimate use of force to rule politically 
over a given population within an identifiable territory . Cf . 
also Dubreuil (2010: 189); a good introductory overview of 
approaches to studying the state is by Hay, Lister & Marsh 
(2006) .
Likewise, I use the term “state failure” here in a rather 
“naïve” way with little differentiation simply because there 
is no room to engage in larger conceptual discussions . For 
useful critiques of the concept, see, i .a ., Call (2008); Eriksen 
(2010); or Boege et al . (2009) .
2   By this term, I do not mean to imply any statement 
about the legal status of disputed territories . Rather, this 
text is about the non-legal dimensions of statehood .
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3   These are security, welfare, and representation; cf ., 
i .a ., Milliken & Krause (2002) . Note that contrary to 
most readings, “representation” is not synonymous with 
the specific kind of democratic representation that is 
achieved through free and fair elections, but what has to be 
represented is referred to by these authors as “the symbolic 
identity of state subjects” (ibid .: 757) .
4   I contend that Egypt represents a case of neither a 
breakdown of statehood nor of regime .
5   Additionally, the international community all too 
quickly bought the Bahraini regime’s discourse about 
the sectarian nature of the protests and did not respond 
positively to local demands for change, but rather quietly 
endorsed Saudi Arabia’s intervention .
6   These are: Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE, Morocco, 
Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Sudan, and Jordan .
7   Two other dimensions are directly linked to this 
question of the “nation”: First, the common strategy 
used by authoritarian leaders to “play the identity card” 
(or to engage pro-actively in sectarian policies) as 
part of a divide-and-rule tactics for autocratic regime 
maintenance, and second, the increasingly common 
trans-nationalization of political conflicts in cases where 
statehood has been weakened, as happened in Iraq, 
Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, and others .
8   A striking case is the failure of the state in Palestine 
where the sense of nationhood is likely larger than in any 
other Middle Eastern state-like entity .
To Intervene or Not to Intervene?
The Use of Military Force as Coercive Mechanism of Autocratic Diffusion
May Darwich, Durham University
The 2011 Arab uprisings appeared to some to indicate a 
wave of democracy shaking long-lasting autocratic regimes 
in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya, and Syria . However, this 
overjoyed moment that was supposed to sweep Arab 
countries along the path of regime change, very quickly 
evaporated as authoritarian regimes adopted measures 
countering democratic diffusion across the region . Just as 
the growing literature on the international dimension of 
authoritarianism observed in previous historical waves, 
the 2011 uprisings have been followed by counter-diffusion 
waves (Weyland 2013; Gunitsky 2014; Elkins and Simmons 
2005) . The spread of autocratic ideas and policies through 
various causal mechanisms – such as learning, emulation, 
persuasion, socialization, and others – shaped the post-
2011 order . Whereas these mechanisms of diffusion are 
distinctive in the lack of intentionality, the post-2011 
uprisings unravelled other mechanisms of active diffusion . 
In their counter-diffusion endeavor, the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) states undertook several military 
interventions to shape transitions in Libya, Bahrain, and 
Yemen . 
These military interventions1 appear to conform to what 
some scholars have qualified as coercive mechanisms of 
1   I adopt a wide definition of intervention allowing some variation in 
the purpose of intervention but also in the extent to which they aim to 
alter domestic institution in the target state . I therefore define a military 
intervention as an overt, short-term deployment of ground troops 
across international boundaries to influence the political outcome 
in another state . This definition follows Finnemore (2004, 9–10) and 
Saunders (2011,21) .
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autocratic diffusion (Ambrosio 2010; Braun and Gilardi 
2006, 309–310) . Scholars have traditionally included 
coercion as a mechanism of diffusion alongside learning, 
emulation, and competition . In contrast to these horizontal 
interdependencies that are at the core of diffusion 
literature, coercion emphasizes a top-down pressure . In 
other words, coercion is a mechanism of vertical diffusion 
that reflects a hierarchical interdependence between 
actors . Coercive diffusion is a process where powerful 
states explicitly or implicitly influence the probability 
that weaker nations will adopt the policies they prefer . 
This process aims to manipulate the opportunities and 
constraints encountered by target countries to stimulate 
policy change . In some instances, coercion takes a “soft” 
form, such as political or financial assistance . It can also 
take a “hard” approach, such as strings attached to financial 
assistance or the use of military of force (Simmons, 
Dobbin, and Garrett 2006, 790–791) . Accordingly,  
coercive mechanisms of autocratic diffusion reveal an 
intentional motive to support an existing authoritarian 
regime or to impose a preferred authoritarian regime or 
policy in a neighboring country .
Since the establishment of modern Arab states, inter-
Arab interventions and interferences have shaped the 
international relations of the Middle East . Some of these 
interventions were driven by ideological rivalry in the 
context of the Arab Cold War, such as the Egyptian 
intervention in Yemen (1962-1967) . Others were motivated 
by territorial claims and security concerns resulting 
from state formation dilemmas in the region – such 
as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (1961 and 1991), the 
Syrian occupation of Lebanon (1976-2005), and Jordan’s 
interventions in the West Bank . The use of military force 
by the GCC states in either supporting or undermining 
their fellow autocrats emerged as one of the most vexing 
autocratic strategies, brining new dimensions to inter-Arab 
politics . Whereas the Saudi-led intervention in Bahrain 
exhibited an autocratic cooperation in support of the Al 
Khalifa regime, other interventions were driven by the 
willingness to topple opponent dictators while critically 
altering the domestic landscape of the countries under 
transition . For instance, the United Arab Emirates and 
Qatar’s interventions in Libya, as well as the Saudi-led 
intervention in Yemen, employed strategies to alter the 
existing authoritarian structures in these countries . While 
these interventions varied in the drivers and motives, 
the choice of a military strategy over other means of 
interference remains an underlying puzzle . Whereas 
military interventions were conducted in Bahrain, Yemen, 
and Libya, the indirect military effort was a strategic choice 
in Syria . Moreover, the Gulf states choose financial and 
diplomatic means elsewhere, namely in Egypt, Tunisia, 
Jordan, and Morocco . 
The use of military force as a coercive mechanism of 
autocratic diffusion in the post-2011 Middle East not 
only brings new insights to inter-Arab politics, but also 
illuminates a “blind spot” within the contemporary foreign 
policy debate on interventions . While the scholarship 
on interventions has been confined to those tasked with 
understanding the foreign behavior of democracies, and 
Great Powers in particular (Owen 2002; Krasner 1999; 
Owen 2010; Bull 1984; Saunders 2011)the most costly 
form of such interventions, between 1555 and 2000 . I 
note several patterns in the data: these interventions 
come in three historical clusters; they are carried out by 
states of several regime types; states engage in the practice 
repeatedly; target states tend to be undergoing internal 
instability; states tend to promote their own institutions; 
and targets tend to be of strategic importance . The 
most intensive periods of promotion coincide with high 
transnational ideological tension and high international 
insecurity . I argue that these two conditions interact: 
forcible promotion is most likely when great powers (1, 
the post-2011 developments in the Middle East bring the 
authoritarian dimension to the study of interventions . This 
coercive mechanism of diffusion poses several questions . 
First, is the use of force a mere conflict initiation based on 
states’ security concerns or one that is driven by autocratic 
dynamics? Second, when and why do autocratic regimes 
decide to use military force among other interference 
strategies? 
This memo examines the study of these emerging 
interventionist policies in the post-2011 Middle East in 
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light of theoretical debates within IR Theory and Foreign 
Policy Analysis (FPA) . It explores the existing scholarship 
on military interventions while identifying some gaps and 
avenues for future research . I argue that the scholarship on 
interventions is mostly structure-based and, hence, falls 
short of offering a systematic explanation of interventions 
as an autocratic coercive mechanism . Instead, the memo 
calls for more attention to the agency of leaders and their 
perceptions as well as decision-making structures .
Structural Explanations to Autocratic Interventionist 
Policies
Although the literature on autocratic military interventions 
is sparse compared to the upsurge in the literature on 
interventions by democracies, a small number of studies 
have explored the use of military force by autocracies in 
international relationships . Two explanations for the use of 
force stand out: one focused on its utility as a mere conflict 
initiation based on states’ international security concerns 
and the other shaped by domestic factors, i .e . the nature of 
authoritarian politics .
The first strand in the literature belongs to neorealism in IR 
Theory . Neorealists argue that the anarchic international 
environment produces external threats and opportunities 
such as shifts in the relative capabilities or regional 
alignments . From this perspective, autocratic states are 
like democratic ones when they behave at the international 
levels . Scholarly interest in the GCC interventions has, 
for the most part, been approached through neorealist 
lenses of regional power interests and geopolitics (Young 
2013) . Accordingly, threat perception, shaped by power 
rivalry with Iran, constitutes the main driver behind these 
interventionist policies (Obaid 2015) . These explanations 
cannot, however, unravel why the GCC states chose to 
intervene in some cases, such as Libya and Yemen, but not 
in others, Syria in particular . Furthermore, the nature of 
security threats is not obvious in many cases, such as Libya 
or Yemen . In short, these explanations account for neither 
the variation in interventions across cases nor the choice of 
military strategies over other means of interference .
Other domestic-level explanations have attempted 
to explain the aggressive international behavior of 
autocracies . One strand of research concludes that regime 
type and the structure of the elite in power answer why 
some autocracies are more belligerent than others . For 
example, Peceny and Butler (2004) argue that personalist 
dictatorships are more likely to recourse to the use of force . 
This argument builds on the selectorate theory of Bueno 
de Mesquita et al . (2003) . From this perspective, leaders’ 
decision to go to war is dependent on their insulation 
from the ruling coalition . Another strand of the literature 
focuses on domestic institutions, arguing that autocracies 
be driven by domestic vulnerabilities . For instance, Lai and 
Slater (2006) find that military regimes are more likely than 
single-party regime to initiate international disputes as a 
diversionary strategy from domestic problems . In the same 
vein, Debs and Goemans (2010) show that leaders care 
about their own survival and seek to avoid punishment, 
such as death, exile, or imprisonment . The decision of 
war then becomes a gamble . Weeks (2012; 2014) also 
argues that to account for why some autocracies are more 
war-prone than others one must examine if leaders are 
constrained by domestic audiences . Building on this strand 
of literature, the GCC’s interventions can be explained 
through the monarchical regime type or the lack of 
audience and accountability . Nevertheless, these domestic 
explanations do not account for the non-compliance 
of Oman with the intervention in Yemen or Qatar’s 
willingness to diverge from GCC foreign policy positions 
in Libya and elsewhere . 
Although this emerging literature has transcended 
the scholarly reading of authoritarian regimes as one 
category and taken into account their variety, the above 
explanations focus on either the structural nature of the 
regional system or the regime type . These slow-changing 
factors cannot explain how states approach interventions 
and why they choose military force over other strategies 
to shape domestic outcomes in neighboring countries . 
Moreover, while these scholarly efforts have proposed 
important hypotheses about autocracies and wars, they 
have focused on the initiation of international conflict . Yet 
scholars and policymakers have a poor understanding of 
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the incentives driving the use of military force as a coercive 
mechanism of autocratic diffusion, a particular type of 
conflict initiation . The use of military force in this context 
thereby constitutes a blind spot in our understanding of 
the foreign policy behavior of autocratic regimes in general 
and the emerging interventionist policies of the GCC in 
particular . 
Agent-Based Approaches: The Way Forward?
The foreign policies of GCC states have often been the 
prerogative of the ruling families, their trusted individuals, 
based on tribal or family basis (Baabood 2003, 265–267) . 
The dynamics of interventionist policies in the Middle 
East coincided with a generational shift in the leadership 
of GCC states – namely Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE 
– with new faces in the decision-making circles willing to 
take assertive and ambitious foreign policy decisions . This 
shift in leadership led to reshuffled ministries and changes 
within the close circle of ruling elite . These developments 
necessitate the incorporation of individual-level factors 
in the analysis . Although leaders operate within domestic 
and international structures, the cases show that leaders’ 
individual characters have a significant influence on 
interventions and foreign policy decisions . This type of 
informal influence on the decision-making process needs 
to be thoroughly examined . How do leaders’ perceptions, 
beliefs, personality traits, psychological biases, and political 
effectiveness shape interventionist policies? The crucial 
impact of individuals – leaders, members of the executive 
authority, and bureaucrats – on war and diplomacy in 
Middle Eastern international relations has been ignored 
and marginalized for decades, with few exceptions (M . 
Hermann et al . 2001; M . Hermann 1988; Malici and 
Buckner 2008) . 
Two strands of research within FPA constitute a potential 
ground for developing systematic insights about these 
autocratic military interventions . First is the poliheuristic 
theory of foreign policy . This approach argues that leaders 
often cut through the plethora of complex information 
available during the decision by employing cognitive 
shortcuts . In the meantime, leaders are concerned first and 
foremost by their political survival (Kinne 2005) . From this 
perspective, the use of military force in interventions can 
be related to threat perception and policy prioritization, 
but also includes the psychological factors influencing 
leaders’ perceptions . The poliheuristic theory of foreign 
policy has, for instance, provided a potential explanation 
to the Gulf states’ varied responses to the 2011 uprisings, 
either supporting or undermining fellow autocrats 
(Odinius and Kuntz 2015) . By taking the decision-making 
process into account, this approach can account for the 
variation in the interventionist policies of the Gulf states . 
The second cluster of research is the psychological 
approach in FPA, which includes a focus on personality 
traits, leaders’ beliefs, analogies, framing, threat 
perception, misperception, and information processing 
in uncertainty (M . G . Hermann 1980; Jervis 1976; Levy 
2003; Kaarbo 1997; Edelstein 2002) . As some of these 
interventionist policies evolved alongside a change in 
the leadership of the some Gulf states, it is important 
to pay attention to the goals and idiosyncrasies of this 
new generation of leaders . Like structural approaches to 
international relations, the first image does not provide all 
the answers . Yet, the study of the decision-making process 
and the role of individuals can be one part of a larger 
whole, and ignoring these can come at the determinant of 
a complex understanding of regional dynamics . Of course, 
recognizing the importance of these factors will make the 
scholarly endeavor more complex, due to the closed nature 
of authoritarian regimes . Such challenges, however, will 
result in a richer product that is better able to explain these 
contentious phenomena .
To summarize, recent interventions by the GCC states 
have been treated as sui generis cases, focusing on the 
foreign policies of individual cases rather than developing 
more generic or systematic insights on why and when 
authoritarian regimes intervene using military force 
as a coercive mechanism of autocratic diffusion . The 
GCC interventionist policies are examples of a wider 
pattern of new interventionism led by authoritarian 
states to shape transitions in their regions – for example, 
Russia’s interventions in Ukraine and Syria (Leonard 
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2016) .  Developing agent-focused approaches to foreign 
policies of autocrats bears the potential of enriching our 
understanding of Middle Eastern international relations, 
and the aggressive conduct of autocracies in the Middle 
East and beyond . 
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Regional case studies
Regional Diffusion, Rentierism, and Authoritarianism in Turkey
Ahmet T. Kuru, San Diego State University
In a recent article, I explained disproportionate 
authoritarianism in 49 Muslim-majority countries with 
the combined effect of regional diffusion and oil-rich 
rentier states (Kuru, 2014) . The recent de-democratization 
in Turkey has constituted a challenge for my argument, 
as it is both a candidate to world’s most democratic 
regional organization (European Union) and an oil-poor 
country . This essay argues that regional diffusion and 
rentierism help us understand Turkey’s puzzling political 
transformation .
Regional Diffusion and Rentier States
Rentier states are financially dependent on rents, such 
as oil and minerals and state control of these rents 
maintains the rulers’ incentive and power to reject people’s 
participation in governance . Rentier states have relatively 
limited need for taxation; instead, using rent revenues, 
they allocate money, jobs, and services to the people . 
This minimizes the people’s power to keep their rulers 
accountable . The patron-client relationship between 
the rentier state and the people hinders the emergence 
of independent political, economic, and civil society . 
Instead, rents provide authoritarian regimes the financial 
capacity to use state-owned media and other propaganda 
instruments and to expand despotic security apparatuses . 
My index of rentier states reveals that 25 out of 28 rentier 
states in the world are authoritarian . Muslim-majority 
countries constitute about three quarters (20/28) of all 
rentier states, although they are only a quarter (49/174) of 
all countries (Kuru, 2014: 415) .
Other scholars have explained the impact of the oil rents 
on authoritarianism in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) and worldwide (Beblawi and Luciani, 1987; Ross, 
2001) . Some recent publications, however, criticize the 
rentier state model by emphasizing that oil-poor countries 
in MENA and Central Asia are also authoritarian . A 
regional diffusion perspective can fix this shortcoming 
of the rentier state model . Such a perspective takes 
rentierism as a region-wide phenomenon and explicates 
why even oil-poor countries in MENA and Central Asia 
are authoritarian . Rentier states promote authoritarianism 
in their non-rentier neighbors, especially if the former are 
numerically, economically, and politically dominant over 
the latter .
In other parts of the world, authoritarianism and 
democracy are also regional phenomena rather than 
isolated phenomena in separate countries . Political 
regimes in a region affect each other through military and 
diplomatic relations, financial interactions, and socio-
cultural exchanges . Given these effects, the transitions 
to and consolidation of authoritarianism or democracy 
are largely regional processes, as seen in the following 
examples: a) the rise of fascism before World War II and 
democratization in its aftermath in Western Europe; b) the 
rise (1970s) and fall (1980s-1990s) of the military regimes 
in Latin America; and c) the dominance of communism 
following World War II and its collapse in 1989-1991 in 
Eastern Europe .
While analyzing transnational influences, Thomas Richter 
and André Bank elaborate on the difference between 
(relatively fuzzier) diffusion and (actor-based) cooperation 
(Richter and Bank, 2016) . The rise of the Arab uprisings is 
an example of diffusion, primarily through transnational 
learning and emulation, whereas their downfall could be 
explained by interstate cooperation within two regional 
blocs . The two blocks are led by Saudi Arabia and Iran, 
two rentier autocracies . Saudi Arabia has led a Sunni 
monarchical bloc that includes the UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, 
and Jordan . This bloc has perceived the regional mood 
toward democratization as a threat and tried to stop it . 
Their cooperation included intervention through coercion . 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE deployed 1,000 troops and 
500 policemen, respectively, to Bahrain to support the 
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kingdom against the popular protests . Their cooperation 
also included patronage . These countries provided an 
approximately $12 billion loan to the military regime 
in Egypt after the coup d’état ousted former President 
Muhammad Morsi . The rival bloc has been led by Iran and 
included the Maliki government in Iraq and Hezbollah in 
Lebanon . This bloc has sustained the Assad regime in Syria 
by providing military and financial support (Kuru, 2015: 
107-108) .
While the Arab uprisings have mostly reproduced 
authoritarianism, Turkey has also experienced de-
democratization and the establishment of a neo-
patrimonial Tayyip Erdoğan regime .
Turkey: Regional Diffusion and Rentierism
In its first and second terms (2002-2011), the Justice 
and Development Party (AKP) government led by 
Erdoğan promised to create a truly competitive market 
economy . Following the 2011 elections, however, Erdoğan 
unapologetically moved to establish a rentier system . 
He centralized key economic decisions, by requiring 
his personal signature on such issues as mining permits 
and the selling of expensive public lands in Istanbul . 
The AKP redesigned legal requirements for government 
tenders in order to freely distribute them to its cronies . 
Using these crony capitalists, Erdoğan has strictly 
controlled the majority of Turkish TV channels and 
newspapers . Meanwhile, employing the justification of the 
constitutional principle of “social state,” the AKP provided 
financial aid to over 13 million citizens, turning most of 
them into loyal voters . Due to the heavy party propaganda, 
these voters perceived governmental aid as a result of AKP 
generosity (Özgür, 2014) . In short, rentierism and patron-
client relationship have become pivotal characteristics of 
the Erdoğan regime (Yildirim, 2015) .
The surprising aspect of Erdoğan’s rentier regime is that it 
is oil-poor . To solve this problem, Erdoğan has employed 
three strageies . First, he has taken advantage of the global 
conditions (e .g ., the U .S . Central Bank’s low-interest policy) 
to receive a substantial amount of loans . Turkey’s total 
international debt (both public and private) increased 
from $130 billion in 2002 to $408 billion in 2014 (World 
Bank, 2016) . Erdoğan also made the biggest privatization 
campaign of Turkish history by selling public properties 
for more than $50 billion . Second, Erdoğan has used lands, 
especially in Istanbul, as a source of rent . The popular 
reaction to Erdoğan’s passion to turn Istanbul’s green 
places into rent led to the Gezi protests in Summer 2013 .
Last but not least, Erdoğan has confiscated and sold the 
properties of the businesspeople who did not pledge loyalty 
to him . In order to cover up the corruption probe that 
occurred in late 2013, Erdoğan has demonized an old ally, 
the Gülen (aka Hizmet) movement . Erdoğan confiscated 
the movement’s bank, Bank Asya, and media outlets . He 
declared the movement a “terrorist” organization and 
seized the properties of several businesspeople affiliated 
with it . The estimated property of Akın İpek, one of such 
businesspeople, is over $10 billion .
Erdoğan’s establishment of an authoritarian rentier system 
has been associated with the decline of Western linkages 
to and leverage on Turkey .1 Following their elections as 
the leaders of Germany and France, respectively, Angela 
Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy reversed their predecessors’ 
favorable policies on Turkey’s EU membership bid, 
weakening EU’s linkages there . Moreover, the recent 
refugee crisis created by civil wars in Syria and Iraq, has 
weakened the EU’s leverage on Turkey . Thus, EU leaders 
have remained mostly silent while Erdoğan pursued 
authoritarian policies . The US policy was no different given 
the American need to Turkey’s partnership in fight against 
ISIS .
During 2002-2011, the AKP was trying to make Turkey 
an EU member and EU norms of democratization and 
liberalization were diffusing into Turkey . Yet after 2011, 
given the impacts of his expanding power in Turkey and 
the euphoria of the “Arab Spring,” Erdoğan’s aspirations 
shifted to become the leader of Arab countries, if not the 
1   For the impacts of Western linkages and leverages on non-Western 
democratization, see Levitsky and Way, 2010 . 
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entire “Muslim world .” Thus Erdoğan took some initiatives 
to weaken Western leverages on his new regime . He 
tried to integrate with Russia and China as alternatives 
to the West . He asked Putin twice to accept Turkey in 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (which includes 
Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and 
Uzbekistan) . He also showed preference to China in a 
multi-billion dollar anti-missile system tender . Although 
Turkey’s downing of a Russian warplane created tension 
between the two countries and Erdoğan ultimately did not 
buy the Chinese anti-missile system, these maneuvers still 
damaged Turkey’s relations with the West .
Erdoğan’s attempts to weaken Turkey’s ties with Western 
countries have had strategic as well as ideological 
roots . Strategically, Erdoğan wanted to minimize both 
intervention and diffusion of Western countries in terms 
of promoting democracy and human rights . The marginal 
reaction from American and European politicians 
to Erdoğan’s crack down on dissenting politicians, 
businesspeople, and the media indicate that his strategy 
worked . Erdoğan has also worked hard to minimize 
Western diffusion to Turkish society via democratic 
learning and emulation . The TV channels and newspapers 
controlled and orchestrated by Erdoğan have pursued an 
unprecedented anti-Western campaign, by presenting 
such Western actors as German President Joachim 
Gauck, U .S . Prosecutor Preet Bharara, and U .S . think tank 
the Brookings Institute as enemies of and conspirators 
against Turkey . This successful campaign has deepened 
anti-Western sentiment and disseminated a fantasy that 
Erdoğan’s Turkey has become an enormously successful 
Muslim country, making the West jealous and increasing 
its enmity toward Turkey (Tas, 2014) . The Erdoğan media 
depicted every critical report in the Western media about 
the problems of human right abuses and authoritarianism 
in Turkey as Western conspiracy .
Ideologically, Erdoğan’s Islamism is the genuine reason 
for his anti-Westernism . Although he had claimed to give 
up the Islamist ideology in 2002-2011 due to pressure 
by the assertive secularist military, once he consolidated 
power, Erdoğan returned to his Islamist roots . At home, he 
Islamicized public discourse, marginalized Alevis, focused 
public education on the Islamic Imam-Hatip schools, and 
channeled public resources to crony Islamic foundations in 
order to train a “pious generation .” Abroad, he established 
close partnerships with such Islamist countries as Saudi 
Arabia and Qatar . 
Erdoğan’s cooperation with Saudi Arabia and Qatar 
has two main dimensions . First, Erdoğan has received 
substantial financial support from these two countries 
through foreign loans, direct investment, and property 
selling . Saudi Arabia and Qatar’s support for Erdoğan is 
“the subject of speculation regarding the huge mysterious 
inflow of unidentified foreign currency to Turkey 
during the years of AKP rule . The sum has reached an 
unprecedented $36 billion in total, with the monthly 
inflows increasing especially during election time” (Doğan, 
2015) .
Second, Erdoğan has established military cooperation 
with Saudi Arabia and Qatar . These three armed several 
opposition groups, including the Al Qaeda-affiliate El 
Nusra Front, against the Assad regime in Syrian Civil War . 
More recently, Turkey joined to Saudi Arabia’s anti-Iranian 
“Islamic Army,” and built a military base in Qatar .
In addition to cooperation, Erdoğan has emulated some 
characteristics of his new Arab partners . His palace built 
from scratch in the middle of Atatürk Forest Farm in 
Ankara symbolizes the combination of Erdoğan’s rentier 
attitude toward parks and his emulation of Saudi-like 
luxury . Erdoğan has also made the National Intelligence 
Organization the central institution of his regime, similar 
to Arab mukhabarat (intelligence) states .
In short, recent political decisions have made Turkey 
more distant from democratic Europe and closer to 
authoritarian MENA . The closer Turkey becomes to the 
MENA states, the more authoritarian it becomes, and vice-
versa . Similarly, a mutual causal relationship seems to exist 
between Turkey’s deteriorating relations with Western 
countries and its fading democracy .
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This essay has explained the recent authoritarianism 
in Turkey by the combined effects of regional diffusion 
and rentierism . Although Turkey is an oil-poor country, 
Erdoğan has established a rentier system using foreign 
debt, privatization revenues, Istanbul’s lands, and 
properties of opposition businesspeople . In this rentier 
system, Erdoğan’s role models are his authoritarian 
neighbors . Turkey’s recent transformation from democracy 
to authoritarianism has been associated with its moving 
away from Western countries and closer relations with 
MENA . The future democratization of Turkey requires it 
to turn the rentier economic system into a competitive, 
free market system, and to reestablish close relations with 
Western countries . These two requirements are mutually 
supportive and jointly necessary for Turkey to become 
democratic again .
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Did Egypt’s coup teach Ennahda to cede power? 
By Monica Marks, University of Oxford
On January 28, 2014, just two days after signing Tunisia’s 
new constitution into law, Prime Minister Ali Laarayedh 
handed power to a caretaker government of unelected 
technocrats . It was a symbolic moment, as Laarayedh 
– a leading member of Tunisia’s center right Islamist 
party, Ennahda, who was imprisoned and badly tortured 
before the revolution – abdicated power on behalf of the 
Ennahda-led coalition that won Tunisia’s first free and fair 
elections in October 2011 . 
Watching from afar, some observers read Ennahda’s 
decision to abdicate power – following months of political 
crisis, negotiation, and pressure from opposition parties 
and civil society groups – as a classic example of political 
learning, a bi-product of the July 3, 2013 coup that toppled 
Ennahda’s cousin party in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood, 
and sent its leaders back into jail . In this reading, Tunisia’s 
Ennahda – presumed to have followed a stubbornly 
hegemonic approach before Egypt’s coup – was essentially 
spooked into ceding power by the undemocratic ouster 
and subsequent re-imprisonment of co-Islamists in 
Egypt . Some observers suggested Ennahda’s abdication 
represented a mere strategic adaptation; others thought 
Ennahda may have internalized the lessons of Egypt more 
deeply . Yet they shared the assumption that Egypt’s coup 
– rather than lessons gleaned from Ennahda’s own history 
and political context – triggered its abdication . 
So did Ennahda cede power in January 2014 because it had 
“learned” from Egypt’s July 2013 coup? The short answer 
is no . The longer answer is that although Ennahda didn’t 
abdicate because of the coup (it was more compelled by its 
own historical experiences, the example of Algeria in 1990-
1991, and domestic pressure from political opponents 
and civil society activists), that doesn’t mean the coup 
didn’t matter . In fact, Ennahda watched the Egypt coup 
closely and felt its impact deeply . Instead of learning new 
lessons from the Brotherhood’s ouster, though, the coup 
reinforced old lessons, increasing the degree of confidence 
Ennahda invested in survivalism, gradualism, and long-
term oriented pragmatism as strategically advantageous 
approaches .1
The importance of history and Ennahda’s own 
experience
Ennahda wasn’t learning new lessons from the Egypt coup . 
In fact, the coup represented a story Ennahda’s leaders 
had heard many times before – of electorally triumphant 
Islamists beaten back by authoritarian establishments, 
often with the West’s tepid blessing . In fact, Ennahda had 
found itself as the credulous Islamist protagonist in one 
of the first editions of that story: Tunisia’s 1989 elections, 
when the country’s now-deposed dictator Zine el-Abidine 
Ben Ali reneged on promises to initiate a democratic 
opening . Ennahda fielded independent candidates in 
the 1989 elections, optimistic this opening, or so-called 
changement, was on its way . But before the election could 
be completed, Ben Ali – startled by the Islamists’ strong 
showing – did an abrupt about-face, using the candidates’ 
names to single out and imprison party supporters .2 
Many nahdawis (Ennahda members) fled for exile, mostly 
to Western European countries . Thousands more remained 
in Tunisia, where many were jailed as political prisoners 
during the 1990s and early 2000s . The Ben Ali regime 
also subjected Ennahda members and their families to 
various forms of human rights abuse, such as blacklisting 
them from employment and educational opportunities, 
requiring them to register at police stations up to five times 
per day – a practice that greatly interfered with working, 
studying, and otherwise leading a normal life – and police 
harassment that sometimes involved sexual abuse, rape, 
1   See Monica Marks, “Tunisia’s Ennahda: Rethinking Islamism in the 
context of ISIS and the Egyptian coup,” Brookings Rethinking Political 
Islam Series, forthcoming with Oxford University Press, 2016
2   See Larbi Sadiki, Political Liberalization in Bin Ali’s Tunisia: Facade 
Democracy, Democratization, 2002; Emma Murphy, Economic and 
Political Change in Tunisia: from Bourguiba to Ben Ali, Palgrave, 1999 .
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and torture for both men and women .3 
Over the coming years Ennahda leaders thought hard 
about how they should have handled the 1989 elections 
and surrounding events . Which represented the wisest 
path vis-à-vis the Ben Ali regime: accommodation or 
confrontation? Ennahda leaders’ opinions were divided on 
this question throughout much of the 1990s and 2000s . 
Yet one thing most of the leadership agreed on was that 
nahdawis needed to be shrewd and long-term in their 
thinking – strategic minimalists willing to go gradually 
rather than overeager maximalists who overplay their 
political hand .
Another touchstone moment that shaped Ennahda leaders 
gradualist approach was the experience of neighboring 
Algeria following its 1990 and 1991 elections . The Islamic 
Salvation Front’s (FIS) dominance in those elections 
spooked Algeria’s existing military regime, which 
responded by cancelling elections and cracking down on 
Islamists . Algeria’s experience and the bloody, decade-
long civil war that ensued powerfully impacted Ennahda’s 
thinking during the 1990s and 2000s . Survival, Ennahda 
leaders surmised, meant stepping slowly and strategically, 
careful to reassure vested interests and society at large it 
had no intentions of seizing the levers of state to impose a 
radical majoritarian version of Islamism . 
In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice 
Party (FJP) failed to internalize the lessons of Algeria . 
The Brotherhood, to be fair, was dealt a difficult hand: 
squeezed by Egypt’s judiciary and elements of its military 
apparatus, its electoral success did not translate into clear 
control of the political system . Yet the FJP failed to play 
the cards it did have wisely . Instead of stepping slowly 
and strategically through the complex entanglement 
that was Egyptian transitional politics, the FJP opted to 
double down in its attempts to assert authority . As in 
Algeria, powerful demonstrations of Islamist force fueled 
3   Author interviews, 2011-2016 . See also Doris Gray, Islamist & 
Secular Quests for Women’s Rights, Mediterranean Politics 17:3, 2012 
and Tunisia reports from Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, 
and the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ)
opposition rhetoric, providing just the window Egypt’s 
military needed to resume full control of the political 
system . In Tunisia, however, Ennahda leaders practiced 
more restraint . 
Regularly referencing the experience of FIS in Algeria, 
Ennahda leaders remained sensitive to suspicions that 
Islamists would instrumentalize electoral victory as a 
means towards illiberal, majoritarian dominance . Ennahda 
therefore adopted a more minimalist approach and, unlike 
the Brotherhood, stayed true to its pre-election promises 
of supporting coalition governments and not running or 
officially endorsing presidential candidates in 2011 and 
again in 2014 . Drawing on lessons it had learned from 
its own experiences and from Algeria’s history, Ennahda 
leaders expressed frustration with the Brotherhood before 
its ouster . “In Egypt the Ikhwan made the worst decision,” 
said Osama Essaghir, an Ennahda MP and member of the 
party’s 150-member Shura Council .4 “They decided to 
govern alone .”
One president, all alone with the powers . . . That was very 
unwise . The day after [Brotherhood member Mohamed] 
Morsi won the [presidential] election, Sheikh Rached 
[Ghannouchi] flew to Egypt for one reason, just to tell 
Morsi one thing: do not govern alone .5
The importance of chronology 
The coup in Egypt didn’t “teach” Ennahda to cede power . 
Rather, Ennahda’s willingness to strike canny, survivalist 
compromises – an approach that came to dominate 
Ennahda’s strategic orientation after the revolution – had 
its origins in lessons party leaders started internalizing 
decades earlier . Getting the chronology correct is an 
essential first step to determine how and whether learning 
has occurred . In this case, Ennahda’s decision to abdicate 
power in January 2014 was preceded by a string of 
4   The 150-member Shura Council is the highest regularly sitting body 
in Ennahda . It is intended to be a representative institution in which 
the party debates and decides positions on important issues via a one 
person, one vote scheme . 
5   Osama Essaghir in discussion with author, March 20, 2013 . 
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experiences that reinforced the value of compromise to 
party leaders . 
Participation in cross-ideological opposition talks 
throughout the 2000s positively reinforced that dialogue 
and compromise were effective steps toward achieving the 
longer-term goal of weakening Ben Ali’s regime . Parties 
to opposition talks in Aix-en-Provence (2003) and Rome 
(2005), for example, included secular and Islamist activists, 
human rights groups, and political actors . Together, 
they forged a shared understanding of the democratic 
principles Tunisia’s polity should affirm . These principles 
included commitments to an inclusive political system 
that would work to realize equality (musawa) between 
men and women, and in which popular sovereignty 
(sayadet al-shaab) would constitute the sole source of 
legitimacy . These talks dovetailed with the formation of a 
cross-ideological opposition movement, the October 18 
Collective, which helped weaken and delegitimize Ben Ali’s 
rule .6
Meanwhile in England, an exiled Rached Ghannouchi 
was laying intellectual underpinnings of Ennahda’s 
compromise-centric approach . Some of the lessons 
Ghannouchi learned in England bore immediate fruit 
following his return to Tunisia . Months before Tunisia’s 
October 2011 elections, for example, Ghhanouchi 
correctly predicted that employing a Westminster style 
first past the post system (FPTP) would result in a coalition 
and democracy-inhibiting landslide victory for Ennahda . 
Instead, he and other Ennahda leaders supported a 
proportional representation (PR) system most beneficial 
to smaller parties . This reduced Ennahda’s own share of 
votes in the 2011 election by a staggering 50 percent . Had 
Ennahda’s leaders successfully advocated an FPTP system, 
the party would have won approximately 90 percent of 
votes as opposed to 40 percent – an outcome party leaders 
feared would have spooked secularists and old regime 
forces, repeating a Tunisia 1989 or Algeria 1991-style 
6   See Monica Marks, “Purists vs . Pluralists: Cross-Ideological 
Coalition Building in Tunisia,” in Alfred Stepan, ed . Tunisia’s Democratic 
Transition in Comparative Perspective, Columbia University Press, 
forthcoming 2016 .
scenario likely to jeopardize Ennahda’s survival and 
Tunisia’s entire democratic transition .7 
Other core compromise-centric positions were taken 
before Egypt’s coup . Months before Tunisia’s October 2011 
election, Ennahda vowed that, even if it won an outright 
majority, it would govern in an inclusive coalition – an 
arrangement party leaders explained would help stabilize 
Tunisia at a fragile time of transition . Ennahda won a 
plurality rather than a majority in the 2011 election and 
was therefore structurally obliged to go into coalition, 
but its pre-electoral statements about the importance of 
compromise evinced a much deeper understanding of 
democratic politics than the Egyptian Brotherhood’s . 
Similarly, chronology demonstrates that the bulk of 
Ennahda’s constitutional compromises had been worked 
out in fall 2012 and spring 2013, months before the June 
2013 coup in Egypt . Indeed, compromises on core issues – 
such as omitting any reference to sharia, defining men and 
women as equal rather than complementary, and omitting 
language that would have criminalized blasphemy – were 
already written into the third draft of Tunisia’s constitution, 
released in April 2013 .8 
The drafting process itself proved an important experience 
of learning for Ennahda, as the party struggled – for the 
very first time – not just to govern, but also to somehow 
translate its abstractly Islamist aims into concrete 
constitutional language . Along the way, leftist and secularly 
oriented segments of Tunisian society – demographics that 
are much larger in Tunisia than in Egypt, Algeria and many 
other Arab countries – taught Ennahda valuable lessons 
about the importance of consensual support . Determined 
and vocal pushback from such citizens – backed by 
7   Author interviews, 2011-2016 . See also Alfred Stepan, “Tunisia’s 
Transition and the Twin Tolerations,” Journal of Democracy, April 2012 
and John M . Carey, “Why Tunisia Remains the Arab Spring’s Best Bet,” 
conference presentation at Dartmouth College, September 9-11, 2013 
accessible at http://sites .dartmouth .edu/jcarey/files/2013/08/Tunisia-
Carey-Aug_2013 .pdf
8   See Draft Constitution of the Tunisian Republic, April 
22 2013, International IDEA translation accessible at http://
constitutionaltransitions .org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Tunisia-
third-draft-Constitution-22-April-2013 .pdf
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well-networked Tunisian civil society groups – resulted 
in a series of street protests and media critiques against 
Ennahda . At critical junctures when more maximalist 
elements of the party reared up, civil society appeared to 
batten them back behind the parapet . 
In its opposition, civil society often found itself in frequent 
alliance with an anti-Islamist coalition of leftists, trade 
unionists, and old regime elites . This constellation of soft 
and hard-power anti-Islamist actors narrowed Ennahda’s 
margin of maneuver, further impressing upon party 
leaders the importance of canny compromise to long-term 
survival . 
Intense pushback from local, Tunisian critics – including 
media, civil society groups, the labor union (UGTT) and 
old regime elites – during 2012 and early 2013 often served 
to remind Ennahda that minimalist pragmatism, with a 
heavy helping of consensus and compromise-making, 
offered the path of least resistance . 
Updating as learning
Though Ennahda didn’t learn new lessons from the Egypt 
coup, it still learned – albeit in the academic sense . The 
definition of political learning used most commonly by 
academics describes learning as “a change of beliefs (or the 
degree of confidence in one’s beliefs) or the development of 
new beliefs, skills, or procedures as a result of observation 
and interpretation of experience .”9 Ennahda learned from 
the coup according to the first part of that definition, not 
the second . In other words, the experience of Egypt’s coup 
updated rather than created Ennahda’s existing posture of 
pragmatism, because it reinforced most Ennahda leaders’ 
confidence that pragmatic gradualism represented the 
wisest approach . 
To be sure, the coup and its aftermath – especially 
the massacre at Rab’a Adawiya in Cairo, which killed 
approximately one thousand people, most of them 
9   See Jack S . Levy, “Learning and foreign policy: sweeping a 
conceptual minefield,” International Organization 48:2, 1994
Brotherhood supporters, in August 2013 – sickened and 
scared Ennahda members and party leaders . Despite 
having often acknowledged the Brotherhood’s mistakes 
in power, nahdawis felt its mistakes merited neither the 
coup nor the crackdown . Some said Rab’a stood as a 
gut-churning reminder of the oppression they and their 
families experienced under Ben Ali . A huge number 
of nahdawis at every level of the party changed their 
Twitter and Facebook photos to the yellow Rab’a symbol . 
Some began wearing yellow Rab’a pins and stickers to 
demonstrate their solidarity with victims .
There may well have been a form of emotional learning  
in which strongly felt visceral reactions_– fear, sympathy, 
disgust – made Ennahda’s base more willing to accept 
previously unthinkable political compromises . The most 
powerful example here is Ennahda’s ultimate decision 
– much opposed by the party’s base – to vote down an 
electoral lustration law that would have banned former 
members of Ben Ali’s party, the Constitutional Democratic 
Rally (RCD) from contesting Tunisia’s 2014 elections . The 
law, tabled by CPR in 2012, was debated off and on before 
finally being voted down – amidst much pushback from 
large swathes of the base and many Ennahda MPs – in 
accordance with the wishes of Ennahda’s central executive 
leadership, including party president Rached Ghannouchi . 
It is likely that learning from the Egypt coup, much 
of it powerfully emotional, played a role in shaping 
nahdawis’ ultimate compromise on the lustration law 
– a proposal party leaders feared would have created a 
strong constituency for a coup in Tunisia . Other sources 
of learning, though – such as the spectacular failure of 
Libya’s attempted lustration law historical lessons drawn 
from Ennahda’s and Algeria’s experiences – were likely 
more powerful influences on party leaders, however, and 
also factored into base-level nadhawis’ views on lustration 
legislation .
Yet overall the emotions following Rab’a reaffirmed 
Ennahda’s existing approach to governance that rested 
on canny compromise and a malleable message of 
cultural conservatism . The coup in Egypt had a powerful 
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demonstration effect – one that, while not new to Ennahda 
given its own experiences and the example of Algeria, 
reinforced and offered new justification for Ennahda’s 
pragmatic compromise-centric approach . 
It is therefore ahistorical to characterize Ennahda’s 
compromises, particularly its decision to formally 
relinquish power in January 2014, as mere byproducts of 
Egypt’s 2013 coup . Ennahda’s logic of long termism and 
track record of cross-ideological compromise indicate 
that its leadership’s operative logics have been crucially 
different than the Brotherhood’s . A series of experiences, 
both before and after Tunisia’s revolution, taught 
Ennahda the value of canny compromise and malleable 
conservatism . These tendencies manifest in Ennahda’s 
historical negotiations and internal evolution, as well as the 
key compromises it made after the 2011 elections . Rather 
than teaching Ennahda to compromise, or spooking it into 
ceding power, Egypt’s 2013 coup justified – with dramatic 
demonstration effect – lessons Ennahda had already 
learned, reinforcing pre-existing postures of pragmatism 
and gradualism that have been crucial to Ennahda’s 
survival in Tunisian society .
Diffusion Mechanisms as Stepping Stones: 
Qualitative Evidence from Syria
Wendy Pearlman, Northwestern University 
At the macro-level, the sudden and rapid spread of protest 
across the Middle East in 2011 leaves little doubt about 
the importance of transnational diffusion in the making of 
what came to be known as the Arab spring . At the micro-
level, however, questions remain about the mechanisms 
through which that diffusion occurred . In this essay I pull 
upon original interviews with Syrian oppositionists to call 
attention to mechanisms that are emotional or behavioral 
more than strictly rationalist and thus encourage us to 
think about diffusion as operating through gradualist 
processes other than rationalist updating .
This argument diverges from a conventional approach 
to protest cascades that focuses on how early risers 
make available new information that alters followers’ 
utility calculations . Applied to the Arab uprisings, this 
perspective suggests that the forced resignation of an 
authoritarian president in Tunisia led citizens elsewhere to 
rationally rethink the probability that anti-regime protest 
could be mobilized and/or succeed in their own countries . 
Kurt Weyland adapts this approach with the important 
caveat that individual rationality is distorted by reliance 
on cognitive shortcuts .1 Heuristics such as availability 
and representativeness thus led those who went to the 
streets after Tunisia’s revolt to overestimate prospects for 
replicating its success . 
These arguments, building from deductive principles about 
human decision-making, go far in explaining diffusion 
dynamics . Research that proceeds inductively from Arab 
oppositionists’ reflections on their experiences, however, 
brings other processes to the fore . This is what I find based 
upon open-ended interviews that I have conducted with 
more than 250 displaced Syrians in Jordan, Turkey, and 
Lebanon from 2012-16, the overwhelming majority of 
whom are opposed to the regime of Bashar al-Assad . My 
interviews affirm the critical impact of precursor revolts 
for Syrians’ path to protest . Yet my results yield mixed 
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support for claims about (boundedly) rationalist updating . 
I frequently asked Syrian rebellion supporters if, upon 
learning about uprisings in other Arab countries, they 
believed there would be an uprising is Syria, as well . Some 
voiced opinions that directly resonated with Weyland’s 
argument, as did this then-recent college graduate from 
the Damascus suburbs:
When the events happened in Tunisia and Ben Ali 
fled, it looked so easy . Then Egypt happened – only 17 
days! Our path was open in front of us . Freedom and 
dignity were going to come . I predicted 30-60 days . 
Tunisia took one day . Egypt took 17 days . Let Syria 
take 60 days .2 
Others expressed an adamantly contrary opinion . Another 
recent graduate from a different Damascus suburb insisted:
I said, it’s impossible, impossible, impossible to have 
a revolution in Syria, because I know the meaning of 
the oppression and fear inside people . The oppression 
we had in Syria didn’t exist in any country where they 
had revolutions . Not in Egypt or Tunisia or Libya 
… We couldn’t even say the president’s name in any 
conversation, even in a positive way . No one dared to 
talk about him .3
In my conversations, I found that even people close to 
each other sometimes expressed divergent views on the 
likelihood of Syria’s emulating other countries’ example . 
One married couple from Daraa recalled:
Husband: When the revolutions happened in Tunisia 
and Egypt, I immediately thought that the same would 
happen here . Because we are all under pressure – in 
every Arab country, and especially Syria . (To his wife), 
Do you remember when I said that?
Wife: Yes . And I thought the opposite . I said it’s 
impossible to have a revolution here . People are 
simple . They just want to live . And we know that [if 
there were demonstrations], the regime would react 
with violence . There would be blood .
Husband: And I said no . People won’t be silent … 
People are going to go out .4 
These individuals, far from showing an unthinking bias 
toward exaggerating the applicability of the Tunisian 
or Egyptian models, engaged in a keen reading of 
opportunities and risks much closer to home . A man who 
left Syria as a child provided further illustration of this 
attention to local circumstances:
It started with the Tunisian Revolution . We felt that 
… something big was happening because we know 
that there are a lot of similarities between Tunisia and 
Syria . We said everything that is causing the revolution 
in Tunisia also exists in Syria . 
But I also felt that we have two things that could delay 
revolution in Syria . One is what I call the memory of 
blood: the memory of what happened in the ’80s . We 
still feel it . We don’t want to get back to that time . The 
other thing is the sectarian problem . That complicates 
everything . The army in Tunisia and in Egypt played 
a big role in making the change . But in Syria, we felt 
that army would not do that … Most of the generals 
and the high ranking [officers] are from the Alawi 
community, and most of them are loyal to the Assad 
family . And nobody wants to get into a sectarian war .5
If it was not strictly a recalculation of costs and benefits 
that propelled transnational diffusion to Syria, what 
did? One pattern emerging across my interviews is 
oppositionists’ sense that they felt actively engaged in 
the Arab uprisings that preceded their own, and this 
engagement served as something of a stepping-stone in 
their path to public protest against their own regime .
For some, this stepping-stone was primarily emotional . 
Emotions are noninstrumental, subjective, evaluative 
experiences that infuse how people define interests, 
influence how they assess information, and trigger 
particular action tendencies . Elsewhere I argue that 
emotions such as anger, joy, and pride played an important 
role in driving individuals’ participation in the revolts 
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in Tunisia and Egypt .6 The displays of defiance in those 
countries likewise triggered emotional reactions among 
citizens in other Arab countries, including Syria . Many 
Syrians with whom I spoke described how the revolts 
in Tunisia and Egypt helped them “break through” the 
barriers of fear that theretofore had discouraged them 
from political criticism . A man from rural Idlib describes:
It started with Bouazizi . We can consider the kids 
of Daraa a spark, but they are not the foundation . 
Bouazizi is the foundation .
People in our Arab countries are scared of the 
president more than God … But when … I saw Zine 
al-Abdine tell the Tunisian people, “I understand 
you” and then run away … I can’t forget that . That’s 
when the barrier of fear started to break for me . 
When I saw that, there was no more fear . Because 
he was humiliated . We didn’t see the tyranny in him 
anymore .7 
This sense of breaking through fear was a crucial part 
of a process of increasingly defiant action . Though this 
emotional reaction might have existed alongside a rational 
updating about the utility of protest, it was not reducible 
to it . An engineer of Golani origin recalled how early Arab 
uprisings set in motion a gradual process of emotional 
emboldening in his community:
The forced resignation of Zine al-Abdine Ben Ali from 
Tunisia was like a fantasy . It was a dream . I was one of 
the people in Syria who had tears in his eyes . People 
just couldn’t believe it … It seemed like a miracle from 
God … We wondered: could a revolution happen in 
another country, too? Most people thought it was 
impossible .
Tunisia did not have as big a psychological impact as 
Egypt did … There were some guys who didn’t sleep at 
night . They followed the news nonstop . All day long: 
Egypt, Egypt, Egypt .
When it was announced that Mubarak had resigned 
… Wow, I remember that day … People in Syria were 
so happy inside . The state did not want to make any 
conflicts in the street . So people went outside, and 
they walked around and started to talk … People 
didn’t talk about Bashar . But inside, they wanted 
their own revolution, too . Outwardly, they just talked 
about Egypt . Inside they were moved, and had other 
thoughts . 
And then there began other revolutions, in Yemen 
and Libya, for example … And the push became even 
bigger for something to happen in Syria … I’d be 
sitting with five or six people and we’d say, “What is 
the situation? What are we going to do?”8
For these individuals, engagement with other Arab revolts 
generated an enthusiasm and hopefulness that prepared 
or propelled them in the direction of protest at home . 
A writer from Aleppo articulated a different emotional 
mechanism through which those uprisings motivated him 
toward open dissent against his own regime: 
When the revolution began in Egypt, we lived it day by 
day . We were on Facebook giving Egyptians advice and 
sharing revolutionary songs, and things like that . We 
felt like we were in the Square with them .
Then the first protest occurred in Daraa . I wrote a 
Facebook status in support of the protest, but didn’t 
hit “enter” to share it . I was scared . My fingers were on 
the keyboard . Finally, I told myself that it was shameful 
that I was sharing stuff to support revolution in Egypt, 
but when the same things were happening in my 
country, I was too afraid to do anything . So I finally 
hit “enter .” I went to bed sure that the regime’s people 
were going to arrest me the next morning .
Whether colored by exuberance or shame, long-distance 
engagement with other uprisings thus may have served 
as an emotional stepping-stone in some Syrians’ personal 
route to protest . Apart from this, engagement with those 
uprisings could induce behavioral changes that increased 
their network-embeddedness and protest-readiness in 
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other ways . One of the speakers cited earlier suggested this 
from his experience:
For me, that time [after the revolt in Tunisia] … was 
when I got involved in social media . Before that, I 
had refused … I’m in my thirties and [Facebook] was 
more for the younger generation . But at that moment, 
I started to use my Facebook account and I opened a 
twitter account . I started to use them actively and get a 
lot of my news from that medium .9
Finally, apart from triggering emotional shifts or expanding 
online networks, uprisings in other countries also sparked 
actual protest events that functioned as critical stepping-
stones in the Syrian groundswell . In February 2011, 
some Syrians held vigils outside the Egyptian and Libyan 
embassies in solidarity with those countries’ revolts . One 
young Damascene describes the significance of these 
gatherings for him personally, and for what he saw as the 
launch of rebellion in Syria: 
My brother went to the protest at the Egyptian 
embassy … So when the Libyan embassy protest 
happened, I decided to go . 
I came a little late . There was this girl holding a candle . 
It was melting all over her hand, but she just kept 
chanting against Qadhafi . I thought, Wow! 
[The regime] didn’t want us to protest … The embassy 
was surrounded by security guards and they were 
recording everyone’s faces . I was a little afraid, but 
at the same time, I was so happy, because I wasn’t 
running away .
Later, I called my brother in Saudi Arabia . I told 
him that we went to the protest and I was chanting 
“Freedom, Freedom .” I was so happy, I felt like I 
needed to tell him about it . [I said]: “You have to 
experience this .” I can’t describe it … It was like letting 
all the energy out of you, all the things you’d kept 
hidden for so many years…
Some people say the start of the revolution was March 
15th . But by then … protest wasn’t a new thing for 
me . I don’t think about that as the beginning . Because 
before that, there was the Egyptian embassy and the 
Libyan embassy .10
The testimonials discussed in this essay affirm that the 
revolts in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and elsewhere were 
indispensible in activating revolt in Syria . Yet in the 
wake of those events, some Syrians came to believe that 
revolution was imminent in their country while others 
remained convinced that mass protest was impossible . 
Rather than immediately impelling people to change 
their forecasts about the probability or utility of protest, 
therefore, uprisings elsewhere might have had their 
greatest impact by emboldening Syrians emotionally, 
opening them to new information networks, or pushing 
them to engage in new forms of dissent online or on the 
streets . I have conceptualized these shifts as psychological 
or behavioral stepping-stones and propose that they 
represent micro-mechanisms distinct from rationalist 
updating . 
The qualitative data interpreted here is admittedly 
anecdotal . Still, open-ended interviews with those who 
have participated in or witnessed uprisings can build 
our understanding of the mechanisms by which protest 
diffuses across borders, helping us both think critically 
about existing arguments and generate new ones . 
Deductive approaches to research are irreplaceable for 
translating theory into hypotheses and testing them 
against empirical data . Yet inductive approaches such as 
the one used here are also critical for uncovering complex 
motivations and nuanced relationships that abstract 
generalizations about human behavior often overlook . 
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International Social Agents and Norm Diffusion:  
the Case of LGBTQ Rights in Morocco
Merouan Mekouar, York University
On June 2nd 2015, two French members of the feminist 
collective Femen organized a gay kiss-in front of a 
mosque located in Morocco’s capital city, Rabat . After 
inviting a group of local journalists, the two women 
removed their shirts and showed their naked torsos on 
which pro-gay slogans were written . For one of the two 
activists, the purpose of the “shock-action” was to spark a 
conversation on LGBTQ rights in the country by creating 
an “iconographic platform that would speak to people both 
within and outside Morocco (E ., personal interview, May 
3, 2016) .” A month earlier, during a concert organized in 
the same city, the bassist of the British rock band Placebo 
also publicly denounced Morocco’s anti-gay legislation 
by displaying the crossed out number 489 (relating to 
the article in the Moroccan penal code criminalizing 
homosexuality) on his guitar . These actions follow others 
initiated by international artists or transnational advocacy 
organizations that all attempt to induce change in the 
LGBTQ legislation in the country by publicly denouncing 
Morocco’s anti-gay legislation or lobbying the government 
to overturn anti-gay verdicts (HRW 2007) . 
This essay attempts to examine the following question: can 
foreign social agents nourish learning (Richter and Bank 
2016) and induce norm diffusion? If so, what characteristics 
do they need to have in order to exert an impact on the 
general public? Using the case of transnational advocacy 
networks1 that attempt to promote and defend Western 
LGBTQ norms in Morocco, the first part will show that, 
in line with Massad (2007), actions taken by social agents 
deemed foreign or culturally alien are largely misread by the 
general public and are often counterproductive . The second 
part will show how international actors can actually enact 
norm diffusion if perceived as legitimate or culturally close 
by the general public .
1   See Keck and Sikkink (1998) for a broader analysis of the logic of 
transnational activist groups .
Western Social Agents: All Gain, No Pain
While Moroccan LGBTQ activists were involved in careful 
work to raise awareness about LGBTQ issues (particularly 
the fact that sexual orientation is not a choice), Femen’s 
bold action sent an ambiguous signal to the intended 
audience and created new and largely negative associations 
in the minds of the Moroccan public . For Mina, a 35 year-
old LGBTQ advocate in Rabat “even the folks who never 
heard about Femen before, suddenly learned all about 
them . Worse, they associated LGBTQ rights with the 
actions of the movement,” (Mina, personal interview, April 
6, 2016) . The defense of LGBTQ rights was associated with 
a number of negative stereotypes ranging from being anti-
religious and promiscuous to being part of a large Western 
conspiracy aimed at breaking the social fabric of the 
country . For Hicham, a 30-year old gay man from Meknes:
the action taken by the Femen was a provocation 
(…), it was really an imposition of other people’s 
view and a dangerous one at that, as it could nourish 
more aggressive reactions from people who disagree . 
(Hicham, personal interview, April 23, 2016) .
Similarly for Ali, a young gay man:
regardless of the nature of their action, the Femen are 
people from the outside . Instead of seeing that they 
defend LGBTQ rights, people [Moroccans] only see 
that they are foreigners . (Ali, personal interview, April 
23, 2016) .
For Seif-Eddine, a Moroccan gay man in Paris: 
the action of the Femen put the LGBTQ question on 
the map . For conservatives, the message was, ‘oh, they 
[members of the LGBTQ community] exist, so we need 
to get rid of them’ (personal interview, May 2, 2016) . 
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Although members of Morocco’s LGBTQ community 
recognize the need for change, they knew the general 
public would perceive the signal sent by foreign activists 
as a Western provocation . Partly because they were 
conducted without support from local organizations, 
actions taken by Western groups and personalities in 
favor of LGBTQ rights did lead to the opposite of the 
intended result . On the day following the kiss-in action 
in Rabat for instance, 1500 people congregated in front 
of the French embassy to denounce the Femen and the 
perceived Western support of the action . From then on 
for Mina, “gays were hunted everywhere (…) two guys 
who took selfies at the location where the Femen did their 
kiss-in were accused of being gay and outed on national 
television,” (personal interview, April 6, 2016) and were 
later jailed under the provision of article 489 . Following 
the events, one magazine published a cover with the title 
“Should we burn the gays” before the issue was banned 
by the authorities (MEE 2015) . A few months later, one 
popular online personality published a video mocking the 
two Femen activists watched by close to 500,000 people, 
the vast majority of whom condemned the action of the 
two women and engaged in gay-bashing . The video was 
published as a number of anti-gay incidents were occurring 
all over the country, the most publicized of which was the 
gruesome arrest and beating of two men arrested by their 
neighbors in the city of Beni-Mellal and jailed because 
they were allegedly engaged in same-sex activities . Actions 
conducted by Western activists also prompted the state 
to crackdown on the small spaces of relative freedom 
that local activists had previously been able to secure . 
As summarized by Seifeddine, “the state has bigger fish 
to fry but has to pretend that it is tackling the question,” 
(personal interview, May 2, 2016) . Because the authorities 
are afraid that the more conservative fringes of society will 
use foreign actions as a pretext to challenge the state, the 
authorities feel that they have to tighten the application of 
the social provisions of the penal code . 
Even for the more politicized members of Morocco’s 
LGBTQ community, actions taken by Western activists 
occur from a platform of privilege with which they cannot 
identify . Local activists know that the foreign citizenship 
of international activists renders them largely immune 
from state prosecution . As such, local activists also know 
that their Western counterparts are for more willing to 
engage in ill-conceived “shock-actions” that have little or 
no cost for them but might have serious consequences for 
the more vulnerable members of the Moroccan LGBTQ 
community . For one Femen activist, “the fact that we are 
Western women is part of the operation,” (E ., personal 
interview, May 3, 2016) . Perhaps more disturbingly, Femen 
activists seemed to have been aware of the consequences 
of their actions on the more vulnerable members of 
the LGBTQ community whose rights they claimed to 
represent . For E ., “we accepted the risk that the more 
vulnerable are the ones who will bear the brunt of state 
repression (…) unfortunately; they are collateral damage .”
Diffusion through Regional Relays
If protest actions by Western advocacy groups are 
counterproductive (Massad 2007), could actions by 
other international groups or personalities with different 
characteristics help promote LGBTQ rights in countries 
like Morocco? 
In line with the literature on diffusion (Lohmann 1994, 
Kricheli, Livne and Magaloni 2011, Mekouar 2014; 2016), 
for diffusion to occur, social agents must have certain 
characteristics – the most important of which is that they 
need to be perceived  as generally moderate or mainstream 
by the general public . The closer social agents are to the 
political or social equilibrium of the population, the more 
impact their message has with the general population .
Thus, recent actions taken by prominent regional figures 
in North Africa and the Middle East might have more 
resonance with the public and might foster a new dynamic 
around LGBTQ rights in the region . One case in point is 
a statement by Salman al-Ouda, a respected senior Saudi 
cleric, generally thought to be conservative who declared2 
to a Swedish newspaper that: 
2   Before nuancing his statement few days later after facing a barrage of 
criticism .
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even though homosexuality is considered a sin in 
all the Semitic holy books, it does not require any 
punishment in this world (…) Homosexuality is a 
grave sin, but those who say that homosexuals deviate 
from Islam are the real deviators (MEE 2016) .
 Another respected public figure who came strongly in 
favor of LGBTQ rights is former Tunisian Prime Minister 
Rached Ghannouchi, the head of Tunsia’s Islamic Party 
Ennahda, who called to decriminalize homosexual 
relations and protect LGBTQs . The statement followed 
other similar statements made by members of the Muslim 
Brotherhood exiled in the UK (Alyomnew 2015) .
While it is difficult to assess the impact of these 
statements, it remains clear that they have the ability 
to trigger a conversation, as their authors cannot be 
automatically dismissed as foreign agents3 . Similarly for 
one interviewee, actions by respected local actors might 
change things in the future:
there are no respected, admired gay personalities who 
are open about their sexuality . There are no Arab or 
Muslim role-models that members of the Moroccan 
LGBTQ community can identify with . We see Americans, 
Europeans, Latin Americans, but no Arabs (personal 
interview, May 2, 2016) . 
Conclusion
According to a Femen activist interviewed for this work, 
“the Femen wanted to be there because local actors could 
not,” (Gala, personal interview, May 3, 2016) . However, 
foreign social agents cannot replace local ones . Because 
Western activists seldom have to bear the consequences 
of their actions, local activists and sympathizers have 
difficulty relating to the message put forward by these 
actors who gain all the “prestige” related to these actions 
3   The same logic explains why for instance, the Islamic party Ennahda 
in Tunisia is also engaged in the defense of sex-workers’ rights 
instead of the more secular parties . In other words, the best agents of 
diffusion on a particular issue are people who are seen as mainstream 
on that particular issue (I would like to thank Monica Marks for this 
observation) .
but bear none of the costs . In some cases, international 
“resistance” may even reproduce and nourish new forms 
of state oppression (Massad 2007) by forcing the state to 
crack down on the small spaces of relative freedom that 
local LGBTQ communities have carved for themselves . 
However, transnational advocacy might work for diffusion 
as long it is carried by local or regional social agents who 
have the perceived legitimacy/stature needed to negotiate 
the adoption of new international norms and the ability to 
communicate with the local publics . 
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Bankrolling Containment: Saudi Linkages with Egypt and Tunisia
By Ruth Hanau Santini, Università degli Studi l’Orientale, Naples and Kevin Koehler, American University in Cairo
Transborder linkages between autocratic states have been 
shown to support authoritarian regime stability (Tansey, 
Koehler, and Schmotz 2016) . In the Middle Eastern 
context, attempts by Saudi Arabia to first prevent and then 
contain political change in the wake of the Arab Spring 
have received particular attention (Kamrava 2012; Rieger 
2014; Farouk 2014) . Going beyond such contributions, 
this memo points to some indications that Saudi Arabia 
is consolidating ties with not only Egypt under al-Sisi, but 
also post-revolutionary Tunisia . 
While Saudi aid flows have played an important political 
role in Egypt since the fall of Mubarak – first starving the 
Morsi-government of funds and then increasing payments 
to unprecedented levels after the 2013 coup (Farouk 
2014) – Saudi involvement in Tunisia had traditionally 
been limited . However, after the strengthening of old 
regime elites with the 2014 parliamentary and presidential 
elections, the Tunisian government began to shift its 
foreign policy in a more pro-Saudi direction .1 Saudi 
engagement in Tunisia has consequently increased, 
including the signing of an agreement in the field of 
security cooperation in December 2015 .2
While Saudi-Tunisian cooperation is very much in its 
infancy, it is linked to a set of domestic Tunisian dynamics . 
We show how the rapprochement was partially made 
possible by a process of learning among Ennahda elites 
after the coup against Morsi in Egypt, which led them 
to accept a greater involvement of Saudi Arabia in the 
economic and security domain as an additional guarantee 
policy for their political survival . 
Transnational Dimensions of the Arab Spring
1   Eric Reidy, ‘Tunisia’s New Government Shifts Foreign Policy,’ Al 
Monitor, 24 April 2015 .
2   Al-Sharq al-Awsat, ‘al-qimma al-sa’udiya-al-tunisiya al-yaum ta‘azuz 
al-ta‘awun al-amniya… wa taufiq ittifaqiya li-l-ta`awun al-difa`iya’ 
[Saudi-Tunisian Summit Today Strengthens Security Cooperation . 
Signing of Defense Cooperation Agreement .], 22 December 2015 .
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That diffusion and learning have structured the spread 
of contention in the Arab Spring uprisings has long been 
recognized . Demonstration effects contributed to the 
spread of protests from Tunisia, to Egypt, to Yemen, 
Libya, and Syria (Weyland 2012), and social learning was 
countered by authoritarian learning as incumbents drew 
lessons from events in neighboring states (Heydemann 
and Leenders 2011) . Beyond such forms of transnational 
diffusion by learning, research has also focused on how 
specific regional actors – principally Saudi Arabia and 
the wider Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – sought to 
influence and contain political change at home and abroad 
during the wave of contention in 2011 (Kamrava 2012; 
Rieger 2014; Farouk 2014; Matthiesen 2013) . 
On a more general level, Saudi reactions to the Arab 
Spring can be understood as at least partially driven by 
linkage patterns between the kingdom and specific Arab 
Spring countries . The tighter the linkages in terms of 
trade, migration, and diplomatic interaction, the higher 
the likelihood that Saudi Arabia would intervene on behalf 
of an authoritarian incumbent under stress – although 
such interventions were not necessarily successful as the 
Egyptian case demonstrates (Tansey, Koehler, and Schmotz 
2016) .
In this memo, we raise the question of whether a new set 
of linkage patterns might be emerging at the moment, 
particularly with respect to the strengthening of Saudi-
Tunisian ties along with the continued backing of the 
Egyptian military regime by Saudi money . Saudi efforts 
have a strong security component in the form of military 
cooperation in joint exercises and membership in military 
alliances on one hand, and through cooperation in the field 
of domestic security on the other . This contributes to the 
diffusion of norms of securitization in the form counter-
terrorism discourses .
This dynamic is somewhat surprising in the Tunisian case . 
While Saudi Arabia had actively – albeit unsuccessfully – 
supported the Mubarak regime in Egypt during the mass 
uprising, Saudi policy towards Ben Ali’s Tunisia in late 
2010 and early 2011 was characterized by benign neglect . 
Thus, just days before Mubarak’s fall in February 2011, late 
King Abdallah openly took the side of Mubarak, attempted 
to convince the United States not to put further pressure 
on the Egyptian ruler, and promised that the kingdom 
would compensate Egypt should the U .S . cut military 
assistance .3 At the time of Ben Ali’s flight from Tunisia, by 
contrast, the kingdom made it known that, even though it 
played host to the deposed president, Ben Ali was not to 
engage in political activities while being a guest in Saudi 
Arabia .4 In brief, initial Saudi reactions to the uprisings in 
Egypt and Tunisia reflected the strength of ties between 
the kingdom and the two countries . While a history of 
strong Saudi-Egyptian ties meant that the kingdom actively 
intervened on behalf of Mubarak, the relatively weak 
nature of Saudi-Tunisian ties under Ben Ali did not trigger 
a similar response .
This contrast becomes even more pronounced if we look 
at the immediate post-revolutionary period . In Egypt, 
Saudi Arabia and other GCC member states promised 
financial support for the country’s transitional leadership, 
but froze the disbursement of funds upon the election 
of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Muhammad Morsi to the 
presidency . Thus, while the Morsi administration in Egypt 
could only rely on Qatari money flowing into its coffers, 
Saudi payments resumed immediately following the July 
3, 2013 coup (Farouk 2014; Rieger 2014) . What is more, 
even during the period of Muslim Brotherhood rule in 
Egypt, military cooperation between Saudi Arabia and the 
Egyptian Armed Forces was maintained . The – up to that 
time – largest joint Egyptian-Saudi maneuvers (Tabouk 3) 
took place from May 8 to 20 2013, just weeks before the 
3   See Elaph, ‘al-Malik Abdallah talaba Obama bi-l-imtina‘ ‘an 
idhlal Mubarak’ [King Abdallah Asks Obama to Refrain from 
Humiliating Mubarak], 11 February 2011, http://elaph .com/Web/
news/2011/2/630960 .html; New York Times, ‘Allies Press U .S . to Go 
Slow on Egypt,’ 8 February 2011, www .nytimes .com/2011/02/09/world/
middleeast/09diplomacy .html?_r=0 .
4   Al-Arab, `Khashoggi: Al-ra’is Zin Bin `Ali asbah fi al-sa’udiyya 
makfuf al-yad wa la yumkinuhu ‘aml ay shay’,’ [Khashoggi: President Ben 
Ali’s Hands Are Tied in Saudi Arabia and He Cannot Do Anything], 16 
January 2011, http://www .alarab .com/Article/352280; Gulfnews . `No 
Saudi Mediation for Bin Ali,’ . 16 January 2011, http://gulfnews .com/
news/region/tunisia/no-saudi-mediation-for-bin-ali-1 .746966 .
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military intervention in Egypt,5 while the two countries’ air 
forces still held joint exercises on 22 June 2013 (Faisal 10), 
not even a fortnight before the coup .6 Saudi support to the 
Egyptian military-led regime after the coup thus does not 
come as a surprise but rather represents the continuation 
of long-standing Saudi support for the old regime and the 
military elite in Egypt .
Saudi Arabia, along with Kuwait and the United Arab 
Emirates, also reacted swiftly to the overthrow of Egypt’s 
first freely elected president in July 2013 . On July 9, not 
even a week after the coup, the three GCC countries 
pledged a total of 12 billion USD in aid to Egypt, including 
a combination of grants, loans, central bank deposits, and 
preferential access to oil .7 The political message of such 
aid was made blatantly clear when the late King Abdallah 
defended the Egyptian military’s repression of pro-Morsi 
protestors on August 14, 2013 that left more than 1,000 
dead in a single day .8 Speaking two days after the massacre, 
Abdallah accused those “interfering” in Egypt’s internal 
affairs of promoting terrorism .9 Three days later, on 
August 19, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal 
announced that the Kingdom would compensate Egypt for 
potential losses in U .S . aid as a result of the events .10 This 
move effectively weakened the impact of the U .S . decision 
5   See BBC Arabic, ‘‘Tabuk 3’ akbar manawarat masriya sa‘udiya 
mushtarika fi tarikh al-baladein’ [‘Tabruk 3’ the largest joint Egyptian-
Saudi manoeuvers in the history of the countries], 4 May 2013, http://
www .bbc .com/arabic/middleeast/2013/05/130504_egypt_saudi_drill .
shtml .
6   Ashraf Abd al-Hamid, `Ma hiya asbab al-manawara al-‘askariya 
bayna masr wa-l-sa‘udiya’ [What are the reasons for the military 
manoeuvers between Egypt and Saudi Arabia?], al-Arabia, 15 April 
2015 . 
7   Rod Nordland, ‘Saudi Arabia Promises to Aid Egypt’s Regime,’ New 
York Times, 19 August 2013, http://www .nytimes .com/2013/08/20/
world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-vows-to-back-egypts-rulers .
html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 .
8   Amy Holmes, ‘Why Egypt’s military orchestrated a massacre,’ 
Washington Post, Monkey Cage, 22 August 2014, https://www .
washingtonpost .com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/08/22/why-egypts-
military-orchestrated-a-massacre/ .
9   Ellen Knickmeyer, ‘Saudi King Offers Support to Egyptian Military,’ 
Wall Street Journal, 18 August 2013, http://www .wsj .com/articles/SB100
01424127887323423804579020510228645356 .
10   Reuters, ‘Egypt Aid: Saudis Pledge To Fill Gap If U .S ., Europe Cut 
Support,’ 19 August 2013, http://www .huffingtonpost .com/2013/08/19/
saudi-egypt-aid_n_3779953 .html .
to (temporarily) freeze military aid to Egypt and was 
interpreted as an affront to the U .S . position in Egypt .
Recurrent warnings that aid levels could not be maintained 
and political friction between Egypt and Saudi Arabia over 
the conflicts in Libya, Syria, and Yemen notwithstanding, 
Saudi Arabia has maintained high levels of aid to Egypt . As 
of May 2016, the total volume of pledges by Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, and the UAE since the coup amount to some 60 
billion USD, roughly equivalent to a yearly average of 20 
percent of government expenditure . 
Strengthening Ties?
In contrast to Egyptian-Saudi relations, ties between 
the Kingdom and Tunisia had traditionally been weak . 
As Sons and Wiese argue, Saudi policy makers did 
not perceive Tunisia as a central player and were less 
concerned about the influence of Islamist actors in the 
post-2011 context (Sons and Wiese 2015, 54–55) . Despite 
Tunisia’s peripheral position, there are signs of a Saudi-
Tunisian rapprochement, not least in military and security 
cooperation . 
Relations between Tunisia and Saudi Arabia had been 
lukewarm ever since the fall of Ben Ali . The late Saudi King 
Abdullah was concerned by regime change in Tunisia as 
Ben Ali “had served as a strategic ally for Saudi Arabia in 
the fight against terrorism, in securing stability in North 
Africa and in countering Iranian influence in the region” 
(Sons and Wiese 2015, 55) . Saudi fears increased when the 
October 2011 elections were won by Ennahda, especially 
since the Ennahda-led troika government was seen as close 
to Turkey and Qatar, who provided significant financial 
help throughout 2012 and 2013 .11 A sign of this regional 
alignment was when Tunisia cut relations with the Syrian 
government in February 2012 . Moreover, then President 
Moncef Marzouki called on Egypt to release Morsi in 
front of the UN General Assembly in September 2013 
and referred to Egypt’s problematic and undemocratic 
11   Eric Reidy, Tunisia’s new government shifts foreign policy, Al 
Monitor, 24 April 2015 .
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transition, triggering the temporary withdrawal of the 
Egyptian and UAE ambassadors to Tunis .12 However, 
Tunisian foreign policy did not experience a U-turn similar 
to Egyptian foreign policy under Morsi . Tunisia’s attitude 
vis-à-vis Teheran (a red line from the Saudi perspective), 
for example, did not change significantly .
Tunisia’s foreign policy stance toward Saudi Arabia 
softened following the resignation of Ennahda’s Ali 
Larayedh as prime minister, who was succeeded by 
the technocrat Mehdi Jomaa in January 2014 . With 
the October 2014 elections won by Nidaa Tounes, the 
December 2014 Presidential elections won by Nidaa’s Beji 
Caid Essebsi, and the ensuing participation in the new 
government led by Nidaa in February 2015, the policy 
continued to ease . In addition to the change of leadership, 
two other context-specific factors need to be stressed: first, 
Essebsi’s decisive role prioritizing better bilateral relations 
and second, the change in Saudi posture vis-à-vis Islamist 
parties in the region since mid-2015 .13 
Tunisian ties with the Gulf have since increased, as 
exemplified by the participation of Tunisia in Saudi 
Arabia’s 34 state Islamic anti-IS alliance, agreed in 
December 2015 . This came after Tunisia’s announcement 
to participate in the U .S .-led anti-IS coalition in September 
2015 as part of the Essid government’s commitment to 
“fight terrorism and extremism” at home and abroad . 
Relations warmed further with the December 2015 
signing of a Memorandum of Understanding for bilateral 
cooperation for security and defense during President 
Essebsi’s visit to the Kingdom . Afterward, Essebsi 
referred to this strengthening of ties as an inevitable 
development in light of the challenges faced by Riyadh, 
12   Robert Joyce, “Egypt and U .A .E Ambassadors Withdrawn Following 
Marzouki Remarks,” Tunisialive, 30 September 2013, http://www .
tunisia-live .net/2013/09/30/egypt-and-u-a-e-ambassadors-to-tunisia-
withdrawn-following-marzouki-remarks/ .
13   Alain Gresh, Rapprochement à petit pas entre l’Arabie Saoudite et 
les Frères Musulmans, Orient XXI, 29 September 2015 . http://orientxxi .
info/magazine/rapprochement-a-petits-pas-entre-l-arabie-saoudite-et-
les-freres-musulmans,1032
justified by Tunisian Arab identity .14 As part of this 
process, the two sides agreed to a yearly meeting of a 
mixed military commission allowing for more regular 
and structured exchanges of information and training 
in the civil protection field . Additionally, Saudi Arabia 
promised to provide Tunisia 48 F-5a military planes .15 
Less than two weeks after Essebsi’s visit to KSA, Saudi 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Adel El-Gobeir visited Tunisia 
in what was described as just one of several meetings to 
be held between Tunisia and KSA to unify their positions 
toward international issues, especially terrorism, based 
on the reinforcement of their cooperation in the political, 
economic and security fields .16
In February 2016, Tunisia participated in joint military 
training organized by Riyadh . The “Northern Thunder” 
exercise took place at the northeastern borders of Saudi 
Arabia in the Hafr al-Batin military facility home of the 
GCC Peninsula Shield Force, the Gulf ’s rapid response 
unit . The training gathered 150,000 troops from 20 
different Arab countries and was by far the largest 
operation since the liberation of Kuwait in 1991 .17 While 
the stated goal was deterring the Islamic Republic of 
Iran from potentially aggressing Sunni Gulf states, more 
likely the show of force had to do with the desire of 
projecting strength and distracting public opinion from the 
protracted Yemen war . From its vantage point, one has to 
remember that, since the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive 
Plan of Action between Iran and the international 
community, Riyadh has warmed up its attitude vis-à-vis 
Sunni regional players, including Qatar, and including 
leading Brotherhood-related figures . This included 
Ennahda leader Rachid Ghannouchi, who was invited to 
14   Munthir Bildiyafi, “President Essebsi reaffirmed Tunisia’s support 
for Saudi Arabia foreign policy to repel any threat to its stability,” 
AlArabiya .net, 29 January 2016, http://english .alarabiya .net/en/News/
middle-east/2016/01/29/Tunisian-president-We-stand-by-Saudi-and-
GCC-to-repel-any-threat- .html
15   http://aawsat .com/home/article/525261/-نواعتلا-ززعت-مويلا-ةيسنوت-ـ-ةيدوعس-ةمق
يعافدلا-نواعتلل-ةيقافتا-عيقوتو-ينملأا?archive=1&date=12/23/2015 .
16   1 January 2016, http://www .raialyoum .com/?p=367335
17   Bruce Reidel, “Are latest war games just a face-saver for Riyadh?”, 
Al Monitor, 18 February 2016 . http://www .al-monitor .com/pulse/
originals/2016/02/saudi-arabia-military-exercises-goal-iran-isis-yemen .
html
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Saudi Arabia in July 2015, a move that further vindicated 
the lessons Ennahda leaders drew from the Egyptian 
experience .18 
Learning and the Saudi-Tunisian Rapprochement 
The rapprochement could not have happened without 
Tunisia’s main Islamist party, Ennahda, changing its stance 
vis-à-vis the Kingdom . Starting from late 2013 and even 
more so in 2014, Ennahda leaders consciously moderated 
their stance towards Saudi Arabia . In the words of a senior 
Ennahda member of Parliament: “There are no problems 
with Saudi Arabia anymore . Ghannouchi has reassured 
them that we do not aim at exporting the Tunisian model . 
Tunisia wants to become the region’s Switzerland .”19 
Moderating foreign policy alignments, in other words, 
became a strategy for Ennahda, especially in light of the 
2013 scenario in Egypt . Ennahda MPs have often referred 
to the lesson learned from the coup against Morsi not 
only in terms of reasserting a non-majoritarian view of 
democracy, but also in more carefully assessing their 
regional alliances and the changing balance of power .20 
According to a senior Nidaa MP, the rapprochement 
was facilitated by Essebsi: “The coup against Morsi was a 
tournant for Ennahda . But in order to smooth relations 
with Riyadh, given their previous alignment with Qatar, the 
rapprochement was facilitated by Beji Essebsi . As a matter 
of fact, they are more in line with Beji’s foreign policy than 
most of Nidaa party .”21 
One example was the toning down of Ennahda’s 
democratic rhetoric with respect to the Gulf, frequent 
reference to the non-exportability of the Tunisian 
revolution, and the uniqueness and specificity of 
the Tunisian political setting .22 Over time, even the 
initial references to the AKP experience as a model 
demonstrating the compatibility of Islam and democracy 
18   Hussein Ibish, “Saudi Arabia’s New Sunni alliance,” New York 
Times, July 31, 2015 .
19   Interview, Bardo, November 2015 .
20   Interviews, Tunis, February and November 2015 .
21   Phone interview, July 2016 .
22   Interviews, Tunis, February and November 2015 .
have been eclipsed and substituted with references to 
European experiences such as the German CDU or the 
Italian Christian-Democrats, further pointing to the 
European-ness of the Tunisian cultural and political 
referents for Ennahda, watering down the previous axis 
with Turkey . The failed July 2016 coup against Erdogan in 
Turkey has further complicated the position of Ennahda 
and its relations with Turkey . Following the coup attempt, 
Ennahda spokesperson Zied Ladhari immediately 
defended Erdogan, depicting the Turkish president and 
the AKP as ‘brothers’ and declaring the attempted coup 
‘outrageous and dangerous’ . Interestingly, however, this was 
framed within a discourse of defending democracy as rule 
of law, separation between the military and civilian affairs, 
and respect for the ballot box, rather than in terms of 
defending Islamists in power .23 Moreover, having lost a vote 
of confidence, the government in Tunis is undergoing a 
deep reshuffling of cabinet positions, including that of the 
prime minister . Ennahda, which has recovered its position 
as the largest political party after a recent split within 
Nidaa, will likely increase its share in government positions 
and thus improve its visibility . Ennahda will therefore once 
again be in the spotlight and will have to carefully assess its 
foreign policy stances .
Conclusion
While Saudi involvement bankrolling the return of Egypt’s 
security apparatus is well known and documented (Farouk 
2014), Saudi Arabia has played a much more limited role 
in Tunisia, both economically and politically . As we have 
attempted to show, however, there are signs of a Saudi-
Tunisian rapprochement . Taking note of the Egyptian 
scenario, members of Tunisia’s Ennahda party have begun 
to accommodate Saudi interests in their foreign policy 
stance, a dynamic further solidified by the strengthening 
of Tunisia’s secular elites with the 2014 parliamentary 
elections, as well as by cautious Saudi moves towards 
Sunni Islamist actors in the wake of the Iran nuclear deal .
23   Adel Lapti, Tunisia Ennahda’s head condems failed coup in Turkey, 
Anadolu Post, July 25, 2016 . Link: http://aa .com .tr/en/middle-east/
tunisias-ennahda-head-condemns-failed-coup-in-turkey/615556
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While Saudi-Tunisian military and security cooperation 
is in its infancy, it nevertheless represents a significant 
step . Increased Saudi-Tunisian military cooperation, as 
well as closer ties in the field of civil defense and counter-
terrorism, could potentially weaken pressures for reform 
in Tunisia’s security sector, undermining efforts to 
restructure security provision in the country, per U .S . and 
EU demands for better civil-military relations, particularly 
accountability and human rights .
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Spreading sectarianism 
The sectarianization of the Middle East: 
Transnational identity wars and competitive interference
By Raymond Hinnebusch, University of St. Andres
Introduction
Scholars have long recognized the exceptional power of 
identity in the Middle East and the permeability of regional 
states to trans-state identity discourses (Salloukh 2004) . 
Barnett (1993) and Lynch (1999) argued that identity is 
shaped by discourse competition in a trans-state public 
space and, once constructed, it shapes actors’ conceptions 
of their interests and generates norms that constrain 
their conduct . In the regional states system, rival states 
bid for hegemony using trans-state discourses (Kienle 
1990; Hinnebusch 2013); and the main threats against 
which many regimes balance has not been foreign armies 
but subversion challenging their domestic legitimacy in 
the name of norms derived from identity (Gause 2003-
04) . Identity, therefore, matters but what is new today 
is the unprecedented surge of sectarian identity across 
the region . Instead of inclusive Pan-Arab or Pan-Islamic 
identities, rival states and movements now exploit the 
highly divisive sectarian dichotomy between Sunni and 
Shia . 
What explains this rapid diffusion and apparent hegemony 
of sectarian discourse and practices across the region? 
This paper will survey the accumulation of factors behind 
the sectarian surge and argue that it is chiefly the outcome 
of the state failures brought about by the Arab spring: 
first, state failures have greatly intensified power struggles 
within states and across the region in which sectarianism 
has been instrumentalized; and second, such failures have 
greatly intensified pre-existing permeability of states, 
amplifying mechanisms of diffusion, from emulation to 
intervention . 
Explaining Sectarian Diffusion: From Banal 
Sectarianism to Sectarian Bi-Polarization
There are multiple identities in the Middle East, located 
at sub-state (communal minorities, tribes), state and 
trans/supra-state (Pan Arabism, Pan-Islam) levels and the 
dominant identity has changed over time . Sectarianism is 
only one possible identity and is not an undifferentiated 
phenomenon (Haddad 2011) . So what explains its 
increasing hegemony across the region? 
Instrumentalization of Banal Sectarianism
Sectarianism is rooted at the micro-level individual/group . 
This everyday (or banal) sectarianism is an un-politicized 
identity marker in multi-communal societies compatible 
with sectarian co-existence and with broader identities 
(e .g . Arabism) . The first step toward sectarianization is 
its politicization . This may be a function of the increased 
competition for scarce resources accompanying 
modernization, especially in times of rapid population 
growth and increases in the educated unemployed; 
when many resources are state distributed, political 
entrepreneurs are incentivized to use sectarianism to 
mobilize sects in intrastate competition over resources, as 
famously in Lebanon and individuals to use sectarianism 
to gain access to clientele networks . This “instrumental 
sectarianism” has little doctrinal implications or necessary 
incompatibility with sectarian coexistence . 
Sectarianism’s use in authoritarian regime building in 
MENA’s multi-sectarian societies further politicized 
it: patrimonial practices such as reliance on trusted 
sectarians to foster cohesive ruling groups, as in Syria and 
Iraq, was a common practice, but it was also balanced 
by cross-sectarian co-optation of wider social forces, via 
bureaucratic institutions . Many authoritarian regimes, 
therefore, both used and contained sectarianism . However, 
where inclusionary practices eroded, the excluded, feeling 
themselves victims of sectarian discrimination, might well 
embrace a sectarian counter-identity, as was particularly 
the case in Syria and Iraq . But such sectarianization was 
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by no means inevitable or particularly widespread; the 
system seemed self-reproducing and required external 
intervention to set off the destabilization of multi-sectarian 
states . 
Precipitating the Sectarian Struggle: From Global Intrusion 
to the New Arab Cold War
The current sectarianization is a recent phenomenon 
precipitated by the unprecedented intrusion of the U .S . 
global hegemon into the regional power struggle . The 
destruction of the Iraqi state amidst massive violence 
(shock and awe) unleashed Sunni-Shia civil war in Iraq . 
The United States constructed a replacement political 
system that institutionalized sectarianism . This failed state 
provided a congenial space for international jihadists, 
including al-Qaeda, to stir up sectarianism by targeting 
Shia mosques . It also allowed for intense penetration of 
Iraq by Iranian backed Iraqi Shia exiles and by anti-Shia 
jihadists transiting through Syria – an unprecedented 
transnationalization of sectarian conflict . The Iraq conflict 
spilled over in the region by stimulating sectarian discourse 
in the trans-state media . 
Moreover, the empowering of Iranian-linked Iraqi Shia 
movements alarmed the Sunni Gulf powers, which fought 
back by instrumentalizing sectarianism . This resulted in 
what has been called the “New Arab Cold War,” which 
polarized the regional system in the 2000s between two 
rival camps – framed as the pro-Western Moderate Sunni 
bloc (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan) and the Resistance Axis 
(Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, Hamas – fighting over sectarian-
divided Lebanon and Iraq and divided over the Israeli wars 
against Hezbollah and Gaza . In the latter, the resistance 
camp, portraying its rivals as siding with Israel, won the 
war for public opinion . The moderate bloc fought back by 
portraying the issue as Shiite Iran’s interference in the Arab 
world against Sunnis . King Abdullah of Jordan famously 
warned of a “Shia Crescent .” Despite this, sectarianism 
found little resonance on the Arab street where Nasrallah, 
Assad and Ahmadinejad were the most popular regional 
leaders for their resistance to what was still seen as the 
main enemy, Israel (Valbjørn and Bank 2011) . At the elite 
level though, the power struggle came to be perceived in 
sectarian zero-sum terms, destroying the tradition of inter-
Arab compromise under which (since the end of the first 
Arab Cold War) regimes had refrained from attacking the 
others’ vital interests . 
The Arab Uprising: from revolt to civil war and grassroots 
sectarianization: 
The Arab uprising further intensified the struggle 
for power . Once regimes were challenged, they 
instrumentalized sectarianism . In Syria, Iraq and 
Bahrain elites’ use of sectarianism to consolidate their 
support bases provoked counter-sectarianism among 
oppositions . Unlike in the 2000s, this instrumentalization 
of sectarianism found wide resonance in Arab societies for 
several reasons . 
First, civil wars during which unrestrained violence was 
deployed in a zero-sum power struggle, turned fighters on 
both sides to jihadist versions of sectarianism . Jihadism is 
incompatible with sectarian coexistence, because it seeks 
to impose, if necessary by force, its one true interpretation 
of Islam in the public sphere, demonizing those who do 
not comply as infidels, and embracing martyrdom for the 
cause . Unlike an instrumentalist pursuit of material goods, 
which can be compromised by adjusting shares among 
the contenders, public religious visions cannot readily be 
compromised . (Brubaker 2015) . 
Second, as civil wars led to state failure, notably in the 
Levant, the renewed permeability of states borders 
allowed Salafist jihadists to intervene on one side and a 
counter-coalition of Shia led minorities (hilf al-aqalliyyat) 
on the other . There was an unprecedented movement of 
foreign Muslim fighters into disputed states, while militias 
from one country, recruited via long-distance sectarian 
networks, regularly intervened in neighboring countries, 
propelling an unprecedented transnationalization of 
opposing sectarian movements and networks .
Third, the security dilemma pushed all sides to fall back on 
their communal group for protection; this, combined with 
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sectarian cleansing and intensely sectarian discourse in the 
satellite and social media, entrenched sectarianism at the 
grassroots of many Arab societies . 
Competitive Interference and Sectarian Proxy Wars: 
In parallel, the Arab uprising reshuffled the cards in the 
regional power struggle of the 2000s, as state failures 
created vacuums inviting competitive external intervention 
in which rival powers provided arms and financing to 
bring sectarian-affiliated allies to power in uprising states . 
Notably Syria, the linchpin of the resistance axis, became 
an arena of competitive intervention, since all sides 
perceived that the outcome of this “New Struggle for Syria” 
would tilt the regional power balance in favor of one or the 
other of the rival camps (Hinnebusch 2015) . 
Sectarian discourses became the main currency of the 
new identity wars . Sectarianism in its jihadist version is 
a particularly powerful instrument for subverting rival 
regimes, since it combines a sub-state character – the 
existence of grassroots communities within a state into 
which people are born – with the transnational networks 
to mobilize supporters across borders . As the rival regional 
powers backed the most sectarian factions – because 
they were the best fighters – the latter came to enjoy 
greater resources, precipitating a “bandwagoning” of 
more “moderate” factions to the jihadist poles, further 
exacerbating sectarianism . 
States had unequal advantages when playing the new 
sectarian power game . Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, 
with historical identities relatively congruent with their 
borders and commanding the material resources to 
co-opt populations, create large security forces, and 
establish administrative structures over their territory, 
were more capable of making their borders impermeable 
to subversion . Their use of sectarianism in the regional 
struggle strengthened internal support (despite a risk of 
blowback, e .g . when Saudi Arabia’s export of Wahhabism 
helped create a threat to it in the form of ISIS) . Their trans-
state ideological appeal was fostered by superior command 
of satellite media and financial resources, arms transfers 
and territorial safe havens enabling their competitive 
intervention . 
By contrast, the most identity-fragmented states (Syria, 
Iraq, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain) were victims of the new 
power struggle . Sectarianism polarized their populations, 
opposition was framed in sectarian terms and regimes 
relied more on defensive sectarian asabiyyeh (solidarity) . 
Their often-arbitrarily constructed borders, which cut 
across identity groups and generated irredentism, made 
them more permeable to trans-state media, networks and 
movements and – to the extent they experienced state 
failure and were unable to defend their borders – they 
were magnets attracting proxy wars . While they had been 
players when regional rivalry focused on interpretations 
of Arab nationalism, sectarianization knocked them out of 
the game .
 Each intervening power has used sectarianism, but 
strategies differ . Saudi Arabia played a key role in fostering 
Sunni sectarianism, seeking to exploit the demographic 
majority of the Sunni world against Iran by depicting 
the Shia as a heretical minority and Iran’s role as non-
Arab interference in the Arab world . Iran’s Pan-Islamic 
discourse tried to re-frame the issue as Muslim resistance 
against the West and its regional collaborators (i .e . Saudi 
Arabia) . While Saudi Arabia exploited Salafist proxies, 
Iran mobilized trans-national Shia clerical networks . The 
greater divisions within the Sunni world (e .g . secularists vs . 
Islamists, Sufi vs . Salafi, Saudi vs . Qatari, Erdogan’s Turkey 
vs . Sissi’s Egypt) compensated for the Shia’s demographic 
inferiority .
Sectarian Bi-polarization:
 These factors stimulated a powerful cumulative tendency 
to bi-polarize the region between Sunni and Shia 
sectarianism in which the moderate secular center was 
being squeezed out . This was paralleled by radicalization 
within each of the two confessions: within Sunnism, the 
normative balance has shifted away from the previously 
majority non-violent versions that accepted co-existence, 
notably Sufis whose “everyday’ sectarianism” was non-
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political and accommodationist with secular authorities 
and other sects . Sufism suffered from the rise of Salafist 
fundamentalism, which, particularly in failed states such 
as Syria, easily slips into jihadism . At the same time, the 
modernists of the Muslim Brotherhood brand struggled to 
sustain their discourse on a civil state, squeezed between 
regimes’ repression and jihadi mobilization . Within 
Shiism, too, politicized militias, composed of zealots 
ready for martyrdom in defence of Shia shrines and 
neighbourhoods, joined the fighting in Syria and Iraq . This 
has shifted the normative balance within Islam away from 
co-existence and toward takfiri practices (claiming other 
Muslims are apostates or infidels) .  
This is not to say that this bi-polarization is uncontested 
or necessarily permanent . Class, local and tribal identities 
cross-cut sectarianism and civic identities compete 
with it . People have many identities and the embrace of 
sect is a function of the current violent conflicts and its 
instrumentalization in the regional power struggle . 
Conclusion
What began as a variant of the struggle for regional 
hegemony between powers aligned with and against U .S . 
intervention in Iraq, framed in familiar Arab-Islamic terms 
(resistance), has been transformed by the Arab uprising 
into an unprecedented sectarian bi-polarization of the 
regional system . Sectarian bi-polarization in the inter-
state power struggle was paralleled by a shifting normative 
balance away from moderates within both Shia and Sunni 
Islam and by polarizations splitting several identity-
fragmented Arab states apart . 
Why has this sectarian diffusion so swiftly achieved near-
hegemony in the wake of the Arab uprisings? Part of the 
answer is the instrumentalization of sectarianism in the 
intense – even existential – power struggles unleashed 
by the uprising . Inside states, warring patrimonial regime 
remnants and opposition charismatic movements draw 
on the historically successful “Khaldounian” practices to 
build power: in multi-sectarian societies sectarianism is 
understood to work in generating asabiyya, mobilizing 
followers and demonizing enemies . This could be seen 
as authoritarian learning: drawing on extensive past 
repertories widely available in regional memories to address 
new episodes of state formation/deformation . At the 
trans-state level, competition for leadership within sects 
promotes outbidding by radical sectarian entrepreneurs 
that marginalizes moderates, a successful practice then 
widely emulated, which deepens sectarianism . Similarly, 
in regional level power struggles, rival states emulate each 
other in what might be called “tit for tat sectarianism”– 
when one side frames the struggle in sectarian terms, its 
success leads its rivals to similarly respond . 
But what makes this instrumentalization of sectarianism 
– which before the uprising had, outside of Iraq, quite 
limited success – so potent? First, the widespread 
weakening of states has made them much more permeable 
than hitherto to the diffusion of sectarianism by extensive 
previously-existing transnational linkages – discourses 
of preachers, activist networks and armed movements . 
Second, the unprecedented level of competitive 
intervention by rival regional powers in failed states results 
in proxy wars funded and armed by kindred sectarians . 
Third, in failing states civil war violence and security 
dilemmas transforms identities in a sectarian direction at 
the expense of more inclusive ones . Thus, similar structural 
factors (state failure, civil war) combined with trans-state 
penetration, emulation, and intervention make states and 
populations susceptible to unparalleled sectarian diffusion . 
The change of dominant identities used in the regional 
power struggle from supra-state ones to sectarianism 
profoundly impacts the conduct of politics . The previous 
dominance of Arabism contributed to the integration of 
Arabic speaking religious minorities within states and 
enjoined the Arab states to cooperate at the regional level . 
By contrast, the current version of radical sectarianism 
prescribes uncompromising jihad within the Islamic umma 
against heresy . In this Sunni-Shia bi-polarization of the 
region all people and states are pushed to take sides . This 
intensified regional power struggle waged by sectarian 
discourse and proxy wars is plunging the Middle East into 
a new dark age . 
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Transnational Diffusion between Arab Shia Movements
Toby Matthiesen, St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford
Arab Shia communities are all related in multiple ways to 
their local and national contexts . Given their geographical 
dispersion and doctrinal pluralism there are important 
differences, but they have long had strong transnational 
connections as well, particularly to the shrine cities and 
Hawzas (Shia religious schools) in Iraq and Iran . Anti-Shia 
polemics generally overemphasize these transnational 
connections, while Arab Shia leaders often downplay them, 
stating that the national affiliation is the most important 
trait of Arab Shia identity . 
A Transnational Shia Public Sphere
Since 2011, transnational identities amongst Arab Shia 
– and to an extent also between Arab and Persian Shia 
and Afghan and Pakistani Shia – have become more 
important, as the fallouts from the Arab uprisings broke 
down nation states and led to the strengthening of various 
pre-existing transnational identities .1 A key facilitator 
of these strengthened transnational identities, not only 
amongst the Shia, was the unraveling of a broader Arab 
public sphere . The development of distinctive public 
spheres for particular sectarian communities in the Middle 
East is the result of the failure and fracturing of the “New 
Arab Public Sphere,” which had been epitomized by the 
rise of pan-Arab satellite TV channels such as al-Jazeera 
since the 1990s . Crucially, this new Arab Public Sphere 
failed to shape the outcomes of the Arab uprisings towards 
inclusion and political transition, and instead was hijacked 
by competing interest groups, many of which set up 
separate media channels .2 
What I call the Shia public sphere is made up of both 
media outlets and physical places of public debate . 
1   Toby Matthiesen, ‘Transnational Identities after the Arab Uprisings‘ 
in: Luigi Narbone and Martin Lestra (ed .), The Gulf Monarchies 
beyond the Arab spring: changes and challenges (Florence: European 
University Institute, 2015), 32-37 . https://www .academia .edu/18203141/
Transnational_Identities_after_the_Arab_Uprisings
2   http://www .marclynch .com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Lynch_
CurrentHistory .pdf .
Numerous satellite TV stations, social media accounts, 
websites and some newspapers are part of a Shia public 
sphere, as are actual spaces, either discussion forums 
such as diwaniyas in the Gulf states, or mosques, coffee 
houses and other public places in Iraq or the Levant . 
As the only state with Shiism as a state religion, Iran 
plays an important part in the (Arab) Shia public sphere 
that I discuss here, by sponsoring media outlets such as 
the Arabic language TV channels al-Alam and via the 
Lebanese Hezbollah al-Manar channel . Other TV channels 
and countless websites are run by non-state actors, the 
offices of a number of Grand Ayatollahs, political parties or 
sectarian identity entrepreneurs . 
The initial protests across the Arab world were not from 
the beginning viewed through a sectarian lens, and support 
on social media in particular was often cross-sectarian 
and international . The Bahrain uprising and protests 
by Shia Muslims in Eastern Saudi Arabia were greeted 
with particular sympathy in the Shia public sphere . The 
militarization of the Syrian uprising, in particular from 
2012 and 2013 onwards, and the emergence of the Islamic 
State as a distinctively anti-Shia movement in 2014, broke 
down any consensus that was left in the Arab public sphere 
about the Arab uprisings .3 
Syria and the so-called Islamic State became key topics 
in the Shia public sphere, strengthening transnational 
connections amongst Arab Shia communities . The 
language, practice and symbolism of Shia political 
mobilization and militancy that diffused through this 
public sphere were quite distinct from previous Shia 
militant movements . The establishment of militias 
to defend the shrine of Sayyida Zainab and al-Hashd 
al-Shaabi, were the two key examples of this new 
Shia political mobilization . Since 2015, the Saudi-led 
intervention in Yemen became another key topic in 
3   http://rap .sagepub .com/content/1/3/2053168014549091 .full .
pdf+html .
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sectarianized public spheres across the region .4
The Shia Jihad in Syria
Iran and Shia militias’ support of the Baath regime in Syria 
is symbolically legitimized by the defense of the shrine 
of Sayyida Zainab . Sayyida Zainab derives its name from 
Zainab, a granddaughter of the prophet Muhammad and 
daughter of Ali Ibn Abi Talib . Many Shia Muslims believe 
that Zainab is buried in a suburb some six miles to the 
southeast of Syria’s capital Damascus, which has become 
a key target for the armed opposition . With Lebanese 
Hezbollah, the fight for that suburb has drawn a large 
number of Iraqi Shia fighters to Syria . The Iraqi recruits 
usually come from one of the Shia militias that became 
notorious in the civil war and the fight against coalition 
troops in Iraq . There are a plethora of Shia militias in Iraq, 
some with tens of thousands of fighters . While there are 
ideological and personal differences amongst Shia militias 
such as Asaib Ahl al-Haqq, Iraqi Hezbollah, the Badr 
Corps, and Muqtada al-Sadr’s supporters (Mahdi Army), 
they all have quite strong ties to Iran . With the start of the 
Syrian civil war and the rise of anti-Shia militias in Syria 
and Northern Iraq, they started fighting in Syria alongside 
the Assad regime, Iranian Special Forces, Lebanese 
Hezbollah and Afghani and Pakistani Shia militants .5 
These foreign militias have saved Sayyida Zainab, but they 
have also further internationalized the Syrian civil war . By 
choosing to protect a Shia shrine city, they have made a 
sectarian statement, somewhat paradoxically supporting 
their enemies’ claims that this is indeed a holy war between 
Sunni and Shia Muslims . 
Many Gulf Shia support the defense of the shrine, not least 
because some may have spent their summer holidays there 
or have been involved in the transnational networks that 
4   https://www .swp-berlin .org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_
papers/2016RP05_trs_wrf .pdf .
5   See, amongst other sources, “Iraq’s sectarian crisis reignites as Shi’a 
militias execute civilians and remobilize”, Institute for the Study of 
War, June 1, 2013, http://www .understandingwar .org/backgrounder/
iraqs-sectarian-crisis-reignites-shia-militias-execute-civilians-and-
remobilize; Philipp Smyth, The Shiite Jihad in Syria and Its Regional 
Effects (Washington, D .C .: The Washington Institute for Near East 
Policy, February 2015) .
moved through the suburb over the past decades . Some 
of the foreign Shia fighters who travel to Syria might also 
be motivated by strong religious feelings about Zainab, 
or by a sense of religious duty to wage jihad against Sunni 
extremists . Lebanese and Iraqi Shia fighters who have died 
in Syria are lauded at home as “martyrs in the defense of 
the holy shrines of Sayyida Zainab,” even if they were killed 
elsewhere in the conflict .6 The sectarianized narrative of 
the Syrian conflict will have contributed to their decision 
to go to Syria to fight . The Syrian war has thus militarized 
numerous Arab and non-Arab Shia communities, or at the 
least has made the prospect of militarization more feasible, 
nominally under the banner of defending a holy site . This 
will have repercussions for years to come . 
The Islamic State and Shia Mobilization
The establishment of al-Hashd al-Shaabi, or the Popular 
Mobilization Forces (PMF), in 2014 in Iraq, has had 
consequences across the Shia world as well . In response 
to the quick military success of the Islamic State, and the 
threat that it could take over the Shia shrine cities and 
possibly even Baghdad, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani 
issued a fatwa urging all able men to join the PMF .7 The 
establishment of the PMFs and their success and popularity 
in Iraq, has had a particular impact in the Gulf region . The 
sense of urgency with which the PMFs were initially created 
was also felt in the Gulf, when the Islamic State started 
targeting Shia mosques in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait . 
Since 2014, IS claimed responsibility for bombings and 
shootings in several Shia mosques and hussainiyyas in 
Eastern Saudi Arabia, as well as a major bombing in 
Kuwait . Together with an attack on an Ismaili mosque 
in Najran, attacks on Saudi security forces, and attacks 
in Yemen, this was the start of a broader campaign in 
the Arabian Peninsula, whose ultimate goal was to bring 
6   “Syrian war widens Sunni-Shia schism as foreign jihadis join fight 
for shrines”, The Guardian, 4 June 2013, http://www .theguardian .com/
world/2013/jun/04/syria-islamic-sunni-shia-shrines-volunteers .
7   See various articles by Renad Mansour on the topic, including 
“The Popularity of the Hashd in Iraq”, Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, February 1, 2016, http://carnegieendowment .org/
syriaincrisis/?fa=62638 . See also http://nationalinterest .org/feature/
iraqs-shia-militias-arent-bad-you-think-16291 .
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down the Al Saud ruling family and “cleanse” the Arabian 
Peninsula from the “rejectionists,” a pejorative term used to 
describe Shia Muslims .8 
Many Shiites in the Eastern Province felt betrayed and let 
down by the state and became fearful of more attacks .9 
Community leaders called for the establishment of popular 
protection committees to prevent future attacks . While 
obviously different from the armed mass mobilization in 
Iraq, these committees share the same name with the Iraqi 
forces, al-Hashd al-Shaabi, or the Popular Mobilization . 
As in Iraq, senior clerics called for the establishment of 
the committees . In the Saudi case the call was led by Abd 
al-Karim al-Hubayl, the leader of Khat al-Imam, a pro-
Iranian social movement that had been active in the Eastern 
Province since the 1980s, as well as other senior Saudi Shiite 
clerics . Soon thereafter, committees were organized in each 
village and urban quarter, and in specific mosques and 
hussainiyyas, to check people entering places of worship . 
Pictures of men in orange vests from the committees 
stopping and checking cars and monitoring people at 
the entrances of mosques, as well as female patrols at the 
entrances for females, were distributed on a specifically 
established Twitter account .10 In some of the later attacks, 
in particular at the al-Anoud mosque in Dammam in May 
2015, committee members actually prevented the attackers 
from entering the mosque, but died while trying to keep the 
militants out .11 These guards also prevented a bomber from 
entering the al-Umran mosque in Qatif in July 2016, after 
which he blew himself up .12 
8   See, amongst others, Cole Bunzel, The Kingdom and the Caliphate. 
Duel of the Islamic States, Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, February 2016, http://carnegieendowment .org/2016/02/18/
kingdom-and-caliphate-duel-of-islamic-states/iu4w; Toby Matthiesen, 
“Sectarianism after the Saudi mosque bombings,” Washington Post, 
May 29, 2015, http://www .washingtonpost .com/blogs/monkey-cage/
wp/2015/05/29/sectarianism-after-the-saudi-mosque-bombings .
9   http://www .middleeasteye .net/news/saudi-crown-prince-accused-
silence-sectarianism-visit-qatif-82588106 .
10   See https://twitter .com/QatifDirect, in particular throughout 2015 
and early 2016 .
11   See the documentary about the work of the committees and 
the bombing of al-Anoud mosque, https://www .youtube .com/
watch?v=88WwDnd9S-k&feature=youtu .be . 
12   http://english .alarabiya .net/en/views/news/middle-
east/2016/07/12/Omran-Mosque-The-traditional-Shiite-fort-in-Qatif .
html .
While the guards are not armed and at times also work 
with the police, the committees’ actions were seen as an 
implicit threat to the state . Several of those working in the 
Saudi committees were subsequently arrested . On Twitter, 
some started to denounce these committees using the 
hashtag “No to the Shiite Committees in Qatif,” replacing 
shaabi (popular) with shii (Shiite) . But the committees have 
now become a reality on the ground . Similar committees 
have been established in other Shia communities in the 
Gulf to protect mosques, in particular in Bahrain . 
Conclusion
Despite the inclusive aspirations and slogans of the early 
Arab uprisings, transnational identities based on sect have 
strengthened across the Middle East . This has happened 
to a large extent through sectarianized public spheres . 
While the Bahrain uprising initially proved divisive, the 
growing polarization and sectarianization of the Syrian 
conflict and the rise of a distinctively anti-Shia movement, 
the so-called Islamic State, have been the main topics 
that could be used in these sectarianized public spheres 
to further the narrative of an epic rivalry between Sunni 
and Shia Muslims . One example of such diffusion 
through sectarianized public spheres is the spreading 
of a particular form of Shia militancy, the PMFs, across 
Arab Shia communities . Another example of diffusion, or 
franchising, is the so-called Islamic State, which claimed to 
have franchises across the Islamic world and beyond, and 
whose attacks spurred counter-mobilizations amongst the 
Shia . As a result, Arab Shia communities in the Levant, 
Iraq and the Gulf became more connected . A set of 
pan-Shia militant symbols and a discourse on protecting 
Zainab and countering “Daesh” and “Takfiri” movements 
has emerged that resonates strongly across different Shia 
communities . Widely spread through social media and 
Shia satellite channels these narrative diffused across the 
Shia public sphere, which has proven vital to strengthening 
transnational sectarian identities .
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The diffusion of contrapuntal anti-sectarian protests
Bassel Salloukh, Lebanese American University, Beirut
Violent conflicts pitting Sunni against Shiite and vehement 
rhetoric from Syria to the Gulf have led many to view the 
Middle East as inescapably sectarian . Indeed, sectarianism 
has become the dominant narrative and marker of political 
identity not only in Western discourse but also in the 
Arab public sphere . Though the region enjoyed malleable, 
multilayered identities in the past, sectarianism has filled 
the institutional and ideological vacuum since the Arab 
uprisings, and sectarianized geopolitical contests have 
caused a number of states concomitant collapse as a result .
Despite this divisive wave overtaking the Arab world, 
anti-sectarian voices persist . New protest movements 
searching for more inclusive types of political organization 
have sprung up, specifically rejecting the sectarian 
practices imposed from above by elite power sharing 
pacts . Part of a loose heterogeneous global trend, these 
grass roots movements protest the corruption of political 
elite, the failure of the state to deliver on an array of social 
provisions and the lopsided consequences of neoliberal 
economic policies . They express a post-uprisings 
irreversibly and “unprecedentedly mobilized Arab public 
sphere,” despite a ruthless authoritarian restoration . This 
kind of anti-sectarian politics does not fit the current 
narrative, making it all the more important .
The two most striking examples of such protest 
movements began — intriguingly — simultaneously in 
Iraq and Lebanon, in the summer of 2015 . Each built on 
previous popular protests but took them in surprising new 
directions .
Thousands of mainly young Iraqis poured into the squares 
and streets of major Iraqi cities on July 31, 2015 in what 
became a massive popular movement . The protesters 
demanded better state service provisions, holding the 
Green Zone political elite accountable for squandering 
public resources and corrupting the bureaucracy . They also 
demanded the elimination of the sectarian quota system 
on which the post-invasion political order and patronage 
networks are based .
As Wadood Hamad contended in an opinion piece 
in as-Safir newspaper, these protests were shaped by 
two patent characteristics . The predominantly Shiite 
protesters in the southern and central parts of the country 
mobilized independent of both secular and religious 
parties; parliamentarians affiliated with establishment 
political parties were denied access to the crowds . The 
protests were also expressly nonsectarian, as protesters 
intentionally distanced themselves from sectarian or ethnic 
symbols and discourse . However, the protests failed to 
build networks with similar demands in the largely Sunni 
areas and remained localized and contained .
Simultaneously in Beirut, a solid waste management 
crisis triggered demonstrations against corruption of the 
sectarian political elite and the dysfunctional sectarian 
power sharing pact . Attracting a broader base of cross-
sectarian and cross-class supporters than its counterparts 
in Baghdad, it assumed the air of an anti-sectarian 
carnival of national conviviality, with people determined 
to creatively express their national, rather than sectarian, 
affiliations .
The sectarian political elite’s response in Baghdad and 
Beirut to these protests was strikingly similar . They first 
tried to adopt a reformist discourse and contain the 
protests by co-opting some of the organizers . When 
these tactics failed to break the protesters’ autonomy 
and determination, they unleashed state security units 
and their own paralegal forces . Lacking any umbrella 
institutional structure and a menu of priorities, the first 
batch of demonstrations soon fizzled away .
Another wave of expressly anti-sectarian protests exploded 
in Baghdad in February 2016 . Public exasperation with 
the corruption and failed promises of the Green Zone 
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political elite again spilled into the streets as protesters 
demanded far-reaching anti-corruption reforms, 
a new technocratic cabinet and the elimination of 
sectarian quotas . This time, however, the protests were 
instrumentalized by the charismatic maverick Shiite cleric 
Moqtada al-Sadr projecting himself as the champion of 
a national underclass . Nevertheless, the 2016 protests in 
Iraq expressed people’s insistence on mobilizing outside 
sectarian identities . As Zahra Ali notes, the protesters 
“brought new hopeful, creative and inclusive ways of 
being Iraqi in a country traumatized by decades of 
authoritarianism, imperialist military occupation, sectarian 
war and the fragmentation of its territory .” No small feat 
indeed .
In Lebanon, the failure of the 2015 protests led to a 
more focused anti-sectarian and anti-corruption but 
apolitical campaign in the form of the independent grass-
roots movement Beirut Madinati (or “Beirut, my city”) . 
Launched to contest the May 2016 municipal elections in 
the capital, the movement exploded onto the public scene 
and transformed a bland electoral contest into a politically 
existential threat to the country’s sectarian political elite .
Though electoral rules and shenanigans denied Beirut 
Madinati any seats on the new municipal council, its 
experience suggests there is a broad anti- and cross-
sectarian audience fed up with the corruption of the 
postwar sectarian elite and the paralysis of the country’s 
power sharing pact . They may be a silent minority given 
the complex ensemble of institutional, clientelist and 
discursive practices undergirding the political economy 
and ideological hegemony of sectarianism, but they are 
nevertheless waiting to be organized by new movements 
practicing a new kind of inclusive politics .
This underscores the challenges facing political reforms 
in weak state institutions crippled by sectarianized 
geopolitical battles . In Lebanon, grass roots demands have 
collided with a resilient sectarian system sustaining the 
privileges of an increasingly overlapping political economic 
elite . Iraq’s quandary is similar . The prognosis for Iraq by 
Maria Fantappie, senior Iraq analyst at the International 
Crisis Group, resonates aptly in Lebanon: “The system 
cannot generate renewal of the political class — whether 
through elections or legislative changes — nor will the 
political class genuinely try to reform that system .”
Contrapuntal, nonviolent, anti-sectarian protests in 
Iraq and Lebanon suggest that sectarianism is not taken 
for granted by all actors and that there are alternatives 
to the sectarianization of everyday politics across the 
region . Challenging sectarianism operates in piecemeal, 
interrupted and not necessarily linear ways, gradually 
exposing fissures in what may otherwise look like a 
hegemonic sectarian edifice . And although they have 
yet to cause a real redistribution of political power 
that empowers counterfactual nonsectarian or cross-
sectarian groups, these modes of resistance nevertheless 
demystify the sectarian narrative so dominant in the 
post-uprisings Arab public sphere, showing that sectarian 
modes of political mobilization are neither primordial nor 
insurmountable .
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